

JAN-ABR • 2019 • V.12

29



**HISTÓRIA DA  
HISTORIOGRAFIA**

International Journal of Theory and History of Historiography

ISSN • 1983-9928

Revista Eletrônica Quadrimestral



**HISTÓRIA DA  
HISTORIOGRAFIA**

ISSN • 1983-9928

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## CONTATO

Rua do Seminário, s/n - Centro Mariana - MG  
35420-000| Brasil  
<http://www.historiadahistoriografia.com.br>  
historiadahistoriografia@hotmail.com  
Telefone: (31) 3557-9400

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## MISSÃO

*A História da Historiografia* é um periódico interinstitucional patrocinado pelos Programas de Pós-graduação em História da Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto (UFOP) e da Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UNIRIO), coordenada pela Sociedade Brasileira de Teoria e História da Historiografia (SBTHH). Sua publicação se insere no âmbito de grupos e núcleos de pesquisa de Universidades brasileiras e estrangeiras das áreas de teoria da História e história da historiografia. A revista tem como missão a divulgação do conhecimento das áreas de teoria da História, história da historiografia e outras afins no intuito de fomentar o intercâmbio de ideias e resultados de pesquisas entre investigadores dessas áreas correlatas, através da publicação de artigos inéditos que, após o processo de avaliação editorial, sejam considerados relevantes às discussões de tais campos. Além de pesquisas originais, incentiva-se a produção de artigos de debate historiográfico que resenhem criticamente publicações recentes pertinentes aos temas relacionados com as áreas de conhecimento que configuram o escopo da publicação. A linha editorial da HH, desta forma, almeja a constituição de um espaço de livre acesso para o debate acadêmico por meio de publicações relacionadas à área.

## FICHA CATALOGRÁFICA

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História da Historiografia. Ouro Preto - International Journal of Theory and History of Historiography / Edufop, 2019, volume 12, número 29, Jan-Abr, 2019, 280 p.

Quadrimestral ISSN 1983-9928

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# EDITORIAL

EDITORIAL

A *História da Historiografia* (HH) já tem uma história. Dez anos já se passaram desde que começamos esta aventura editorial. Na edição anterior (v. 11, n. 28, set-dez, ano 2018), Flávia Florentino Varella traçou um perfil histórico rigoroso e crítico dessa primeira década da HH. Por meio dele, podemos confirmar algumas suspeitas que nos rondavam, perceber com mais precisão certas dificuldades e descobrir novos desafios que se impõem.

Não cabe, contudo, retomarmos aqui os detalhes coligidos nesse balanço, mas apenas ressaltar alguns dados que sinalizam nossos limites e potencialidades. Por exemplo, se, por um lado, verificamos que 30% de nossas/os autoras/es são vinculados a instituições estrangeiras e que o índice de citação de textos publicados na HH tem aumentado significativamente, indicadores que demonstram nossa crescente inserção no debate nacional e internacional acerca da teoria da história e história da historiografia; por outro, em termos estritamente brasileiros, observamos uma preponderância de autoras/es do sul e sudeste (53%), que ratificam a permanência da histórica desigualdade de incentivos à educação e à pesquisa em nosso país. O mesmo desequilíbrio se verifica no corte de gênero, no qual notamos 38% de mulheres autoras e 62% de homens autores, e de raça, revelada na autodefinição dos editores executivos da revista que apontam que 72% são brancos e 14% são pardos, nem um pesquisador autodeclarado negro.

A HH não é, por conseguinte, um espelho invertido do país e nem está alheia a seus graves problemas e injustiças. Não obstante, à identificação dessas e de outras questões que se refletem em um projeto editorial de um periódico de alto estrato na área de humanidades no Brasil, correspondem, de nossa parte, tentativas para aprofundar um gesto intelectual que nos caracteriza desde os primeiros números da revista: nos repensarmos!

Nesse sentido, a HH vem sendo, redefinida, reconsiderada, em busca de inovações e redimensionamentos que nos levem a intervir com mais qualidade no espaço público e, simplesmente, de continuar existindo diante da crise de financiamento pela

qual passamos. Para tanto, vieram a se somar aos colegas Mateus Pereira e Valdeir Araujo, novos editores executivos: Ana Carolina Barbosa Pereira (Universidade Federal da Bahia); Ewa Domanska (Adam Mickiewicz University em Poznan); Omar Acha (Universidad de Buenos Aires); Temístocles Cezar (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul).

As mudanças no projeto editorial, ainda em curso, propuseram a transferência das seções de resenha e publicação de documentos para o portal da *História da Historiografia Magazine* (<https://hhmagazine.com.br/>), e deixamos de publicar traduções de artigos cujos textos já apareceram em outros idiomas. Propusemos também a criação do artigo-resenha de debate historiográfico, cuja expectativa é estimular e aquecer discussões antigas e contemporâneas do campo.

Além disso, temos buscado ampliar a gama de nossas/os pareceristas, tanto no Brasil quanto no exterior. Essa ampliação, entretanto, não visa apenas uma mera dilatação quantitativa; ao contrário, pretendemos que ela seja um instrumento para aperfeiçoar o complexo diálogo entre autoras/res, pareceristas e editoras/es. Como efeito secundário, não menos relevante, a circulação de ideias que tal alargamento induzido tem o potencial de proporcionar é uma confrontação mais explícita da competição entre o sistema de periódicos, como índice da produção intelectual qualificada, e as coletâneas temáticas ou avulsas de artigos não necessariamente pré-avaliados.

Isto posto, não são poucas nossas pretensões, só comparáveis a nossa vontade de, como grupo organizado, resistir e incentivar o conhecimento histórico. Resistência ao contexto social e politicamente opaco e imprevisível no qual estamos inseridos. Incentivo à criatividade historiográfica, mais livre e menos disciplinada. Talvez, possamos assim passar do “estranhamento do que ocorre hoje”, como diria Michel de Certeau, à sua compreensão.

Os artigos que se seguem foram avaliados sob esta perspectiva. Agradecemos às/aos autoras/res e às/aos pareceristas. Agradecimento especial a Augusto Ramires, que encerrou em janeiro deste ano sua colaboração preciosa como secretário da revista.

História da Historiografia (HH) already has a history. Ten years have passed since we started this editorial enterprise. In the previous edition Flávia Florentino Varella drew a rigorous and critical analysis of this first decade of HH, and from it we can confirm some suspicions, more accurately perceive certain difficulties and discover new challenges.

However, we cannot return to the details gathered in this analysis, but only to highlight some data that indicates our limits and potentialities. On the one hand, we find that 30% of our authors are linked to foreign institutions and that HH citation index has increased significantly, showing a growing insertion in the Brazilian and international debate about theory and history of historiography. On the other hand, in strictly Brazilian terms, we observed that most authors are from the south and southeast regions (53%), confirming the persistence of the historical inequality of incentives to education and research in our country. The same imbalance when considering gender, in which we noticed 38% of female and 62% of male authors, and race: in the self-declaration of members of the executive editorial board since the journal's creation in 2008, 72% reported to be white, 14% mixed race and zero black.

Therefore, HH is not an inverted mirror of the country, nor is indifferent to its severe problems and injustices. Nevertheless, the identification of these and other issues found in a high-profile periodical in the area of humanities in Brazil, corresponds, for our part, to attempts to deepen an intellectual gesture that characterizes us since the first issue: to continuously rethink our project!

In this direction, HH has been redefined in the search for innovations and remodeling that will lead us to intervene with more quality in the public space, and continue to exist in face of the financing crisis currently happening in Brazil. To that end, Ana Carolina Barbosa Pereira (Federal University of Bahia); Ewa Domanska (Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan); Omar Acha (University of Buenos Aires); and Temístocles Cezar (Federal

University of Rio Grande do Sul) came to join Mateus Pereira and Valdeir Araujo (both from Federal University of Ouro Preto) as new executive editors.

The changes in the editorial project – which are still in progress – have moved the short-review and documents sections to the História da Historiografia Magazine (<https://hmagazine.com.br/>). We also stopped publishing translations of articles that have already been published in other languages. Moreover, we proposed the creation of a long-format article focused on historiographical debate to stimulate and warm up old and contemporary discussions in the field.

Furthermore, we have sought to widen the range of our referees, both in Brazil and abroad. This expansion, however, is not merely a quantitative matter. Rather, we want it to be an instrument for perfecting the complex dialogue between authors, reviewers and publishers. Although not less relevant, a side effect of the circulation of ideas that such enlargement may provide is to explicit the competition within the journal, as an index of proficient intellectual output, and a thematic or individual collection of articles, not necessarily double-blind reviewed by peers.

All considered, as an organized group we have ambitious goals, only comparable to our will, to resist and encourage historical knowledge. To resist the opaque and unpredictable context in which we are inserted and encourage historiographical creativity, with freer and less disciplined practices. Perhaps we can move from the “strangeness of what is happening today”, as Michel de Certeau would say, to its understanding.

The following articles have been evaluated from this perspective. We thank the authors, referees and all our staff. We would also like to thank our former secretary Augusto Ramires, for his precious collaboration.



# ARTIGOS

ARTICLES



# Metahistory for (Ro)bots: Historical Knowledge in the Artificial Intelligence Era

Meta-história para robôs (bots): o conhecimento histórico na era da inteligência artificial

Thiago Lima Nicodemo & Oldimar Cardoso

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1588-0683> 

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5614-4535> 

## ABSTRACT

This text offers a theoretical reflection on the effects of the artificial intelligence and digital era on the historian's métier. It is based on a set of experiments involved in the development of a cybernetic historian, dealing with hypotheses such as (ro)bots creating historical narratives and mastering methods of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, as well as suggesting research problems. In other to do so, we present our own technology, in progress of development, and we problematize the steps to create a historian "bot". The term robot is understood as a computer program executing tasks on a largely automated basis, without any relationship with a human user. In turn, tasks are complemented by an artificial intelligence system. This emergent reality raises an urgent debate on ethical issues, such as transparency and digital ethics, and it may also be useful to problematize the future of the historical profession in the contemporary world.

## KEYWORDS

Digital Humanities; Digital History; Theory of History.

## RESUMO

Esse texto oferece uma reflexão teórica sobre os efeitos da inteligência artificial e do universo digital no ofício do historiador. A reflexão é baseada em um conjunto de experimentos relacionados com o desenvolvimento de um "historiador cibernético", lidando com hipóteses tais como, robôs criando narrativas históricas e dominando métodos de análise qualitativa e quantitativa. Para isso, apresentamos nossa tecnologia própria em fase de desenvolvimento, problematizando as etapas para a criação de um "robô" historiador. O termo "robô" (ou "bot") é entendido como um programa computacional que executa tarefas de forma quase inteiramente autônoma, sem qualquer relação com o usuário humano. Por sua vez, estas tarefas são complementadas por um sistema de inteligência artificial. Essa realidade emergente suscita questões urgentes sobre transparência e ética no mundo digital, e pode ser uma poderosa ferramenta para problematizar o futuro da história no mundo contemporâneo.

## PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Humanidades Digitais; História Digital; Teoria da História.

## Post-human narratives

Orson Krennic (Ben Mendelsohn), Director of the Advanced Weapons Research Division of the Imperial Forces enters the space shift and finds his commander, Governor Tarkin (Peter Cushing), standing back, looking through a wide glass window at the final stages of his planet-sized doomsday weapon, the “Death Star.” Still facing back, the Governor expresses his disappointment with the “security breach” on Jedha with a biting voice inflection somewhat resembling a classical horror movie’s butler. As Tarkin turns to face his interlocutor, the audience is surprised to see the same actor from the late 1970s first *Star Wars* saga movie appear on the screen forty years later, with no sign of aging. The spectator feels something is not right in his acting: a slightly robotic movement in his articulation, a somewhat rubbery texture on his face. And, besides, how could an actor that looked around 70 years old in 1977 not be dead in 2016?

Peter Cushing did, in fact, pass away in 1994. His post-mortem role in the *Star Wars* saga movie *Rogue One* was possible thanks to a high-tech computer-generated image overlapping a real actor’s performance (Guy Henry). In essence, such process is based on an overwhelming personal archive: a complete record of all of Cushing’s performances, including his roles as Frankenstein, Sherlock Homes, and Dracula in the 1940s and 1950s. Every facial expression, every voice inflection and body gesture, including a Cushing’s mid-eighties mask plaster lifecast, was used as input for the robot-avatar.

This remarkable technological achievement has raised attention in terms of ethics and legal dilemmas, such as limits and consents for a non-human after-death performance. For example, actress Carrie Fisher (Princess Leia), who appears forty years younger in *Rogue One* thanks to the same technology that enables Cushing’s acting, and passed away as *The last Jedi* (2017) was being produced, apparently had given consent for the use of her image in the follow-up episodes of the *Star Wars* franchise. Another suggestive example is the appearance of the

character Rachel (Sean Young) in *Blade Runner 2049* (2017). A similar technology allows the 58-year-old actress to appear exactly the same as 35 years earlier. The interesting spot in this case is the metafictional or intertextual element, since Rachel herself impersonates a droid seducing her romantic partner in the 1980s *Blade Runner*, now aged Deckard (Harrison Ford). Reality in this case matches fiction, because Young plays what she indeed is: a hi-tech avatar, based on her 35-year-younger self. The issue of personal archives or memory enabled by technology concerns not only sci-fi movie actors, but every ordinary man or woman who produces massive digital information through computers, digital media, photos, video recording, interactions with friends and colleagues, and even texts, all of which might be subject to memory reproduction and eventual impersonation at different levels.

One could thus think of a “biopolitics of memory,” an idea that cannot be taken for granted taking into consideration Foucault’s and Agamben’s writings on the topic. Agamben claims biopolitics as a fundamental concept that stresses the original bond between politics (sovereignty) and the “bare” life. His master metaphor in *Homo Sacer* is based on the linguistic difference in Ancient Greek between the meanings of life: *zoē*, the life proper to all living things, and *bios*, life in interaction, which could be understood as political life in its primordial form (AGAMBEN 1998a). Control over a biological body, even when stripped of its political qualities, such as the figure of the banning or the “Muselmann” (AGAMBEN 1998b, p. 155) (a nazi concentration camp refugee figure described by Primo Levi, in which violence and malnutrition leads to a state of bare life latency), sets the original source of sovereignty within modern States: control over bodies (AGAMBEN 1998b).

Thinking in Agamben terms, the biopolitics of memory implied in Cushing’s after-death performance corresponds to the widening of biopolitical control beyond bodies as well as beyond death; it neutralizes the dichotomy between *zoē*, and *bios* and enables the possibility of a post-human paradigm: the

control over a bare *bios*, a political control over minds, even in the absence of the body. The suggestive idea of a mind with no body being controlled remotely has grown into a ubiquitous futuristic topos within the sci-fi genre that can be defined as “mind uploading” or “whole brain emulation.” Variations on the same theme can be found in series and movies, such as the British production *Black Mirror*. A recent episode, “Black Museum” (2017, Season 4, Episode 6) captures the idea by presenting a collection of crime stories related to “mind uploading” – the transfer of a mind into a device or another being. In the story, the spectator realizes that some of the artifacts collected are the trapped minds of the very people involved in those crimes. In some cases, such as in *Black Mirror*’s “USS Callister” (2017, Season 4, Episode 1), the mind uploading results in a duplicate consciousness, in this case trapped into a sadistic payback role-playing game. In other cases, such as on the pilot for the whole series “Altered Carbon” (2018), man reaches immortality thanks to the shifting of someone’s mind to different bodies through a mini-disc stored in the back of the head.<sup>1</sup>

This text presents a series of experiments dealing with an analogous idea: the possibility of a non-human writing of history, enabled by a computer program and a very detailed input or archive. In short, the historian bot would operate in a somehow similar way to Peter Cushing’s avatar, or any other sci-fi analogy mentioned so far. The development of a computer program capable of processing historical information and producing texts is not the main goal of the project hereby presented nor its possible commercial applications. In other words, we are not hoping that a historian bot will be fully functional anytime soon, but it must be seen as a hypothetical horizon.<sup>2</sup> However, in order to deal with this hypothesis, this text will problematize the concrete steps for a historian bot to be successfully functional, and, at the end of the text we will show a complete flowchart and an item, entitled “The Algorithm”, entirely dedicated to explain the technical steps of the bot. In the course of the analyses we will also refer non-systematically to some of the algorithm key steps. In

*1 - Other examples of recent series are Black Mirror, Season 2, Episode 4, “White Christmas” (2014) and X-Files, Season 11, Episode 2, “This” (2018).*

*2 - We understand both robots and bots as programmable things that execute actions automatically. The term “bot” derived from “robot” just because of the corporeal culturally attributed characteristics of the robots. Our proposition intentionally plays with this meanings. It is also worth pointing out that the research presented in this text not only reflects about technology but is directly involved in the creation and development of new technology. There is no “software” used in these experiments: creating a bot is more complex than using a software, requires writing a complex code in a programming language, which in this case is Python.*

addition, some of the bot steps can help developing effective researching tools for historical research, as shown further. As Manovich, Silveira and others assert, the digital media emerges as a transposition of traditional media and data into computer programming language (MANOVICH 2001, p. 46-47; SILVEIRA 2018, p. 106-108). Digital media is, therefore, a cultural form with a strong claim of objectivity regarding making meaning out of the world (GALLOWAY 2012, p. 54-77). Research tools in digital humanities operates according to this very same logic in transposing traditional data into digital forms associated to a rhetoric of objectivity. This text is inspired by an idea of a possible “metahistory” of the digital research tools that might be useful for the historian’s craft. Of course, it takes this idea from the well-known Hayden White’s book, “Metahistory”, a book moved by the idea of scrutinizing the discourse structures and implicit rules underlying the XIX<sup>th</sup> century European historical imagination.

In both metahistorical cases objectivity as a rhetorical form plays a fundamental role (WHITE 1973, p. 433-434). As Ramsay argues, the frame for investigation should be the “hermeneutical foundations that make such statements seem necessary” instead of “the nature and limits of computation (which is mostly a matter of methodology) and move it toward consideration of the nature of the discourse in which text analysis bids participation” (RAMSAY 2011, p. 8). In any case, the database is a “cultural form” very resisting to interpretation because refuses to project a previous order to the world of meanings (MANOVICH 2001, p. 225). This form deeply contrast with the traditional forms of history and literature understood as “narrative”, because what makes a narrative is the organization of apparently chaotic events in a plot (RICOEUR 1983, cap. 2). Therefore, as Manovich asserts, digital database and narrative are concurrent forms, “natural enemies”. In his own words, “competing for the same territory of human culture, each claims an exclusive right to make meaning out of the world” (MANOVICH 2001, p. 225). In resume, the metahistorical horizon of the XXI<sup>th</sup> century must consider the tension between

narrative and digital databases (as a cultural form) as not only valid but as a fundamental question.

Moreover, in order to substantiate or claim for full transparency from the “historian robot” in its own making as a software that may be used as an educational and learning tool. As the code created for this robot would be written as a reflection of what historical knowledge is and what a historian does, this code is itself understood as a new metahistory, or at least could help provide new grounds for future metahistorical exercises.

### The input: on “hyper-archives”

The crystallization of the “mind uploading” *topos* in recent sci-fi might be understood as a symptom of significant shifting within the genre. Fiction in the last decades of the twentieth-century, such as the book *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968) and the movies *Blade Runner* (1982) and *Terminator* (1984), dealt with the dystopian fear of humans being replaced by robots. Authors were constantly driven by the idea that control over society is lost to androids that eventually identify humanity’s remains as threats or flaws.<sup>3</sup> In sharp contrast, mind uploading narratives rely on the possibility of full control over minds even in the absence of bodies or, turning again to the Agamben-inspired idea, a “biopolitics” of memory. The common element to these narratives is no longer the struggle between man and machine, but the very idea of scraping and storing unlimited personal information. Again, mankind fails and loses control to a cybernetic will, yet there is no embodiment on either side, man or machine, but rather a non-visible threat, underlying our experiences in everyday life, with searches on the web, social media, email, etc. Thus, the main question underlying the “deep” use of artificial intelligence in the new wave of robotics is: how do we define something that we cannot see but has great control over our lives, such as Facebook or Google?

*3 - Although, as Hayles notes, the drama is sustained by a dialectical drive between the human element inside the non-human and vice-versa. See Hayles (1999).*

The “mind uploading” *topos* shows then a displacement of the biopolitical focus from bodies to minds, a reaction to the

sense of ubiquity of control in contemporary society. Most of Agamben's work deals with the opposite possibility, which is the partial or total death of the social and political capabilities of the "animal on the outside," relegating the biological body, "the animal on the inside," to political control (AGAMBEN 1998b, p. 152) Mind uploading deals with the survival of life beyond biological restraints, the body. In his own words, "whether what survives is the human or the inhuman, the animal or the organic, it seems that life bears within itself the dream – or the nightmare – of survival" (AGAMBEN 1998b, p. 155).

What is at stake is no longer the coming of the "terminator" to annihilate humanity, but rather of an invisible algorithm or artificial intelligence that affects our lives very deeply, amplifying a sense of surveillance and lack of privacy. The "mind uploading" *topos* is nothing but a metaphor for this invisible threat, the symbol of an impossible disarticulation of the subject beyond contingency and possibility (AGAMBEN 1998b). Mind uploading *topoi* go even beyond Hayles' definition of post-human as "data made flesh" (quoting Gibson's *Neuromancer*), but in a post-biological direction – essentially, flesh made data (HAYLES 1999, p. 5-6).

Turning back to Cushing's performance as an example, one could argue that what makes his avatar plausible is the mobilization of an overwhelming repository of personal information; on another plane, closer to reality and everyday life, it can be argued that the capabilities of making significant correlations within Google or Facebook, which have contributed so much to raising the feeling that we are no longer in control of our lives, are also made possible for the very same reason. Assuming we are dealing with forms of archiving and storing information, the question raised by this statement is: should archives be re-conceptualized, considering these new social outcomes? The answer to this question can help lead the discipline of history and historians to the frontline of social science research, or at least allow for rethinking some fundamental aspects of its epistemology, since documents and

archives have always been a central foundation of nineteenth and twentieth century historical research (WIMMER 2015).

Traditionally, archives are the physical place where data is accumulated, after a process of collection, conservation, and classification. Every archival system has a “threshold,” a point at which an archive takes physical custody of records. Normally, this threshold is regulated by a “retention schedule,” a set of rules established by the archive to assess what is going to be permanently stored or disposed of (PEARCE-MORSES 2005; SCHELLEMBERG 1996). When a document becomes permanent or historically relevant, it loses its original function (which implies transformation), and that is why the retention schedule is specific to the context where the document flow occurs.<sup>4</sup>

Ricoeur and de Certeau consider the archive to be not only a physical place, but a “social place” as well. In Ricoeur’s words,

the multileveled architecture of the social units that constitute archives calls for an analysis of the act of placing materials in such archives, their archiving, capable of being situated in a chain of verifying operations [...] (RICOUER 2006, p. 167).

*4 - For a brief history of the archive, see Giannachi (2016, p. 1-25).*

There are social protocols underlying the cognitive operations implied in archiving or, expanding this argument in Foucault’s terms, “the general system of the formation and transformation of statements” (FOUCAULT 1972, p. 130).

Technological and communication processes in the contemporary world produce massive quantities of historical data and might be understood as archives in both terms: physical storage and social entity. An archive means at the same time the physical storage and its power of consignment, a set of rules and social protocols that merge into a system of signs and meanings. But the question is: what is a hyper-archive? Is there any differentiation from regular archives, considering the duality in every archive? Hiperarchives can be, as Cohen and Rosenzweig (2011) asserts, far larger, more diverse and more



inclusive than traditional archives. That is because “with new media, the content of the work and the interface are separated. It is therefore possible to create different interfaces to the same material” (MANOVICH 2001, p. 227). The archive is not only the input, but, quoting Manovich, the “center of the creative process in the computer age”. Forgetting is as constitutive of memory as disposal is of an archive. What makes a hyper-archive different from a traditional archive is precisely the loss of agency over forgetting and erasing, which ultimately results in someone or something living in a loop, not being allowed to die. We don’t even need to resort again to Cushing’s after-death performance as a metaphor; just consider the controversy over erasing information on Facebook, Google, etc. Writing about forgetting as a constitutive element of memory, Ricoeur inquires, “could a memory lacking forgetting be the ultimate phantasm, the ultimate figure of this total reflection that we have been combatting in all of the ranges of hermeneutics of the human condition?” (RICOEUR 2006, p. 413). Having in mind the case of Borges’ *Ficciones*, “Funes el memorioso” (BORGES 1988), a man incapable of forgetting anything, Ricoeur defines this question in terms of a feeling, a “presentiment” (“*Ahnung*”), “as we pass through the procession of figures that hide the horizon line.” (RICOEUR 2006, p. 413).

Getting back to Agamben’s biopolitics, the formula “to make live and to let die” is the “insignia of biopower” and it differs itself from the dynamics of the sovereign power in the old territorial State defined by Foucault, summarized by the *formula* “to make die and to let live.” The reflection on contemporary mind uploading narratives leads not “to make die or to make live, but to make survive,” still following Agamben’s definition of twentieth century biopolitics; in his own words, “the decisive activity of biopower in our time consists in the production not of life and death, but rather a mutable and virtually infinite survival.”(AGAMBEN 1998b, p. 55). The basic difference between Agamben’s biopolitics and the implications of mind uploading fictions/hyper-archives is that, in the former, *zoē* and *bios*, the inhuman and the human, are disrupted

through an emphasis on the biological body, whereas in the latter the emphasis relies on the political or social body, through a hypertrophy of data and memory. It can be argued that the hyper-archive gets even closer to the biopower's supreme ambition: "the absolute separation of the living being and the speaking being, *zoē* and *bios*, the inhuman and the human – survival" (AGAMBEN 1998b, p. 156).

Finally, as for the historian robot experiment, it can be stated that what feeds every robot is nothing but a hyper-archive, a digital documentation and/or bibliographical corpus. Thus, the basic principle of a historian robot is in fact data scraping. Our particular experiment is based on simple material scanning, followed by Optical Character Recognition (OCR) application. This procedure corresponds to the fifth step of the historian robot (flowchart box 5). The bot also depends on a careful text preparation of the sources (flowchart box 6) through data treatment by deleting duplicate pages and junkpages (such as advertising and tables of contents), merging portable document format (pdf) files (to combine many articles in just one full edition file), converting these files to .txt format, converting these files' system from Unix to DOS, deleting headers and footers from each page (as they involve repetition of the same words on many pages, which can skew the final word count and all the results), and merging the .txt files to create the corpus of each selected period. Then, the archives to be processed can be seen in the two senses already mentioned: as storage and as power of consignation, a set of rules and social protocols that merge into a system of signs and meanings.

However, such a process could theoretically be applied to any digital book or document database. That is why scanning projects should be pushed further, but bearing in mind that, in the short term, such "archives" could undergo massive robotic assessments. In other words, there is far more room for knowledge to be produced once archives become digital, as we show in the next item.

## Heuristics of the new times

The historian robot idea represents a displacement of the technology originally conceived to trace consumer profiles towards production of historical knowledge. This shifting is done simply by feeding the robot with an archive to be processed. In order to explore the potentialities of these tools for our purposes we must consider the actual reach of artificial intelligence technology beyond tracing consumer profiles. For instance, displacing this original function is analogue to what the consulting company Cambridge Analytica did in 2014, by directly and indirectly collecting personal information from 50 million people through Facebook (RILEY; FRIER; BAKER 2018). Instead of tracing consumer profiles, the company used psychographic modeling techniques to generate political profiles that might have been used to target voters during the United States' 2016 presidential campaign. According to Michael Riley and others, "the firm believed those profiles were better predictors of how voters could be swayed through targeted ads than traditional data on party registration and voting patterns" (RILEY; FRIER; BAKER 2018). It is possible that the same company influenced the Brexit vote in 2016, by identifying masses of voters more susceptible to manipulation.

However, such wide-ranged technologies generally understood as "text mining" could also be a very powerful tool in scientific research if questions are asked considering other types of databases. Text mining tools are able to compute lexical patterns in frequency and distribution of words and performing tasks as grouping and categorization (JOCKERS 2013, p. 24-34). Very recent initiatives, for example, apply a knowledge-graph-based system in the probabilistic search for adequate drugs for cancer treatment (MCCUSKER et al., 2017). Recent experiments on AI conducted by Caliskan et al. (2017) at Princeton University developed a word-embedding method algorithm capable of representing each word in its interactions within a text corpus of 2.2 million unique words (out of 840 billions of tokens) and in 300 semantic dimensions (named WEAT - Word-Embedding

Association Test). The result shows not only that AI devices incorporate human-like biases, such as gender prejudice and others, but also that human prejudicial behavior implicitly conveys ingroup/outgroup identity information through language (CALISKAN et al. 2017).

Raw linguistic evidence, amplified on an unprecedented scale, confirms what we already knew from twentieth century linguistics: firstly, that meaning is defined by use; in other words, that there is a visceral correlation between meanings and speech acts (WHORF 1956), and, ultimately, “that behavior can be driven by cultural history embedded in a term’s historic use” (CALISKAN et al. 2017, p. 185). But the huge difference of scale allows for relevant progress since we can much better assess the intricate system of meanings where a word is embedded. It can be argued that this intricate network of correlations is nothing but an archive. Following Agamben’s reading of Foucault, the archive corresponds precisely to the threshold between meaning and speech, so “the archive is thus the mass of the non-semantic inscribed in every meaningful discourse as a function of its enunciation,” and furthermore, that the archive reduces the subject to a “simple function or an empty position,” (AGAMBEN 1998b, p. 145) and it “is the unsaid or sayable inscribed in everything said by virtue of being enunciated; it is the fragment of memory that is always forgotten in the act of saying ‘I.’” (AGAMBEN 1998b, p. 131).

An engine such as this one works basically by deriving artificial intelligence “by discovering patterns in existing data.” (CALISKAN et al., 2017, p. 183). This can be made for example by topic modeling, a type of statistical modeling for discovering the abstract “topics” that occur in a collection of documents. There is no predictable feature to patterns revealed in processing massive linguist evidence. It is also hard to find a graphical representation of multiple overlapping dimensions, including the modification over time and space. Generally, the idea of “network” is for semantic networks and eventually knowledge graphs (BRACHMAN 1979). Variations of this technology have

been developed since the 1950s and have spread in recent years through commercial and research applications on the web, such as Google's "knowledge graphs" since 2012 (ROUSH 2012). In the experiments discussed in this paper we have used something simpler than topic modeling, which is the counting of the most used words from a corpus under Zipf's Law (ZIPF 1949) and the methodology described by Silva and Silva (2016). This is an empirical law on mathematical statistics, which determine that the frequency of any word in an ordered list is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table. A word is less relevant in a corpus the more advanced is its ranking position, the majority of the words have very low frequencies and play an irrelevant role in it. The decreasing of the relevance of each word on the ordered list is often logarithmic, instead of linear, so the most used words in a corpus are completely relevant to establish its essence.

On the graph below we show an example of semantic network based on a single corpus analyses experiment: all the texts published by the journal *The Public Historian* during its thirty years of existence, from 1978 to 2017.



scrutiny of the nation-state oriented history? In any case, the way of collecting data, displaying this data and interpreting it, totally depends on the on the human eye. The machine, so far, only enhances the capacity of data processing.

Another fundamental steep of the historian robot works by creating a series of semantic networks over pre-determined time frames. Technically, it starts with the lemmatization (the algorithmic process of determining the lemma of a word based on its intended meaning, e.g. by grouping together the inflected forms of a word) of the corpora, which differentiates nouns and verbs written with the same words and divides compound words (flowchart box 7). After that, the words of each corpus are counted and ranked in the file `words.csv`, the nodes formed by these words are identified by one identity number in the file `nodes.csv`, and these identity numbers are used to establish the edges among these words. After this, we proceed to a manual input of stopwords, which are the non-relevant words to the research (such as *the, of, and, be, to, etc.*) (flowchart box 8), the words used in the title of the source (such as the words *public* and *historian* in the case of the journal *The Public Historian*) and in the title of the field research related to the source (like the word *history* in the case of the journal *The Public Historian*). The bot can be loaded with a generic list of stopwords and skip this manual step by automatically filtering the ranking of the most used words using its default list of stopwords, but manual input provides better quality until a specific artificial intelligence (like the Application Programming Interface `spacy.io`) is developed to define the stopwords of each corpus. Then the robot assesses if there still are stopwords among the words on the file `words.csv` (flowchart box 9), which enables the sorting of the most used words in different periods by merging all the semantic networks of each period in one temporal network (flowchart box 10),<sup>5</sup> and the consecutively summing junction which uses the equation  $R = (k \times w) + \ell + M + \mu + \tilde{x} + m + s + \Delta + v + a + \sigma$  to merge the rankings of the most used words in the corpora of different periods (flowchart box 11). For example,

5 - To the concept of temporal network, see: Peixoto e Rosvall (2017) and Li et al. (2017).

such equation could be used to merge the rankings of the most used words in the corpora of five decades, from the 1970s to the 2010s. In general terms, the results could be effectively used to assess popular themes or trends in the historiography of the “Public History” fields. Similar methods could be applied to historical sources or any kind.

Table 1 – The most used words in all editions of the journal *The Public Historian*

	1978-2017	R	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
1 <sup>st</sup>	American	American	historical	historical	American	American	museum
2 <sup>nd</sup>	historical	national	program	state	historical	national	American
3 <sup>rd</sup>	work	work	work	work	national	historical	national
4 <sup>th</sup>	museum	state	university	American	work	work	work
5 <sup>th</sup>	national	historical	state	national	state	state	state
6 <sup>th</sup>	state	museum	research	program	museum	university	park
7 <sup>th</sup>	university	university	study	university	book	site	historical
8 <sup>th</sup>	park	park	policy	Study	university	exhibit	site
9 <sup>th</sup>	book	site	project	Policy	study	park	university
10 <sup>th</sup>	time	time	student	Book	time	Time	community
11 <sup>th</sup>	site	war	department	Research	war	People	project
12 <sup>th</sup>	program	book	national	Record	site	Book	war
13 <sup>th</sup>	war	commu- nity	people	Social	park	War	time
14 <sup>th</sup>	people	people	American	Time	research	Past	people
15 <sup>th</sup>	research	exhibit	preservation	government	program	commu- nity	city
16 <sup>th</sup>	community	past	government	Service	people	Library	past
17 <sup>th</sup>	past	city	city	Local	review	Place	visitor
18 <sup>th</sup>	city	project	time	City	exhibit	City	place
19 <sup>th</sup>	preservation	study	business	Society	past	Visitor	exhibit
20 <sup>th</sup>	local	program	community	community	preserva- tion	Press	story

Some of the already mentioned questions could be complexified and proposed in different angles with the help of the time frames. The point, for the sake of this text argument,



is to imagine the possibility of analyzing almost infinite data, including documents and books, but also human interactions, economy, images in a scale the human eye cannot simply perceive. Thus, the advantage of the use of a robotic-made temporal network in a historical interpretation is comparable to the use of a microscope instead of the naked eye in natural sciences. The robot cannot interpret the sources better than a human historian, but this human historian might do a better work with the help of the robot. So the historian robot is more an exoskeleton than an automaton. It will not replace historians, but perfect their work. Also, this bot can help humans to introduce reproducibility in the humanities. If different historians use the same temporal network as the basis for an analysis, it is easier to establish distortions and biases.

## On Digital Ethics and Learning Tools

In engineering, a black box is a system only accessible in terms of its input, output, and transfer functions, without any knowledge of its internal workings. The main current experiments with artificial intelligence or machine learning using neural networks exclusively, especially generative adversarial networks (GANs), tend to work in this way. Such assertion leads us to formulate a base law of “humanistic” robotics, inspired by Isaac Asimov’s “laws of robotics” (ASIMOV 1950, p. 40). The basic principle is that a historian robot must never be just a black box (Law number 1) in order to work with transparency. A historian robot must openly describe every step it took (Law number 2) and, for the sake of the present research, that is exactly what is done in the appendix (on the algorithm and the Metahistory Flowchart). Finally, to align the first and the second assertion, a historian bot must be able to be run on a personal computer, which makes it accessible to anyone (Law number 3). This basic set of rules may allow robots to be a self-developmental and educational tool.

Neural networks are created to relate data for which there still are no equations, to solve problems for which only the

answer is sufficient and the problem solving process is irrelevant. An example of machine learning based exclusively on neural networks are the walking bots developed by Boston Dynamics (RAIBERT et al. 2008, p. 10822-10825). They learn how to walk without any algorithmic instruction on what to do with their body, legs, or knees. They are just ordered to walk forward and have to learn by themselves how to do this. They fall for generations (and the learning of the previous generation is even transplanted to the next) until they understand how to use their body's resources to move under the effect of Earth's gravity. How they learn to walk is not important to computer engineers, as long as they learn to walk satisfactorily. As they learn by trial and error, their movements are more natural than in former robots taught to walk by lines of code describing precisely each movement.

Although how they learn is not a problem in many cases for robots, this is definitely a problem for humans. Ignoring this fact, many adaptive platforms developed with machine learning for educational purposes work as black boxes (BRUSILOVSKY; PEYLO 2003). The AI system does not care for the reasons and grounds for learning; it just recognizes in a binary way the effectiveness of the process. Computer engineers designing AI systems for education might get better results working with education experts because it would allow for a better understanding of how and why students learn better. The problem is simple: an adaptive platform which is a complete black box, which does not know why students learn better in the way they are taught, is not created to help teachers, but to replace them. Only experts can understand why it is a problem to totally replace teachers (or historians, in our case) with an artificial intelligence; computer engineers cannot. If we historians are out of this research, the writer bots and specifically the historian bots will be developed in the same way the educational adaptive platforms, without us and to replace us. As Annette Vee asserts, "treating coding literacy as a real thing allows us to anticipate this time and prepare for it with better and more inclusive educational approaches" (VEE 2017, p. 760).

Fighting the full black-box logic on historian bots is not (at least not only) a case of historians or educational experts corporatism. This is a political combat related to machine bias and to the replacement of moral (human) authority by (bot) mathematical authority. We understand that the moral authority eventually implicated in historical writing and scholarship should also be questioned. Sometimes historians' work is also a black box so the reader cannot understand exactly how certain inputs gave rise to their outputs, what are the sources, how theory and methods led to heuristics (how the sources were analyzed) and how this analysis implied the narrative (LATOUR 1999).

The issue of neutrality and objectivity is one of the fundamentals of historical scholarship. Many historical manuals beginning with Droysen's *Historik* (1854), claim that the "critique" of the sources is a fundamental step to avoid relying on the authority of texts by tradition (#33); the "chaos" of "simultaneous opinions, news, rumors" (#34); this is only the superficial origin of the historical sources. The historian must actively access biases in historical documents that make them part of their own time and space, and by doing so, as Ernst Bernheim's *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, by 1900, producing "self-distanciation", recognizing, as Herman Paul (2011) asserts "otherness of the past".

Massive quantitative data appears in its chaotic organization in a first regard as "independent of interpretation", nonetheless as Moretti asserts at the same time "they often demand an interpretation that transcends the quantitative realm" and, "most radically", "we see them *falsify* existing theoretical explanations" (MORETTI 2005, p. 30). This complex layers points to the underlying "assumptions about information, texts and people are "embedded in the software programs we compose" and that is why "the scrutiny of computational procedures can help us to understand the affordances and actions of the various programs on which we now depend" (VEE 2017, p. 760).

So taking into consideration the history of historical scholarship itself, we acknowledge that new hopes of

transparency in AI are directly related to the urge of documental and algorithmic critique, with the need of qualitatively situated sources and their own methods historically and socially. Applying AI to historical learning could then lead to multiple “bias catcher” robots using the available knowledge of the concepts of “eurocentrism”, following Chakrabarty (2000) e Young et al (2004) definitions, for instance.

These experiments could not only be a powerful learning tool, but also help enable new professional activities for historians based on what we have been doing at least in the last 200 years in terms of historical theory: discussing production of knowledge through analysis of sources, with particular attention to the historical biases of social groups in time frames. As Greenwald (2017) argues, technology such as WEAT could be used as a tool to “diagnose” biases in any type of media, or to associate different biases to certain social groups.<sup>6</sup>

## The Algorithm

*6 - See also Noble (2018).*

In order to substantiate the laws defined in the previous section and to present an example of robotic-metahistorical reflection, we will describe the flowchart of the historian bot developed by the company run by one of this paper’s authors. The flowchart at the end summarizes all the necessary systems to perform from the treatment of the sources to the writing of the historical narrative. Each paragraph below is related to one of the boxes used in the flowchart, numbered from 1 to 19.

The starting step of the historianbot.org (flowchart box 1) is to collect the sources, by scanning printed books with some human help or by scraping data alone on the internet. The easiest, cheapest, and more effective way to scan a book, with better results on optical character recognition (OCR), is to shear its spines and scan it to a portable document format (pdf) file as single sheets. We can rebind the book after this process and make it brand new without any loss or throw it away as recycled paper. There are some cheap scanners that

could get the full text of a book by optical character recognition (OCR) just after scanning the printed pages. All historians can have such a scanner at home, without the need for expensive scanners which could only be bought by institutions. This is very important for free research. The only human work to scan a book is to shear its spines and insert at most 100 pages at a time into the scanner. The scanner can automatically collect these 100 pages one by one and create a portable document format (pdf) file with the full text as metadata supplied by its own optical character recognition (OCR) software for many languages. It may seem counterintuitive, but if the sources are already digital, the work can be harder than with printed sources. The first problem with obtaining digital sources is to scrape them from the internet. Many journals, books, or documents are not easily accessible. They can be read by humans, page by page, but it is commonly difficult to download the whole data, which is necessary for historian bots. They need all files on the drive to manage them – it is not possible to just read pages on a browser like a human. As many scholarly platforms have protection against bots, which is strange and symptomatic, data scraping requires the use of some application programming interfaces (APIs) to bypass these protections on the platforms where the sources are stored. The most common example of protection subject to bypassing by using APIs are the Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA). Some paid APIs are able to convert to text the image file of the CAPTCHA and to write this text in the expected field, simulating human action and enabling the download by the historian bot. For example, the full text of the 40 years of the journal *The Public Historian* was downloaded by historianbot.org in three hours; a human will need at least a week doing just this for many hours a day to complete the same task. Moreover, while a human bored with this task would probably leave some files behind, bots do not. After bypassing the protection, the second problem of the historian bot is to deal with digital files with lousy optical character recognition (OCR) because they were made a long time ago, when this technology was first out. So historianbot.

org is able to delete the old OCR and to generate it again with better technology. The margin of error of an old OCR, as we found on the journal *The Public Historian* from 1978 to 2000, is more than 30% (which completely undermines the analysis work of the bot). However, historianbot.org can reduce it to less than 1% by deleting and redoing the optical character recognition (OCR). In addition to text, the bot can also sort and rank pictures and videos if this is relevant to the research.

The second step of historianbot.org (flowchart box 2) is to calculate the margin of error of the optical character recognition (OCR) used to digitize the sources. The historian bot uses a spell-checking tool to know the margin of error of the digitalization of the sources by counting how many words are detected as wrong by the spell-checking tool and comparing this quantity of words with the amount of words in the whole text. If the margin of error is less than 1%, the data is sent to flowchart box 6, "Preparation: Data treatment." If the margin of error is more than 1%, the data is sent to flowchart box 3, "Or."

The third step of historianbot.org (flowchart box 3) is an or function which separates scanned sources, sent to flowchart box 4, "Manual operation: Redo scanning," from scraped sources, sent to flowchart box 5, "Predefined sources: Redo OCR."

The fourth step (flowchart box 4) is the manual operation to redo the scanning of printed sources with a margin of error superior to 1%. Historianbot.org cannot do anything if the scanning of a printed source is badly done and this is the only manual operation of this flowchart that cannot be replaced by an automatic one.

The fifth step (flowchart box 5) is the predefined process to redo the optical character recognition (OCR) if a portable document format (pdf) file source presents a margin of error greater than 1%. In this case, historianbot.org can automatically correct the problem by deleting the old OCR and by making a new one.

The sixth step (flowchart box 6) is the preparation of the

sources through data treatment by deleting duplicate pages and junkpages (such as advertising and tables of contents), merging portable document format (pdf) files (to combine many articles in just one full edition file), converting these files to .txt format, converting these files' system from Unix to DOS, by deleting headers and footers from each page (the repetition of the same words on many pages can skew the final word count and all the results), and finally merging .txt files to create the corpora of each selected period.

The seventh step (flowchart box 7) is the predefined process to create one semantic network for each period of time. This starts with the lemmatization of the corpora, which involves differentiating nouns and verbs written with the same words and dividing compound words. After that, the words of each corpus are counted and ranked in the file `words.csv`, the nodes formed by these words are identified by one identity number in the file `nodes.csv`, and these identity numbers are used to establish the edges among words.

The eighth step (flowchart box 8) is the manual input of the stopwords, which are the non-relevant words to the research (such as *the*, *of*, *and*, *be*, *to*, etc.), the words used in the title of the source (such as *public* and *historian* in the case of the journal *The Public Historian*) and in the title of the field research related to the source (such as the word *history* in the case of the journal *The Public Historian*). The bot can be loaded with a generic list of stopwords and skip this manual step by automatically filtering the ranking of the most used words with its default list of stopwords, but manual input provides better quality until a specific artificial intelligence is developed to define what are the stopwords of each corpus.

The ninth step (flowchart box 9) is to assess if there are still stopwords among the words in the file `words.csv`. If so, the list of words is sent back in a loop to flowchart box 7, "Predefined process: Create semantic networks;" if not, it is sent to flowchart box 10, Sort: Merge temporal network."

The tenth step (flowchart box 10) is the sorting of the most used words in different periods by merging all semantic networks of each period into one temporal network.

The eleventh step (flowchart box 11) is a summing junction which uses the equation  $R = (k \times w) + \ell + M + \mu + \tilde{x} + m + s + \Delta + v + a + \sigma$  to merge the rankings of the most used words in the corpora of different periods. For example, if the position of the same word in the rankings of the 20 most used words in the corpora during five periods is 14<sup>th</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 1<sup>st</sup>, 1<sup>st</sup>, and 2<sup>nd</sup>, the relative numbers to identify these positions are inverted to 7, 17, 20, 20, and 19. So the variables will assume the following values:

$R =$  position of the word in the temporal ranking = 300.02  
 = 1<sup>st</sup>;

$k =$  number of variables except  $k$  and  $w = 10$ ;

$w =$  weighted average =  $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n i \cdot x_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n i} = (7 \times 1 + 17 \times 2 + 20 \times 3 + 20 \times 4 + 19 \times 5) / (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5) = 18.4$ ;

$\sum_{i=1}^n i \leftrightarrow \frac{n(n+1)}{2} = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5$ ;

$\ell =$  last position = 19;

$M =$  maximum position = 20;

$\mu =$  population mean =  $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i = (7 + 17 + 20 + 20 + 19) / 5 = 16.6$ ;

$\tilde{x} =$  median = ordered positions: (7, 17, 19, 20, 20) = 19;



$m$  = minimum position = 7;

$s$  = swing = if  $m$  appears before  $M$ , then  $s = M - m$ ,  
otherwise,  $s = m - M = 20 - 7 = 13$ ;

$\Delta$  = delta =  $l$  – first position =  $19 - 7 = 12$ ;

$v$  = speed =  $\Delta / (n - 1) = 12 / 4 = 3$ ;

$a$  = acceleration =  $(2 \times v) / (n - 1) = (2 \times \Delta) / (n - 1)^2 = 6 / 4$   
 $= 24 / 16 = 1.5$ ;

$$\sigma = \text{population standard deviation} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \mu)^2} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{5} [(7 - 16.6)^2 + (17 - 16.6)^2 + (20 - 16.6)^2 + (20 - 16.6)^2 + (19 - 16.6)^2]} = 4.92.$$

The twelfth step of the historian bot (flowchart box 12) is the predefined process of proposing historical problems. The organization [historianbot.org](http://historianbot.org) has worked so far with five ordinary directive algorithms which analyze five parameters of the temporal network to write questions in English proposing problems to the sources. These parameters are:

1. the expressive rise of a word in the rankings of the most used words in the corpora through certain periods;
2. the expressive fall of a word in the same context;
3. the stability of (a) word(s) in the initial positions of the rankings of the most used words during all the periods;
4. the sudden rise of (a) word(s) highly ranked in the final periods without appearing in the initial periods;
5. the sudden appearance of (a) word(s) only in the final periods.


For example, the bot can formulate the following questions

to the data on Table 1 above:

1. Expressive rise: How do we explain the rise of the words *American* and *national* in the rankings of the most used words?
2. Expressive fall: None.
3. Stability: Why are the words *historical*, *work*, *university*, and *state* stable among the first half of the most used words?
4. Sudden rise: How do we explain the sudden rise of the word "museum"?
5. Sudden appearance: How to explain the sudden appearance of the word(s) *park*, *site*, *war*, *past*, and *exhibit*?

As an example of the use of this equation to merge the rankings of the most used words in the corpora of five periods, we can see on the table below the ranking of the most used words in the single corpus of all editions of the journal *The Public Historian* from 1978 to 2017 (column **1978-2017**) compared to the temporal ranking organized by this equation (column **R**) and to the five rankings of the most used words in the same journal organized by decade (columns **1970s** to **2010s**).

Graphic II – Representation of questions 1 and 3



The thirteenth step of the historian robot (flowchart box 13) is a process of writing a text to answer the questions proposed in step 12, “Predefined process: Propose historical problems” under an ordinary directive algorithm. This writing algorithm can write a text word by word using four main parameters: 1. the edges among words in quotes in the questions proposed in step 12, “Predefined process: Propose historical problems”; 2. the semantic network of the full sources; 3. the semantic network of the literature; 4. the semantic network of the author’s complete works. With these four parameters, the bot is able to establish the probability of the chain of words in a text answering each question proposed on step 12, “Predefined process: Propose historical problems.” This text is for sure still an imperfect creation, worse in style than a human research report, and demands a hard human edition.

The last six steps of the historian bot (flowchart box 14 to 19) are yet in development and are related to the creation of the historical narrative itself. A Human edition (flowchart box 14) is necessary after the Writing algorithm (flowchart box 13) to validate the narrative created by the bot based on the semantic networks. A Narrative assessment (flowchart box 15) after this Human edition decides if the narrative is ready. If it is not ready, it goes to a Neural network (flowchart box 16) and

it comes back to the Writing algorithm (flowchart box 13) to be improved. In this case, all the change decisions of the neural network are registered in a public database to provide Algorithm transparency (flowchart box 17). If the narrative is ready, it goes to the terminator as Historical narrative (flowchart box 18) and it is stored in a database (flowchart box 19) to be used in the future as part of the author's complete works to contribute to the definition of his/her text style.

## Will Robots Replace Historians? Some final remarks

Just like the case of Peter Cushing's post-mortem performance, a hypothetical virtual historian could be brought back to life based on his personal hyper-archive as a source (not only personal papers, but every writing), through a mere historian's avatar. Cushing shaped his performance on his individual skills, historical circumstances, and interactions with the director and other actors. In other words, there was a unique artistic quality implied in his craft, which is lost when he becomes a "robot." The same analogy applies to a hypothetical historical robot, since it will be based on emulation and repetition of patterns. A research "methodology" (or school of thought) emulator is also very possible in the near future not only for history, but for any humanities field in general. There are already several ongoing experiments in composing music, such as the *Iamus*, at the University of Malaga<sup>7</sup> (DIAZ-JEREZ 2011), the *Aiva* (Artificial Intelligence Virtual Artist),<sup>8</sup> or the case of Pindar Van Arman's *Cloudpainter* robot, among many others.<sup>9</sup>

7 - See <http://melomics.com>.

8 - See <http://www.aiva.ai>

9 - See <http://www.cloudpainter.com>

In general, textbooks are written based on a summary of previously developed historical scholarship. Though there is room for innovation, it is oriented towards new methods of learning; in other words, on how information is displayed. For this reason, a textbook robot is very likely to be available in the short term. At least as far as the Brazilian context is concerned, textbooks are written by teams comprised of several specialists. The jobs of authors or content producers may be in jeopardy, and there will be space for a general content "curator."

Incarnating a historical method or a certain historian's style could be a very effective learning tool to help students formulate problems and enable new possibilities of working with historical sources. Moreover, the "historian robot" itself could be a heuristic tool to learn history in the digital era. Its data processing power could also be established to test old historical hypotheses and affirmations, as well as to improve existing methods in quantitative and qualitative assessments. In general terms, professional historians are losing space as agents in the production and circulation of historical knowledge in contemporary society. Digital humanities should therefore urgently be included as a discipline in historical training – however, it is worth discussing its specific conditions and above all the question: should we be turned into computer programmers?

Traditional historical training can be very useful in the Artificial Intelligence reality. We have suggested some paths, but it must also be acknowledged that experiments should be multiplied so we could understand much better these potential professional activities coming up in the near future, such as source critique robots, or "stereotype catchers." False information, diversion, "fake news" are massively replicated in social media on an increasing scale. The case of AI influencing Brexit and the US 2016 elections was particularly symbolic not only because the mass of information collected through social media enabled the tracing of behavior profiles, but particularly because, mostly, these algorithms led to locating people more susceptible to "fake news" so their opinions could be more easily manipulated.<sup>10</sup> In other words, source critique, enabled on an unprecedented scale by AI and associated with an idea of transparency, could be a powerful tool to save whatever is left from democracy in the near future. That is one of the reasons a robot such as the historian robot must be able to run on a personal computer, must be accessed from poor or underdeveloped countries as well as open to the general public. Moreover, a historian bot must describe openly every step it took also because everyone can be able to contest its conclusions. Not only must the code used to interpret the sources be open

<sup>10</sup> - See Hersh (2015).

to everyone, but also the full sources and bibliography used by the bot (CARDOSO 2012). This claim for transparency is strictly connected with two fundamental elements, one is the openness of the sources and codes (that the “nonprofit mission of online historical archives generally produces even higher rates of honesty” (ROSENZWEIG 2011, p. 145), and secondly with a postcolonial or peripheral horizon which fights for more equality not only for the access of digital resources but also for agency in the creation and reproduction of this same resources. Initiatives such as the “Mapping Digital Humanities in India” have shown that decentralization and empowerment in the practice of humanities brings several significant changes “particularly with respect to traditional methods of pedagogy and scholarship” (SNEHA 2016, p. 3-4).


Finally, this research has also shown that digital knowledge, including libraries and historical archives, is the substantial input for post-human production of knowledge. We must know and discuss more about possible AI’s applications to digital libraries and archives. Non-human massive robotic assessments should be included in the agenda of every digitalization project. Moreover, the private monopoly of digital hyper-archives could seriously jeopardize the development of independent science (and historical knowledge) in the short or medium term. That issue raises the importance of the creation of national and global public libraries, such as the point raised in several occasions by the North-American historian Robert Darnton (2010).

Since the 1950s, cybernetics represented a threat to jobs, human ethics, and intelligence. The fact is that robots did not create their own civilization and tried to exterminate humanity as we have seen so many times in science-fiction. The real problem concerning robots – as we have learned from the WEAT (Word-Embedding Association Test) – is that robots effectively learn from humans, even unconscious prejudices and biases. Moreover, AI definitively leads everything to an unprecedented scale, including human issues such as inequality and wealth concentration, monopolies of all sorts including

knowledge, vigilance, arms races and, above all, stupidity. But it also enables some new possibilities in which historical training can still definitely contribute.

Graphic III

**Metahistory as flowchart**



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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

### Thiago Lima Nicodemo

tnicodem@unicamp.br  
Professor de Teoria da História  
Universidade Estadual de Campinas - Brasil

### Oldimar Cardoso

oldimar@gmail.com  
Pesquisador no Laboratório em Rede de Humanidades Digitais  
Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia  
Brasil

Acknowledgments: Cynthia L. Z. DeRoma, Edson Armando Silva, Marcela Guimarães Silva, Marco Costa, Pedro Telles da Silveira, Ruhama Sabião, CAPES and Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung.

RECEIVED IN: 11/JAN./2019 | APPROVED IN: 17/MAR./2019

## ERRATA

*Corrigendum* published on April 28, 2019.

1. Both authors contributed equally to this work.
2. The property of the algorithm used to obtain the data of this article belongs to Oldimar Cardoso.

# Do Theorists of History Have a Theory of History? Reflections on a Non-Discipline

## Os teóricos da História possuem uma Teoria da História? Reflexões sobre uma não disciplina

**Zoltán Boldizsár Simon**

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8763-7415> 

### ABSTRACT

This brief article is a discussion-starter on the question of the role and use of theories and philosophies of history. In the last few decades, theories of history typically intended to transform the practice of historical studies through a straightforward application of their insights. Contrary to this, I argue that they either bring about particular historiographical innovations in terms of methodology but leave the entirety of historical studies intact or change the way we think about the entirety of historical studies merely by describing and explaining it in fresh and novel ways, without the need (and possibility) of application. In the former case, theories appear as internal to historical studies. In the latter case, they appear as theories about history, and such theories are no longer limited to study history understood as historical writing. In reflecting on the historical condition of the ever-changing world, they foster a more fruitful cooperative relationship with the discipline of history. Discussing the scope and use of such theories of history is inevitable today when a younger generation sets out to theorize history against the backdrop of the experiential horizon of their own times.

### KEYWORDS

Theory of History; Philosophy of History, Historiography.

### RESUMO

Este breve artigo faz uma discussão inicial sobre o papel e o uso de teorias e filosofias da história. Nas últimas décadas, as teorias da história em geral pretendiam transformar a prática dos estudos históricos por meio de uma aplicação direta de seus insights. Em vez disso, argumento que essas teorias ou trazem inovações historiográficas particulares em termos de metodologia, mas deixam a totalidade dos estudos históricos intactos, ou transformam a maneira como nós pensamos sobre a totalidade dos estudos históricos apenas descrevendo e explicando-os através de formas novas e inovadoras, sem a necessidade (e possibilidade) de aplicação. No primeiro caso, as teorias parecem internas aos estudos históricos. No último, elas parecem como teorias sobre a história, e tais teorias não estão mais limitadas a estudar a história entendida como escrita da história. Ao refletir sobre a condição histórica do mundo em constante mudança, elas promovem uma relação cooperativa mais frutífera com a disciplina da história. Discutir o escopo e o uso de tais teorias da história é inevitável hoje, quando uma geração mais jovem se propõe a teorizar a história contra o pano de fundo do horizonte experiential de seus próprios tempos.

### PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Teoria da História; Filosofia da História; Historiografia.

Are you fascinated by questions of historical knowledge? Are you engaged in mapping the narrative strategies of history? Or do you rather ask yourself lately how the Anthropocene and visions of a posthuman future might transform whatever we think history is? Perhaps you find it more important to explore the ways in which the category of gender pervades historical practice. Or maybe you just give a pause to questions concerning historical studies and venture into theorizing something like a historical process. Perhaps you are fascinated by discourses of memory and trauma and by the question of how they relate to history. Or do you have a methodological proposal instead? Do you theorize global history, environmental history, or postcolonial history? Are you a conceptual historian? Do you plan to announce a “turn” in historical studies or to contribute to one? Maybe you did that already.

If you are and if you do or did, then most likely you think of yourself the same way as most likely your colleagues think of you, namely, as someone being engaged in what is commonly called historical theory. Or theory of history. Or philosophy of history. Or, all this taken together: the theory and philosophy of history. This is the intellectual activity I am usually engaged in too, and this is the activity that puzzles me a lot. Not only when I actually pursue it, but also when I try to explain what it is what I actually do while pursuing it in the first decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The difficulties begin right away with naming the activity itself as a field of study. The three most popular alternatives are, as indicated above, historical theory, theory of history, and philosophy of history. Yet it would be mistaken to argue that these three terms are equivalent in their current usage. They seem to overlap in many ways, but they also differ in many others, most apparently regarding their scope in terms of inclusivity and exclusivity. In reviewing the options, Herman Paul opts for “historical theory” in his introductory book for undergraduate students precisely for inclusiveness reasons (PAUL 2015). In Paul’s view, the inclusivity largely stems from the possibility to overcome a view of “philosophy of history” that

sharply distinguishes between its “speculative” and “critical” (WALSH 1960) or “substantive” and “analytical” versions (DANTO 1985). And Paul, I think, makes a call that suits the purpose of inclusivity on multiple levels. For the distinctions were introduced by analytic philosophers in the postwar decades with the intention to legitimize a study of historical knowledge and delegitimize speculating about anything like a historical process. They are not merely about what constitutes “proper” philosophy, but also about what is the “proper” sense of the word history. Whereas old speculative and substantive philosophies of history were engaged in mapping history understood as the unitary course of human affairs, a legitimate critical or analytical philosophy of history would study history understood as historical studies (or, in a wider sense, any practices that claim to produce historical knowledge, including old philosophies of history). Overcoming the distinction by “historical theory” would then imply at least a renegotiation of the relationship between the two senses of the word “history”.

Yet things are a bit more complicated than this. For what seems to be a desirable term for Paul because of its integrative potential might look desirable for others precisely because of its potential for exclusivity. The latter potentiality is what informs Nancy Partner’s take on the issue as the co-editor of *The SAGE Handbook of Historical Theory*. Partner distinguishes between “philosophy of history” and “theory” considering the different senses of history, claiming that whereas the former deals with the historical process, the restricted sense of “historical theory” should concern only matters of the discipline of history (PARTNER 2013, p. 2). She thereby posits a divide not only between the different senses of history, but also between “philosophy” and “theory” (although the distinction suspiciously resembles the distinction of analytic philosophers, with “theory” standing for the legitimate and “philosophy” standing for the illegitimate).

The situation arising out of Partner’s and Paul’s stances is rather uncomfortable. By mentioning only two different takes

on a single term – “historical theory” – multiple divisions already come to light: between different understandings of “philosophy of history”, between different senses of “history” as historical studies or as the course of human affairs, between “philosophy” and “theory”. Reviewing even more variations and eventually solving the naming problem, however, is not the purpose of this essay (see SIMON; KUUKKANEN 2015). Instead, on the following pages I will refer to a field of study in the most inclusive terms. I will refer to it as the theory and philosophy of history that somehow encompasses all the different understandings of “theory”, “philosophy”, and “history”, and I will explain what I think this field of study already is. Not because I wish to reveal the true nature of the theory and philosophy of history, but because it seems to me that the time is ripe for a discussion about what theories and philosophies of history may and may not achieve today, with special attention to the question of how they relate to historical studies.

Nevertheless, there is value in the quick look at the confusion about naming: it attests to the fact that the field of study whose name is in question barely exists institutionally. The field itself is not a subfield of any existing institutionalized discipline, and job openings in “theory of history”, “historical theory”, or “philosophy of history” are more seldom than heartwarming deeds in *Game of Thrones*. Individual approaches and projects that constitute a part of the wider field of the theory and philosophy of history are nevertheless hosted by various university departments. History departments at most universities offer methodological courses and courses in historiography (as the study of the history of historical studies) that may optionally include theories in history. A few analytic philosophers can, in principle, maintain an engagement in “philosophy of history” at philosophy departments as one of their focuses. In the last decades, departments of English and (comparative) literature routinely discussed themes that overlap with themes discussed in the theory and philosophy of history (like that of historical narratives). Such thematic overlaps and partial inclusions in educational and research profiles, however,



do not create a shared sense of institutional or disciplinary integrity; on the contrary, they create institutional division and sometimes even intellectual discord from institutional divisions.

But defying the rigid institutional landscape may not be a bad thing after all, if the theory and philosophy of history can achieve integrity by other means. So is there anything that could create a sense that the theory and philosophy of history may constitute a field of study in the first place? I believe there is. For despite all disagreements about naming (disagreements about questions of inclusion and exclusion) and despite the lack of formal institutional and disciplinary integrity, I think that there are two major centripetal factors that generate a sense that there may be a wider field of study in the most inclusive terms.

The first factor is the ongoing discussion that takes place not only at conferences and workshops, but also in certain common venues. Analytic philosophies of history, philosophical takes on history as the course of human affairs, methodological treatises, histories of history, critical theories of historical work, conceptual works on the notion of history, questions of postcolonial and gender theory in and as history, and several other diverging approaches meet on the pages of journals ranging from *History and Theory* through *Historein*, *Rethinking History*, the *Journal of the Philosophy of History* and *Storia della Storiografia* to this very journal. Behind this ongoing discussion lies the second centripetal factor, namely, the informal and quasi-formal networks, centers and hubs. Without aiming at providing a full list, you can think of the most integrative *International Network for Theory of History* in Ghent, the more focused research seminar in philosophy of history at the Institute of Historical Research in London, the *Centre for Philosophical Studies of History* in Oulu, the *Metahistorias* group and research program in Buenos Aires with a history of almost two decades, the *Sociedade Brasileira de Teoria e História da Historiografia* (Brazilian Society for Theory and History of Historiography) in Brazil with a focus on the history of historiography, or the *Zentrum for Theorien in der Historischen Forschung* (Center for Theories in Historical Research) recently launched in Bielefeld.

The pioneering work of a previous generation of eminent scholars may have led to the existence of all this. However, in the first decades of the new century, a younger generation is pulling the diverging threads together and trying to establish common platforms for exchanging ideas about history. These centripetal factors may be accompanying phenomena of a wider reorientation of the field of the theory and philosophy of history, which would hardly be surprising news to any historians. For not only history as historiography changes – of which historians are very well aware (SPIEGEL 2007; HUGHES-WARRINGTON 2013) – but its theory and philosophy changes too.

The changes in the theoretical field may or may not interact with historiographical changes. In fact, the overall question of the relationship between the theoretical field and historical work is precisely what is at stake in the wider exchange of ideas about history in the aforementioned common platforms. As soon as you enter the exchange, you take on the scholarly role of a theorist of history, defined by your very engagement in that widely construed exchange. And it is, I believe, the actions emerging from the scholarly role that constitute the field of the theory and philosophy of history, and the field itself is held together by the abovementioned shared platforms and networks of exchange, giving a certain degree of integrity and coherence to an otherwise barely institutionalized field of study. But then, if the formal institutional situation is not decisive, the following question arises: what does it mean to take on the role of a theorist of history? What do you do as a theorist of history? Are you at least expected to develop or hold “a theory of history”? Or, to put it preposterously simply, do theorists of history *necessarily* have a theory of history?

To answer this question, first I must answer the question about what “a theory of history” might be. As I see it, a theory of history is precisely what it grammatically is: it is a theory; and it is a theory of history. A theory of history is no more *the* theory of history than Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality* (FOUCAULT 1978–1986) really is *the* history of sexuality (even

if hardcore fans of Foucault may treat it as if it really was), while the “of” in the phrase “a theory of history” can be interpreted in two major ways. First, it can mean a theory that *belongs to* history, in which history is understood only as the discipline. In this sense, a theory of history is a theory internal to or internalized by the practice of history, and the term “theory” is very loosely defined. So loosely that in fact it is not defined at all, usually being regarded as a methodology like Skinnerian intellectual history, an approach like the currently fashionable global history, critical theories as appropriated to historiography like postcolonial theory and postcolonial history, a long-term historical interpretation (like “theories” of modernization or secularization), or any mixture of these and other internal or internalized theories.

Some of these are compatible with each other while some are not. But in principle you have a choice about them, and your choice does not imply a normative statement that would concern the entire discipline. Although there certainly are dominant internal theoretical choices at certain times in certain environments, if you choose to write a microhistory, it simply does not imply that the entirety of historical studies should transform into microhistory. The same way – just to have a timelier example –, if you choose to write a global history, it does not imply that all your colleagues should follow suit and write only global histories from now on, despite all appearances. The particularity of internal theoretical choices is even better illuminated by a combination of such choices. If your global history is also an environmental history that appropriates insights of postcolonial history as informed by postcolonial theory, then you certainly would not think that your internal theories of history should be of universal validity for the entire discipline. Or, to have a concrete example, if you think with Angelika Epple that practice theory may solve some challenges of writing global history (EPPLÉ 2018), then you definitely would not think that practice theory should be integrated to all historical approaches. Most likely, you would not even think that the adoption of practice theory is a solution for all varieties within that particular historical approach called

global history. Plainly put, having “a theory of history” in this sense is a matter of particular choices. Although these choices bring about changes within the discipline, they do not change the entire discipline.

The case is very different when considering the second major interpretation of the phrase “a theory of history”, meaning a theory *about* history. Here history can mean both historical studies and the course of human affairs, and a theory about any of them clearly implies a universality claim. What this universality claim means is that a theory of history as a theory about history demands validity concerning all historical practices the discipline consists of (if you talk about history as historical studies), and it demands validity concerning an overall view of the changing world of human affairs (if you are among the few theorists of history who are willing to talk about such things). In the last few decades, theorizing about history dominantly fell into the former category. Although a revival of theorizing history as the changing world of human affairs might very well prove to be the much-needed refreshment in the theory and philosophy of history, for now, “a theory of history” as a theory *about* history still has the primary focus on historical writing. Such a theory of history (as historiography) explains history on a level so general that is indifferent to the methodological plurality of historical approaches. Notwithstanding the fact that methodological treatises are usually also labeled as “theory”, a theory *about* history explains or understands history (both as historiography and as the changing world of human affairs) regardless of the particular ways historians have or invent to satisfy their particular curiosities (methods), and regardless of the curiosities themselves (specific study subjects).

Just like an internal theory of history, a theory of history in this sense also brings about changes regarding history. But unlike an internal theory of history, its function is not to bring about a change *within* the discipline.<sup>1</sup> Instead, *it changes the entire discipline by describing and explaining it in a fresh way that sheds a new light on what previously has been thought*

*1 - This may nevertheless happen in a certain way to which I will come back later. For now, what I would like to point out is only that this possibility does not derive from the constitution of any theory about history; it comes as a consequence of historians making use of a theory about history and internalizing it as a particular approach.*

*about history*. The most obvious example here is theoretical work on history as narrative, inspired either by analytic philosophy or the work of Hayden White. Whereas theories that belong to historical studies are responsible for the inner orientation of the discipline, theories about history may change the self-image of the entire discipline and thus orient the discipline in its outer relation to other disciplines.

The same goes for a theory of history as a theory about history which concerns history as the changing world of human affairs: *it may change whatever has been previously thought about historical change by conceptualizing novel ways in which the past, present and future relate to each other*. This latter case entails what I think is the most fruitful relationship between theories and philosophies of history and historical studies. Rather than merely discussing the work of the discipline of history, theories of history can, in principle, work together with historical studies on developing ways to understand the historical condition of ourselves and the world. Not *instead of* theorizing the work of historical studies but *supplementing* it; and not in a way that revives classical philosophies of history as large-scale interpretations of an overall historical process, but in novel ways that evade the much-criticized presuppositions of those philosophies of history, such as teleology, ultimate meaning, or linear temporality.

The old-fashioned distinctions between “critical” and “speculative” or “analytical” and “substantive” philosophy of history are, in fact, already overwritten today in a variety of ways. The case is not that the distinctions merely lost their appeal; what occurs is that the categories of these distinctions cannot adequately capture the character of much of recent theoretical work on history. To one extent or another, they simply do not apply to a vast amount of work on historical time (as recently reviewed by FARELD 2016) and related topics such as periodization and chronology (LORENZ 2017; JORDHEIM 2019); to François Hartog’s analysis of “regimes of historicity” (HARTOG 2015); to Berber Bevernage’s call for a philosophy

of historicity (BEVERNAGE 2012); to Eelco Runia's philosophy of history (RUNIA 2014); to Dipesh Chakrabarty's efforts to understand the historicity brought forth by the Anthropocene predicament (CHAKRABARTY 2009; 2018); and hopefully to my half-decade work on "unprecedented change" as a novel kind of historical change (culminating in SIMON 2019). Instead of being "analytical" and "critical" or "speculative" and "substantive" philosophies of history, all these theories wish to explore an entire *historical condition*, which provides a shared object of study with historical studies on the one hand and implies a theory of historical studies on the other (by virtue of the fact that the discipline of history necessarily operates under the historical condition explored by these theories).

Now, why does it seem to be important to point all this out? First, because we witnessed a theoretical excess in the last decades without substantially reflecting upon what theory might be able to achieve, or more precisely, without discussing which notion of theory could achieve what. Second, because a recent collaborative intervention of the Wild On Collective (Ethan Kleinberg, Joan Scott, and Gary Wilder) – an online manifesto entitled *Theses on Theory and History* – intends to rekindle debates on the theoretical conduct of historical studies, or the lack thereof (WILD ON COLLECTIVE 2018).

The ideas at the core of theoretical debates in the last half-century were ideas of "a theory of history" that tried to explain the entirety of historical studies. Yet they were often conflated with (at best) and mistaken for (at worst) internal theories of history and expected to transform the practice of historical studies. "Postmodern" theories of history were especially prone to such expectations. Both its advocates and opponents thought that the measure of success of such overall theories must be their ability to bring about a spectacular change not merely by describing and explaining the entire discipline in a fresh way but also by applying its insights. As Ernst Breisach put it, their success seemed to depend on "whether life would conform or could be made to conform to theoretical expectations" (BREISACH 2003, p. 202).

But such thing simply could not have happened. For how could a theory that explains the entirety of historiography require any practical conformation to its terms on behalf of historiography if what such a theory claims is precisely what historiography *already is* as theory describes it? No particular history can conform to a universal theoretical notion such as the notion of non-referential language. If you subscribe to a theory of history that advocates such a view on language, you already consider every history ever written since the institutionalization of historical studies as having a non-referential language. How could you expect a *transformation* of historical practice to result in non-referential written histories if you think that all written histories are non-referential anyways? To have a concrete example in the shape of postmodern calls for such overall transformations,<sup>2</sup> when Munslow defined “written history as a socially constituted narrative representation that recognizes the ultimate failure of that narrative form to represent either accurately or objectively” (MUNSLOW 1997, p. 17), then all histories ever written and all histories yet to be written should have appeared to him as so. And if written history is already so, then the imperative of turning it into that which it already is amounts to an unintelligible enterprise. Paternalizing historical practice by demanding conformation to overall theoretical definitions of historical studies only creates rifts between historical studies and theories about history, despite the fact that it simply makes no difference whether historians accept the overall definition or not. From the viewpoint of such a theory, history will be as the definition claims, regardless of what historians think about it.

*2 - For a relatively late call see BOWEN RADDEKER, 2007. For an earlier one see JENKINS 1991.*

It is nevertheless possible to be inspired by such theories about history, just as much as by any other theory. To begin with, consider the way Quentin Skinner internalized speech act theory (SKINNER 2002). Skinner turned to universal philosophical notions about language, that is, to notions that describe language use without temporal and spatial confines. What Wittgenstein said about language and meaning, and what J. L. Austin said about the performative function of language,

Skinner took as being valid concerning a subcase of the general case: the language in which his sources has been written. In doing so, Skinner construed a subject of study that intended to explore what certain political theorists had been doing through writing political theories (that is, through their performative speech acts), and he devised a method that he thought was best suited for studying the subject in question. In other words, Skinner took a theory demanding universality regarding all speech acts regardless of temporal and spatial confines, and turned its insights into an internal theory of history, as a method in the history of ideas.

On the same premise, even a theory about history can be internalized (thus becoming a particular approach among the many existing ones), and if it takes root, it may result in changes *within* the discipline. This is precisely what Ann Rigney did in mapping various narrative representations of the French Revolution (RIGNEY 1990), or what experimental histories did in exploring new ways of writing history and new representational forms inspired by narrativist insights (MUNSLOW; ROSENSTONE 2004). Yet, as Frank Ankersmit pointed out, each experiment, if it wishes to qualify as experimental, must be unique even when compared to other experiments. Even if taken together they may qualify as a “specific class” of historical studies, to remain experimental they need other forms of historical studies to differ from (ANKERSMIT 2007, p. 181). Explained in the terms of this essay, experimental history may bring about particular changes *within* historical studies by internalizing and particularizing a general theory about history, but only as an internalized theory of history and not as a theory *about* history.

These are then, I think, the two major senses of “a theory of history”: a theory that belongs to history as historical studies and constitutes a specific method or approach, and a theory about the entirety of history understood either as historical studies or the changing world of human affairs (or a theory about both).<sup>3</sup> Acting in the role of a theorist of history might

*3 - It is also possible to say that internal theories of history are theories in history as opposed to theories of history which are about history. This is how, in negotiating the character of events organized by the Zentrum in Bielefeld, we often distinguished between them. Yet, when the aim is to achieve the integrity of the theory and philosophy of history as an inclusive field of study, the “in” and “of” introduces yet another unnecessary division that could easily be turned into means of separating theoretical work concerning history into two rigid fields. For this reason, I would keep on arguing for a shared sense of “a theory of history” that consists of two occasionally intertwining subcases, referring to internal theories of history and theories about the entirety of history.*



result in developing “a theory of history” of either type, as Skinner’s and Munslow’s examples show. And as the case of experimental history indicates, these two senses of “a theory of history” may even interact. But the main point I would like to make is that acting in the role of a theorist of history means committing – either explicitly or implicitly – to “a theory of history” in one sense or the other. This of course does not mean that theorists of history necessarily develop a full-blown theory, be it a Skinnerian method or a postmodern theory of history. It only means that insofar as theorists of history enter the exchange of ideas, they at least presuppose one, contribute to one, or argue in favor or against one. For “a theory of history” is simply the purpose of the game. The most important thing to keep in mind when entering the exchange is not to confuse the expectations attached to one or the other sense of “a theory of history”, like it constantly happened throughout the last decades.

Now that the heyday of narrative philosophy of history and postmodern theory of history is over, now that a younger generation takes on the role of theorizing history against the backdrop of the experiential horizon of their own times, now that networks, centers, and hubs try to pull together the widely understood field of the theory and philosophy of history, the time is ripe for coming to terms with the question of what can reasonably be expected of what sort of “theory of history”. If, as I think, Ewa Domaska is right that today we need to develop theories of history adequate to address the global problems of our own times (DOMANSKA 2010), then it is equally important to have an idea of what such theories may be good for. This could be the first step towards a more fruitful relationship between the non-discipline of the theory and philosophy of history and the institutionalized disciplines whose paths it crosses, especially that of history. For the theory and philosophy of history is more than a collection of inherited concerns with the oftentimes mistaken ambitions of the last half-century. Today, it is what we are about to make out of it.

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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

Zoltán Boldizsár Simon 

zoltanbsimon@uni-bielefeld.de  
Bielefeld University - Germany

RECEIVED IN: 01/MAR./2019 | APPROVED IN: 11/MAR./2019

# Exemplary History: Competition in Roman Historiography

## História exemplar: a Competição na Historiografia Romana

Catalina Balmaceda

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8650-6421> 

### ABSTRACT

A great part of the perceived value of history in the ancient world was connected with its educational function. In one way or another, it was regarded as a beneficial guide to conduct or as *magistra vitae* (Cicero, *De Oratore II*, 36). To give political instruction and advice on the one hand (Polybius, I, 1, 2), and to provide *exempla*, were two major aims of history. This paper will argue that by narrating the history of the past, historians not only judged past actions or people, and provided useful moral examples to their contemporaries, but also stimulated a type of competition between past and present times. By recording good examples to be imitated and bad ones to be avoided, the Roman historians promoted the code of values of the *maiores* for their own time, fostered action and, to a certain extent, became significant indicators to Roman society. This competitive aspect of Roman historiography is illustrated here in three distinct categories, analysing the work of major Roman historians: Sallust, Livy and Tacitus.

### KEYWORDS

Roman historiography; *Historia magistra vitae*; Historians.

### RESUMO

Uma grande parte do valor percebido da história no mundo antigo estava ligada à sua função educacional. De um modo ou de outro, ela foi considerada como um guia benéfico para a conduta ou como *magistra vitae* (CÍCERO, *De Oratore II*, 36). Dar instrução política e aconselhamento, por um lado (POLÍBIO, I, 1, 2), e fornecer *exempla*, por outro lado, eram os dois grandes objetivos da história. Este artigo argumentará que, ao narrar a história do passado, os historiadores não apenas julgavam ações ou pessoas do passado, e forneciam exemplos morais úteis a seus contemporâneos, mas também estimulavam um tipo de competição entre os tempos passado e presente. Ao registrar bons exemplos a serem imitados e maus a serem evitados, os historiadores romanos promoviam o código de valores dos *maiores* para seu próprio tempo, fomentavam a ação e, em certa medida, tornaram-se indicadores significativos para a sociedade romana. Esse aspecto competitivo da historiografia romana é ilustrado aqui em três categorias distintas, analisando o trabalho de grandes historiadores romanos: Salústio, Tito Lívio e Tácito.

### PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Historiografia Romana; *Historia magistra vitae*; Historiadores.

One of the main purposes of Roman historical writing was to learn something from the past. The narration of past events fulfilled a specific and practical part in the community, as Livy said:

There is this exceptionally beneficial and fruitful advantage to be derived from the study of the past, that you see set in the clear light of historical truth, examples of every possible type. From these you may select for yourself and your country what to imitate, and also what, as being mischievous in its conception and disastrous in its results, you are to avoid" [*Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites.*] (Livy, *praef.* 10).<sup>1</sup>

By their narratives, the Roman historians, then, provided good models to imitate and bad ones to avoid. In one way or another, history was regarded as a beneficial guide to behaviour, or as Cicero would crisply summarise it, as *magistra vitae* (Cicero, *De Oratore*. II, 36).

Thus, the topics with which Roman history was concerned helped to promote the same kind of behavior that had been followed in the past, encouraging fidelity to the *mores maiorum* through *exempla*. (HÖLKESKAMP 2004, p. 169-98; WALTER 2004). The weight and authority that exemplarity had in Roman culture pervaded its society in a way that is difficult to assess in all its significance today. It worked as a complex process that assumed that past actions could be in some way inspirational to the present, or a model for future actions, as if the possibilities and values of the actors remained similar.<sup>2</sup> As Matthew Roller said: "Exempla (...) constitute a form of moral discourse; and they evince a particular historical consciousness." (ROLLER 2018, p. 1).

This paper will focus on the competitive aspect of Roman historians and will show how by means of their historical narratives they aimed to foster action in their audiences. By narrating the history of their past, Roman historians provided a useful repertoire of examples to their contemporaries, and also

1 - All translations are from the latest Löeb editions with minor modifications, unless otherwise indicated.

2 - For exemplarity in Roman historiography, see esp. Chaplin 2000; Roller 2004; 2009; 2018. In a similar note, see Marincola 2010, p. 259-289. There is a vast bibliography on the relationship between rhetoric and ancient historiography, see for example, Wiseman 1979; Fornara 1983; Woodman 1984; Kraus; Woodman 1997; Marincola 2007.

tried to stimulate action through competition between past and present times. Emulation was something that the exemplarity culture of the *mores maiorum* in Rome tended to promote and was emphasised by rhetorical education.<sup>3</sup> These two elements, the culture of exemplarity and the specific stress in competitive action with the *maiores*, gave Roman historiography a particular hue which made history especially useful and practical.

## Internal competition

I have identified at least three kinds of competition in Roman historical writing. The first one which I will refer to is the **internal competition** that concerns the actors that appear in the historical account. I have called it internal because both contenders – or group of contenders – are placed within the narrative and therefore the competition is self-contained or somehow encapsulated in the internal audience.<sup>4</sup> Historical characters compete with one another in a time-frame set in the past, and this may be seen mainly through explicit comparisons or when the historians use the specific word *certamen* or the verb *certo* which means to contend for superiority.<sup>5</sup> The republican historian, Sallust, for example, tells us how old Romans cultivated high moral standards in peace and in war; they lived in the greatest harmony and had little or no avarice (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* IX, 1-2). “To such men,” says Sallust, “no toil was unusual, no place was difficult or inaccessible, no armed enemy was formidable; their valor had overcome everything [*Igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduus erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus: virtus omnia domuerat*]” (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* VII, 5), because “citizens **contended** with citizens in nothing but virtue [*cives cum civibus de virtute certabant*]” (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* IX, 2, my emphasis). This is obviously an idealized image, but it is still significant that the historian chose to portray early Rome as a field where good men competed with one another in uprightness, and this competition, according to Sallust, was carried on throughout the centuries. One generation after another contended for moral excellence,

3 - For exempla originating in rhetorical education, see ROLLER 2018 *passim*, but esp. p. 11-13.

4 - For different types of audiences, see CHAPLIN 2000, p. 4, p. 50-53, p. 103.

5 - OLD, s.v. *certo* 1. For more on the language of competition and rivalry in literature, see WISEMAN 1979, p. 27-29; HARDIE 1993, p. 116-119.

allowing the Roman Republic to show its glorious achievements along the way. It is only when the historian moves nearer to his own age, the first century BC, that this idyllic picture is brutally shattered:

For after the tribunician power had been restored in the consulship of G. Pompey and M. Crassus (...) everybody, though affecting concern for the public good, **contended** every one for his own interest [*Nam postquam Cn. Pompeio et M. Crasso consulibus tribunicia potestas restituta est (...) bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant*] (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* XXXVIII, 1-4, my emphasis).

In these two cases of competition both group of rivals share the same historical time: on the one hand, a time in the past prior to the destruction of Carthage when according to Sallust Romans fought to excel in virtue, and on the other, a time closer to the historian, but still in the past, which he identifies with the restoration of the tribunician power under Crassus' and Pompey's consulship in 70 BC, when men changed the goals of their competition for the worse, as private interests seemed to be the main aim: *pro sua potentia*.

But there are more specific examples of internal competition in Sallust. Cato and Caesar, for instance, in the *Bellum Catilinae* are a pair competing to excel in *virtus* in a period where the representatives of Roman virtue, according to Sallust, were almost non-existent:

in many periods no one at all in Rome was outstanding for his *virtus*. But within my own memory there were two men of towering virtue, though of opposite character: M. Cato and C. Caesar [*multis tempestatibus haud sane quisquam Romae virtute magnus fuit. Sed memoria mea ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus fuere viri duo, M. Cato et C. Caesar*] (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* LIII, 6).

The details of this syncrisis are familiar to all and studies abound (BATSTONE 1988; SKLENÁR 1998; KAPUST 2011). Caesar was praised for his generosity and benefactions



[*munificentia ac beneficiis*], Cato for the uprightness of his life [*integritate vitae*]; one was gentle and compassionate; the other possessed a dignified severity. The easy-going nature of Caesar was contrasted with Cato's steadfastness. The former wanted to show his *virtus* in a new war and longed for great power; the latter, on the contrary, cultivated self-control, propriety and above all austerity (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* LIV). Moreover, even Caesar's and Cato's speeches in the *Bellum Catilinae* contend with one another. Caesar's speech against putting the conspirators to death relies mainly on historical *exempla* and jurisprudence. As a plea for moderation, it proposes exile and not death. Cato, on the other hand, very dramatically favours capital punishment and supports *severitas*. Even though one can identify the winner in the historical senatorial debate – Cato –, the information that Sallust gives in his account does not allow the reader to identify the winner of the contest in the narrative: the sense that the historian is presenting two competing models of being and behaving in the turmoil of the late Republic is evident.

A subtler and less explicit contest appears in the *Bellum Iugurthinum* where three successive Roman leaders strive to defeat the Numidian Jugurtha and win the definitive battle. Sallust's presentation of consecutive commanders, Metellus, Marius, and Sulla are there to show how difficult it was to achieve the goal and how each commander-in-chief excelled his predecessor in method and strategy. Neither Metellus' nor Marius' skills were able to bring the war to an end, but only Sulla's bargain with King Bocchus. It is striking that the Romans, who possessed good generals, soldiers, and weapons, were able to win the war only through treachery. In fact, they win by using the same deceitful techniques as Jugurtha had used before. The only difference was that the Romans used these skills – mainly deception and bribery – *more* effectively than the Numidian king.<sup>6</sup> So here we have a double competition going on: one among the Roman commanders themselves succeeding and replacing one another, the last one trying to surpass the previous one; and the other contest is that

6 - For reasons of the prominence of bribery in Sallust's narrative, see PAUL 1984, appendix 1.

between the barbarian and the Roman way of using dishonesty as a tactic for winning wars. Sallust denounces this ambiguous competition: Rome wins, but it is not a victory to be proud of.

In the same vein, Livy in his *Ab Urbe Condita* also gives the picture of characters competing with each other within his historical narrative framework. It was not only generals or statesmen who competed in valour or prudence – as we see when the author refers to old republican war heroes such as Fabius Maximus (22.18.8-9), Marcellus (38.43.8), or the Scipios (25.38.5-10; 38.58.4-6); the competitive spirit is so widespread in Rome that we can see it alive even in Roman women who contended with one another as well. Echoing Sallust in his presentation of a primitive virtuous Rome, Livy also depicts the female members of this past society as competing to surpass one another in virtue. Regarding the main qualities that Livy acknowledged in women, chastity appears top of the list and as the highest praise that the historian can bestow on a Roman woman. Competition in chastity [*castitas*] and modesty [*pudicitia*] appear very clearly in Book 10, around 295 BC, with the erection of the temple to Plebeian Modesty.<sup>7</sup> The circumstances were as follows: a patrician woman who by marrying a plebeian had been denied entrance to the temple of Patrician Modesty, decided to set up a temple so that modest women among the plebeians could also participate in the ceremonies. During the dedication of the temple, she urged plebeian matrons to compete in modesty in the same way as their men competed in courage: “As the men of our state **contend** for the rewards of valor, so the matrons may **vie** for that of modesty [*quod certamen virtutis viros in hac civitate tenet, hoc pudicitiae inter matronas sit*]” (Livy, X, 23, 7, my emphasis). *Pudicitia* appears here as a womanly virtue worthy to be set up as an example and to foster competition with other women, analogous to the competition in bravery exercised by Roman men.

7 - For the cult of *Pudicitia*, see LANGLANDS 2006, p. 44-49. Cf. also CLARK 2007, esp. p. 39-46.

There was also competition and imitation in Livy's characters even in the most tragic events. In this case, it is not that the rivals try to outdo one another consciously, but the consequences of their actions bring about similar or comparable

results that acquire the resonances of a competition. The particular circumstances show that, once again, Livy chooses women to be at the centre of action in his records of early Rome.<sup>8</sup> Not many years after the famous Lucretia had fought unsuccessfully for her honour and chastity – a fight that brought her nothing but disaster and an untimely death –, Verginia's tragic defence of her own maidenly modesty appears in the narrative and would end up having the same important political consequences for Rome which Lucretia's death had had:

This [Lucretia's death] was followed by a second atrocity, the result of brutal lust, which occurred in the City and led to consequences **no less** tragic than the outrage and death of Lucretia, which had brought about the expulsion of Tarquinus and the royal family. Not only was the end of the decemvirs **the same** as that of the kings, but the cause of their losing their power was **the same** in each case [*Sequitur aliud in urbe nefas, ab libidine ortum, haud minus foedo eventu quam quod per stuprum caedemque Lucretiae urbe regnoque Tarquinius expulerat. Ut non finis solum idem decemviris qui regibus sed causa etiam eadem imperii amittendi esset*] (Livy, III, 44, 1, my emphasis).

Even though the competition is less evident here than in the previous case of plebeian modesty, it is nevertheless clearly shown by the comparative *haud minus* (no less), which reflects the fact that the deaths of the two women are deliberately presented by the historian in explicit contrast with one another. Livy represents the deaths of Lucretia and Verginia competing with one another in the results. The competition in this instance ends up in a draw, which is reflected by the words **idem** and **eadem**: they not only have the same cause – the lust of the powerful, but also the same ending: the end of the monarchy in the first case, and the end of the decemvirate in the second one.

Advancing in time towards the Principate, the competition in which imperial Romans are immersed according to Tacitus not only has the characteristic darker tone of this historian, but it is also an 'inverted competition,' one which reflected the changed state of the city: *verso civitatis statu*. (Tacitus,

1 - All translations are from the latest Löeb editions with minor modifications, unless otherwise indicated.

2 - For exemplarity in Roman historiography, see esp. Chaplin 2000; Roller 2004; 2009; 2018. In a similar note, see Marincola 2010, p. 259–289. There is a vast bibliography on the relationship between rhetoric and ancient historiography, see for example, Wiseman 1979; Fornara 1983; Woodman 1984; Kraus; Woodman 1997; Marincola 2007.

*Annales* I, 4, 1). According to Tacitus, and very much following Sallust's line of argument but for different reasons,<sup>9</sup> Romans no longer competed in virtue, but in vice. Describing the panorama under the Principate, the historian comments that "the **rivalry** of the magnates and the greed of the officials had discredited the administration of the Senate and the People [*suspecto senatus populique imperio ob certamina potentium et avaritiam magistratuum*]" (Tacitus, *Annales* I, 2, 2, my emphasis). But, in Tacitus' opinion, the corruption and disorder were more widespread than previously, since it was not only men in important political posts who competed with one another in their desire for dominion and wealth, but also the soldiers, "who in former times **competed** in bravery and modesty **contended** now in insolence and insubordination [*ut olim virtutis modestiaeque, tunc procacitatis et petulantiae certamen erat*]" (Tacitus, *Historiae* III, 11, 2). As he does in the *Annals* for the period immediately after the death of Augustus, so he had done in the confused times of the civil wars in the *Histories*: he points out that both the civilians and the military had changed the contents and goals of their contests from virtue to vice. Another aspect that should not be overlooked here is that the competitive nature of Romans is presented as something 'natural', almost taken for granted: the reference to the past, *ut olim*, is there to stress a continuum regarding rivalry and emulation.

Before we move on to the next category of competition, it is important to be aware that in identifying internal competitions in historians it does not really matter if they present an idealized view of Rome in the past or generalize a situation that was not like that in reality – something that we cannot know for certain anyway – but what is of interest here is their insistence in presenting Rome as a 'field of competition' in their historical narratives. By portraying Romans constantly vying with each other, the historians show the dynamism of the Roman people, their drive not to conform to what had been achieved in the past, their desire to outdo their elders or, if that was not possible, at least to equal them.<sup>10</sup> It is, of

9 - Tacitus does not explicitly blame the abundance of wealth and the lack of metus hostilis after the fall of Carthage as Sallust had done.

10 - On Roman aristocratic competition, see, for example, ROSENSTEIN 1990a; 1990b; 2006; ROLLER 2001; FARNEY 2007.

course, difficult to know whether they were expressing reality as they actually saw it, or if they had perhaps a specific motive for presenting it like that, or both.

## External competition

A second type of competition present in the historical narratives is the **external** one, which consists in the emulation that the historian is keen to foster between the contemporaries of his own generation and the historical characters or situations presented in the narrative. In this contest, one of the contenders belongs to the historical account and the other one is placed outside it, in the real world and at the actual time of the historian. As one of its practical uses, history had to be useful for the present: the time in which the historian was writing, then, was explicitly called to action by the records of the past, which “had a thriving, evolving, ideologically efficacious life in any given present” (ROLLER 2004, p. 51). Seeing history as a matter of contemporary relevance made both *exempla* and *aemulatio* something decidedly effective and necessary for one’s own present.

*11 - For the significance of the fall of Carthage as a turning point in Roman history see, for example, PURCELL 1995, p. 133-148.*

We will again take Sallust as our first case. In both of his monographs he is constantly comparing the situation of Rome before and after the destruction of Carthage which is given as the turning point for the decline of the Roman Republic and the morality of its men.<sup>11</sup> When Carthage, the rival of Rome’s dominion, was finally destroyed in 146 BC, the lust first for money, then for power, grew upon them; and that was for Sallust the root of all evils:

For avarice destroyed honesty, integrity, and all other noble pursuits; taught in their place insolence, cruelty, to neglect the gods, to set a price on everything [*Namque avaritia fidem, probitatem ceterasque artis bonas subvortit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit*] (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* X, 4).

The deplorable race downhill had not stopped; on the contrary, in Sallust's own times it had reached an extreme point:

In the current degenerate state of society, however, who does not **compete** with his ancestors in wealth and extravagance, instead of in uprightness and energy? [*At contra quis est omnium his moribus, quin divitiis et sumptibus, non probitate neque industria cum maioribus suis **contendat**?*] (Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum* IV, 7, my emphasis).<sup>12</sup>

Sallust makes a bold accusation before his audience: his own contemporaries are engaged in a competition with the past as previous Romans had been, but they had missed the point: no longer do Romans try to outdo their elders in merit – *cives cum civibus de virtute **certabant*** –, but in material possessions. (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* IX, 2, my emphasis). The historian, however, will not remain passive before the dark panorama of his own times that he has presented, and under the auspices of *historia* as *magistra vitae*, he embarks on the task of moving his generation to change and spurring them to virtuous conduct in the same way as the traditional wax images of the ancestors inspired and inflamed younger generations of nobles:

I have often heard that Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio, and other illustrious men of our state used to say that their hearts were inflamed by a burning desire to pursue virtue by the sight of their ancestors' portrait-masks [*Nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maximum, P. Scipionem, praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, cum maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissime sibi animum ad virtutem accendi*] (Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum* IV, 5).

Of course it was not that the actual wax likeness had such power over them, continues Sallust, but that "the memory of great exploits kindled in the breasts of noble men a flame that cannot be put out until, by their own virtue, they attain the same glory and renown [*sed memoria rerum gestarum eam flammam egregiis viris in pectore crescere neque prius sedari, quam virtus*

12 - All the translations of the *Bellum Iugurthinum* are taken from COMBER; BALMACEDA 2009.

*eorum famam atque gloriam adaequaverit]*" (Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum* IV, 5-6). This flame that Sallust is talking about, then, is the 'burning desire' of a young generation to excel the forefathers, or at least to equal them. Later on, he will even compare the use that his historical narrative – his *memoria rerum gestarum* – has on his audience precisely with the wax masks of the ancestors used in Roman funerals.<sup>13</sup> Both material products of the past – the masks and the historical account – fulfilled a similar aim: on the one hand, both publicized the virtue of the past, and on the other they awakened emulation for the present. Through this perception of the record of the past used as a reminder and beacon, history sought to influence the present and, to a certain extent, helped to shape it, as the reading of history inspired, should have inspired or, at least, was designed to inspire specific actions and behaviours.

In Livy's work too some implicit cases of competition with the present time of the historian appear scattered throughout the narrative, but it is in the preface where the idea of competitiveness between past and present is described very explicitly. In setting his goals for the project of giving an account of the history of Rome, Livy chose to give examples of virtue and vice as the key to understanding what the life and morals were like of the men who had made the Empire great: "*quae vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit*" (Livy, *Praef.* IX). He highlighted how the downfall came about little by little [*paulatim*], and above all, how weak was the response that his own generation was giving to the present circumstances:

with the **gradual** relaxation of discipline, morals **first** gave way, as it were, **then** sank lower and lower, and **finally** began the downward plunge which has brought us **to the present time**, when we can endure neither our vices nor their cure [*labente **deinde paulatim** disciplina velut desidentes **primo** mores sequatur animo, **deinde** ut magis magisque lapsi sint, **tum** ire coeperint praecipites, **donec ad haec tempora** quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est*] (Livy, *Praef.* IX, my emphasis).

13 - For the dialectical relation between history and memory, see GRETHLEIN 2006, p. 135-148. For the role of the wax images of the ancestors, see FLOWER 2006.

Livy had previously said that there had never existed any commonwealth greater in power, with a purer morality, or more fertile in good examples than Rome, but he then compares this picture with his own times. *Deinde, paulatim, primo* and *tum* are all adverbs that reinforce the sense of the evolution of Rome through time. The presence of *donec* (until) on the other hand, breaks this chain of progression and brings the reader *ad haec tempora*, that is, the historian's own times.

Beside these temporal markers that highlight the different layers of historical times and reinforce comparisons, there is another feature in Livy's preface that makes it particularly inviting to action in the present, and this is that the historian not only provides information about Rome's greatest men, their lives and their morals, but also addresses his audience directly in the second person singular. If one reads the preface one finds that he is unmistakably telling 'me' to 'do' something:

What chiefly makes the study of history wholesome and profitable is this, that **you behold** the lessons of every kind of experience set forth as on a conspicuous monument; from these **you may choose** for **yourself** and for **your** own state what **to imitate**, from these mark for avoidance what is shameful in the conception and shameful in the result [*Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vitas*] (Livy, *Praef.* X).<sup>14</sup>

14 - Cf. CHAPLIN 2015, p. 111 and for the preface in general MOLES 1993.

Livy had stated that history was useful and *frugiferum*, and so he urged his contemporaries to react to the present times – *ad haec tempora* – by choosing *imitare* or *vitare* the right examples from his long account of the history of Rome. And thus, by fostering emulation, his audience would be more prepared to make the effort to match or surpass their predecessors.

A less conspicuous case of promoting competition between the past and his own present in Livy is seen, once again, in his treatment of women's chastity. The care of this



virtue was also linked with politics in the cases of Vestal virgins being condemned for *impudicitia*.<sup>15</sup> By their improper conduct – the violation of their Vestal vows was seen as *nefas*, similar to an act of pollution – they had put the state at risk (Livy, XXII, 57, 4). Livy may give these cases to provide *exempla* to the internal audience, that is, to other Vestals in his narrative, but also to the external one, namely, women in Augustan Rome. By the time of Livy’s writing, Julia the Elder, Augustus’ daughter, had already given cause of scandal with her behaviour and she received a harsh punishment from her father the Princeps. Was Augustus emulating Romans of old times in the chastisement of his daughter’s lack of chastity? Or was Livy indirectly supporting the Princeps’ so-called moral legislation?<sup>16</sup> No doubt, the exile of Augustus’ daughter (and later on grand-daughter as well) must have been something much talked about at that time, and the accounts in Livy of these chaste women giving their lives for the sake of *pudicitia* like Lucretia or Verginia, or the Vestals dying tragically when they had violated it, were probably seen as a warning. Moreover, Julia’s punishment – being sent to a desert island – was metaphorically similar to the customary penalty for an unchaste Vestal virgin, namely, being buried alive.<sup>17</sup> These comparisons with Livy’s own times in Augustan Rome are no more than speculations, but the connections are nonetheless remarkable.

Tacitus, on the other hand, in one of his rare moments of being unequivocal, also spurs his contemporary readers to action and change. He is well aware that emulation and sound rivalry work as a trigger to improvement, and this is why he expresses his disappointment when he sees his own senatorial class mired in mediocrity and passivity. But, unlike Sallust this time, he does not idealize the past while overlooking the present, and is able to find good things in his own times under the Principate. One illustration of this is the example of *parsimonia* [sobriety, austerity] that Tacitus alludes to in Book 3 of the *Annals*. He explains that the excesses of wealth and luxury that Rome had undergone after the battle of Actium until the advent of the emperor Galba had been mitigated a little

15 - For cases of Vestal virgins condemned to death for unchastity, see 2.42.11; 4.44.11; 8.15.7; 22.57.2; Per. 14; 20; 63.

16 - On what has been termed Augustan moral legislation see, for example, FRANK 1975; BOUVRIE 1984; BADIAN 1985; GALLINSKY 1996, *passim*, but esp. p. 128–140.

17 - Julia the Elder was exiled in 2 BC to Pandateria in the Tyrrhenian Sea; Julia the Younger was exiled in AD 8 to Trimerus in the Adriatic.

by the entrance of austere new men from the *municipia* and colonies, but that lately they had had an even greater promoter of *parsimonia* in Vespasian and his strict way of living. (Tacitus, *Annales* III, 55, 1-4).<sup>18</sup> The historian comments that the desire to imitate the emperor did more than the fear of punishment to bring this ancient virtue of the *maiores* back into fashion. The desire to emulate Vespasian had proved more powerful than legal sanctions and deterrents (Tacitus, *Annales* III, 55, 4). This fact compels Tacitus to exclaim that not all past times were necessarily better:

Nor, indeed, were all things better in the old time before us;<sup>19</sup> but **our own age too** has produced much in the sphere of true nobility and much in that of art which posterity well may **imitate**. In any case, may the honourable **competition** of our present with our past long remain! [*nec omnia apud priores meliora, sed nostra quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit. Verum haec nobis in maiores certamina ex honesto maneant*] (Tacitus, *Annales* III, 55, 5, my emphasis).<sup>20</sup>

Competition between past and present is explicit here: Tacitus will not give up hope in his own generation and through 'positive reinforcement' he aims to move his contemporaries to reject the main vices of the Principate, namely inactivity, adulation and fear of the emperor. It has been argued that in his *Annals* Tacitus not only illustrates the sad condition of Romans under bad emperors, but also proposes a new model of behaviour for the good Roman (BALMACEDA 2017, p. 157-241), and thus, he is not a complete pessimist. Tacitus' *nostra aetas*, that is his present time under Trajan, is openly contending with the past and the historian is favourable to his own times. Competition is something that will continue; it is a characteristic feature of Roman culture: the notion that the present imitates the past and will be emulated by the future is consistent with Romans' attitude to the *maiores*.

18 - For Vespasian's virtues, see LEVICK 1999, *passim*, but esp. p. 124-151.

19 - One might assume this to be the belief of a Roman aristocrat.

20 - See further GINSBURG 1993, p. 86-103. Cf. WOODMAN; MARTIN 2004, *ad loc.*, esp. p. 408-413.

## Authorial competition

A third type of competition present in the historical narratives of the Roman historians is the one that I have called **authorial** which involves the competitiveness proper to the author regarding his own occupation and work. This is the contest that the historian carries out with other historians as his own predecessors or 'ancestors' in writing history.

The most obvious example of this authorial competition is Livy, who declared bluntly:

Whether I am likely to accomplish anything worthy of the labour, if I record the achievements of the Roman people from the foundation of the city, I do not really know [*Facturusne operae pretium sim si a primordio urbis res populi Romani perscripserim nec satis scio*] ... perceiving as I do that the theme is not only old but hackneyed, through the **constant succession of new historians**, who believed either that in their facts they can produce **more authentic** information, or that in their style they will prove **better** than the rude attempts of the ancients... [*quippe qui cum veterem tum volgatam esse rem videam, dum novi semper scriptores aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos credunt*] (Livy, *Praef.* I-III, my emphasis).

21 - For more on Livy's preface, see MOLES 1993, p. 141-164; MILES 1995, esp. p. 14-20.

The first sentence of *Ab Urbe Condita* could, of course, be interpreted just as the conventional *captatio benevolentiae* or words to win over the empathy of the reader to approach the work with *benignitas*.<sup>21</sup> But the author is also telling us that emulation among writers of the history of Rome was something common: one after the other, Roman historians had written their histories hoping to supersede their predecessors either in content or style. The words *certius* (more authentic) and *superaturos* (surpass) show unambiguously that for Livy there was competition in this tradition of writers, as they hoped to provide more reliable information or write in a more refined style about Rome's past. Even though Livy does not have the traditional background of a retired politician who wrote history

as the noblest occupation to which he could dedicate the rest of his life, he distinctively presents himself as one more link in that chain of competing historians (MARINCOLA 1997, p. 140). His rivals, in fact, were the previous republican annalists – of whom, unfortunately, we can only judge by their fragments – such as Cincius Alimentus, Coelius Antipater or Cassius Hemina from the older generation and Claudius Quadrigarius (a major source from Livy’s Book 6 onwards), Valerius Antias (frequently criticised for his exaggerations), Sempronius Asellio, Cornelius Sisenna or Licinius Macer.<sup>22</sup> The result of Livy’s efforts to supersede these annalists – his exceptional *Ab Urbe Condita* – makes us forget or at least disregard his lack of previous experience and credentials as a traditional Roman historian and, in comparison with his competitors, he earns a place very near the winners – if not as *the* winner – of the contest.

Tacitus also presents himself as part of this continuous succession of Roman historians. If Livy was explicit in saying that he was competing with his predecessors, he was diffident as to the results: “Whether... I do not know... [*Facturusne... nec scio...*]” (Livy, *Praef.* I). Tacitus, on the contrary, states clearly why he is better equipped than his previous colleagues to write history. With a few words he made the reader believe that he had no motives for being biased, and for that reason he persuaded his audience that his account of Roman history – specifically under the Principate – was more trustworthy than others. According to Tacitus, the histories of the emperors Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, and Nero had been either falsified through terror when these emperors had been alive or written with hatred after their deaths. “Hence my purpose is,” he continues, “to relate a few facts about Augustus – more particularly his last acts, then the reign of Tiberius, and all which follows, without either bitterness or partiality, from any motives to which I am far removed [*sine ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo*]” (Tacitus, *Annales* I, 1, 3). *Sine ira et studio* appear at first sight to be the innocent words of an author’s methodological programme, but they are in fact – among many other things – Tacitus’ powerful indication to his readers of his own superiority

22 - For the topic of Livy’s sources, OAKLEY 1997, p. 13-109 is essential. For the fragments of these Roman historians, see CORNELL 2013.

(MARINCOLA 1997, p. 115, 144, 166). He had said it before in the *Histories* as well, when he stated that after the battle of Actium there were no historians who could write 'proper' history:

because they were ignorant of politics as being not any concern of theirs; later, because of their passionate desire to flatter; or again because of their hatred of their masters [*primum inscitia rei publicae ut alienae, mox libidine adsentandi aut rursus odio adversus dominantis*]. So, between the hostility of the one class and the servility of the other, posterity was disregarded [*ita neutris cura posteritatis inter infensos vel obnoxios*] (Tacitus, *Historiae* I, 1, 1).

According to Tacitus, the historians of the Republic had striven to do their job well, with eloquence and freedom [*pari eloquentia ac libertati*], but that had only lasted until "the interests of peace required that all power should be concentrated in the hands of one man [*atque omnem potentiam ad unum conferri pacis interfuit*]" (Tacitus, *Historiae* I, 1, 2).

Tacitus does not name his contemporary rivals in writing history, but one can infer at least two predecessors: Asinius Pollio and Velleius Paterculus. Even though Asinius Pollio (75 BC – AD 4) cannot be counted as a contemporary to Tacitus and his historical works are mainly lost, we know that he provided much of the material found in Appian or Plutarch, and that his histories would have dealt with the times of the civil wars.<sup>23</sup> A friend of Caesar and then Antony, he was not Augustus' enemy, but remained aloof from the vicissitudes of the new regime. He maintains the image of a "disillusioned republican" and "hostile to the emperor" (CORNELL 2013, p. 434), hence he could have written with *ira* or *odio*. Velleius, on the other hand, a former soldier serving directly under Tiberius' command and one who had benefited greatly by the new regime, wrote a very enthusiastic account about the second *princeps*, one with which Tacitus did not concur in the main, and to which he would not have hesitated to ascribe the aforementioned label of *studium*.<sup>24</sup>

23 - Horace's Ode 2.1 gives this indication, cf. WOODMAN 2003, p. 191-216. For more on Asinius Pollio, see FrHist I, p. 430-445 (CORNELL 2013).

24 - For Velleius' career and historical work, see respectively LEVICK 2011; RICH 2011. For Velleius' view of Tiberius' virtues, see for example, SCHMITZER 2011; BALMACEDA 2014.

Sallust's contest is slightly different. He compares himself not with previous or contemporary historians, but with politicians and men of action. His challenge is not simply to produce a more powerful narrative or a more truthful historical account than previous historians. He competes against the very doers of the actions he is telling the reader about:

It is glorious to serve one's own country by deeds, even to serve her by words is a thing not to be despised; one may become famous in peace as well as in war [*Pulchrum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est; vel pace vel bello clarum fieri licet*]. Not only those who have acted, but also those who have recorded the acts of others often receive our approbation [*et qui fecere et qui facta aliorum scripsere, multi laudantur*] (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* III, 1).

Sallust broadens the fields by which Romans could achieve glory in Roman society: the customary competition for activities such as public office or the waging of wars was going to be expanded to other occupations too, such as the writing of history. Sallust's reflection on his own career provides us with one of the earliest references to the glory and fame that belong to the historian, which are based mainly on surmounting the difficulties attached to writing about the past.<sup>25</sup> "I regard the writing of history as one of the most difficult tasks, because the style and diction **must be equal** to the deeds recorded [*tamen in primis arduum videtur res gestas scribere: primum, quod facta dictis **exaequanda** sunt*]" (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* III, 2, my emphasis). The other difficulty was that the historian needed some courage to overcome and put up with malicious reproaches:

because such criticisms as you make of others' shortcomings are thought by most men to be due to malice and envy [*dehinc, quia plerique, quae delicta reprehenderis, malevolentia et invidia dicta putant*]. Furthermore when you commemorate the distinguished virtue and fame of good men, while everyone is quite ready to believe you when you tell of things which he thinks he could easily do himself, everything beyond that he regards as fictitious, if not false [*ubi de magna virtute atque gloria bonorum memores*

25 - For the difficulties of writing history as an ancient historian, see Marincola 1997, p. 148-158.

*quae sibi quisque facilia factu putat, aequo animo accipit, supra ea veluti ficta pro falsis ducit]* (Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae* III, 2).

By this explicit association of *facta et dicta* – deeds and words – Sallust is presenting himself as a man of action, comparable to the actors of his own history, perhaps not shown in military campaigns or public office – although he was involved in both – but through recording the memory of the things done: *memoria rerum gestarum*. He states that his writings, which could be seen by some as a simple pastime for a retired politician will, in fact, be more useful than others' actions: “**greater** benefit to the state is likely to come from my retirement than from others' activity [*maiusque commodum ex otio meo quam ex aliorum negotiis rei publicae venturum*]” (Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum* IV, 4, my emphasis). And indeed, this proved to be the case, because Sallust's monographs provided a rich example for historical writing henceforward, and were useful in many more ways than the historian could have foreseen.

How can Sallust compare actual deeds and achievements in history with the written account of these same achievements – which of course are not really comparable? The answer is that he emphasises the similar nature of the difficulties that have to be overcome in both cases: the two situations present parallel intrinsic and extrinsic challenges. On the one hand, there is the intrinsic challenge of doing something remarkable either in politics or in war, and there is also some intrinsic value in writing about it 'properly', matching deeds with words, doing justice to great actions by writing about them in great words. The extrinsic challenge, on the other hand, is more related to an external problem, that is, what others might think of the actor involved in political action – or warfare – or of the historian himself. Both are open to praise or criticism and to the relentless judgement of both their colleagues and posterity.<sup>26</sup>

Authorial competition, therefore, could involve two types of competitiveness among historians: the first one – seen with Livy and Tacitus – was the historian rivalling his own colleagues,

26 - For historians criticising other historians, see MARINCOLA 1997, p. 225-236.

as if he were contending with his own *maiores*, in some way following their *exemplum*, but trying to supersede them. The second and more ambitious type, implied that the historian saw himself as crucial and essential as the characters in his historical narrative because the way and manner in which the historical facts were told – and therefore understood – were as important as the facts themselves.

## Final Considerations

Competition went hand in hand with exemplarity in Roman historiography, or rather, the historians fostered rivalry and emulation precisely by providing historical examples. The power of exemplarity in Roman historiography, then, was used by the historians not only as a pedagogical rhetorical device to explain or illustrate the situation that was being narrated, but also as an exhortative encouragement to motivate readers into action.

It is interesting to see how the historians in the first place present *exempla* and competition in virtues to the internal audience of their narratives – that is to other characters in the historical account – as if to show in a practical way to the external audience – i.e., their own contemporaries – how they should read the history of their own past and what they should do to match their ancestors. The internal competition among the historical characters appears at first sight a rather subtle way of promoting rivalry with the present, since it requires an alert audience, but it is nonetheless inspiring and powerful. External competition, by contrast, involves addressing the reader in terms that may be more or less aggressive depending on the historian, and the message is made clearer. The explicit educational function of history was precisely placed in this message; the Roman historian had to do more than merely tell pleasant stories from the past: he had to pass moral judgement. For Tacitus, for example, this was history's highest function [*praecipuum munus annalium*]: "to ensure that virtue shall not lack its record and to hold before the vicious word and deed the terrors of posterity and infamy" (Tacitus, *Annales* III, 65, 1).<sup>27</sup>

27 - quod praecipuum munus annalium reor ne virtutes sileantur utque pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate et infamia metus sit. Cf. LUCE 1991, p. 2914; WOODMAN 1995, p. 116-117, p. 126; and WOODMAN; MARTIN 2004, ad loc.



History was a commemoration of virtue, and a deterrent from following bad examples lest one's evil deeds should be recorded for ever. As *magistra vitae* history had to teach lessons to the reader and this was done by giving examples, persuading the audience and fostering action by emulation.

Authorial competition, more or less explicit depending on each author, in some way showed what the historians thought about themselves and the position and place they occupied in the development of their craft. Often their deepest thoughts on the nature of their occupation were crystallised within the discussion of the purpose of writing history or while they were trying to justify their reasons for embarking on this activity after so many had already done the same. In this way, the historians not only promoted competition with their writings, but they actually set an example of how the competition should be undertaken. The presence of competing narratives, competing characters and competing authors reveal the competitive way in which Romans approached all things.

In a society in which action and achievement were the main measurements of personal success and in a culture where the *mores maiorum* played a major role, historical *exempla* presented as a challenge for the present had a great appeal to contemporary audience. Roman historians, then, were not mere passive chroniclers of past times. To a certain extent, they became active guides of conduct to Roman society by promoting a specific moral code of values. Reading history was seen as something eminently useful and applicable. It was there to inspire the reader to think: 'I will do the same' or 'I can do better'. Much more explicitly than in our contemporary age, to influence the present constituted a primary aim in historical writing in antiquity. Competition in Roman historiography – internal, external or authorial – acted as a powerful incentive to trigger action in the present, making the records of historical past something decidedly practical.

Competition between past and present constituted the core of the exemplary function of history in Rome.

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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

**Catalina Balmaceda** 

cbalmace@uc.cl

Profesor Asociado Historia Antigua

Facultad de Historia, Geografía y Ciencia Política

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Chile

This article is part of the project funded by Fondecyt 1160272.

RECEIVED IN: 13/SEP./2018 | APPROVED IN: 10/JAN./2019

# Theory of history and history of historiography: Openings for “unconventional histories”

Teoria da história e história da historiografia: aberturas para  
“histórias não-convencionais”

**Thamara de Oliveira Rodrigues**

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2330-6494> 

## ABSTRACT

This article aims to discuss the relationship between what we will call “unconventional histories”, the Theory of History and the History of Historiography. We will discuss the possible openings of these disciplines to the spheres that strain with their more settled protocols. Moreover, we seek to reflect on the relationship of these openings with the emergence of a temporality that has transformed the Humanities and their epistemological priorities. We will argue that the practical past, the *Critical Quantitative Inquiry*, the paradigm of presence, Public History and popular historiographies would be some examples of openings for “unconventional histories” since these perspectives can critically intervene in speeches and academic and historiographical paradigms.

## KEYWORDS

Theory and History of Historiography; unconventional histories; Public History.

## RESUMO

Este artigo tem como objetivo discutir a relação entre o que chamaremos de “histórias não-convencionais”, a teoria da história e a história da historiografia. Discutiremos aberturas possíveis das disciplinas para esferas que tensionam com seus protocolos sedimentados e, também, a relação destas aberturas com a emergência de uma temporalidade que tem transformado as humanidades e suas prioridades epistemológicas. Argumentaremos que os passados práticos, a *critical quantitative inquiry*, o paradigma da presença, a história pública e as historiografias populares seriam alguns exemplos de aberturas para “histórias não-convencionais”, à medida que intervêm criticamente no que diz respeito aos discursos e paradigmas históricos e historiográficos academicamente instituídos.

## PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Teoria e História da Historiografia; Histórias não-convencionais; História Pública.



Current research has prioritized the need for reestablishing our relationship with the past and temporality in general. These relationships occur autonomously when compared to those produced in academic spaces like universities. The reason for this phenomenon is related to the confrontation of a certain feeling of failure, or even of some irrelevance of History as a discipline in contemporary debates. Hans U. Gumbrecht explained that the time had come for professional historians to face the fact that no one relies on historical knowledge in practical situations (GUMBRECHT 1997, p. 411). Such claim means that the institutional preponderance achieved by the discipline in its manifestation in Western cultures from the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards was widely problematized. And it was from this problematization that a formal conception of History has been “replaced” by other forms of access to the past.

Although History remains in the curricula of Western schools, those who teach it feel that speeches used to assign legitimacy to it are losing strength (GUMBRECHT 1997). Gumbrecht also emphasizes that the growth of interest in history that occurs in contexts other than academic institutions in the strictest sense is very distinct. There is a desire for history manifested in the everyday life through literature, films, television series, music, videogames, plays, arts in general, in other words, through television, radio, museums, and other media. This is a demand that cannot be ignored. Understanding the place of History as a discipline in the contemporary world – considering its limits and potentialities –, implies incorporating this second phenomenon in its analysis, starting from the new social configuration of the period to which it is related.

Gumbrecht’s provocation is not the only one, several works reflect on the diagnosis of the limits of History and its relation with the “crisis of historicism”. These works also investigate new demands and possibilities for the discipline. This article collects these reflections, aiming to discuss the relationship between what we will call Ewa Domanska’s “unconventional histories” (DOMANSKA 2004), the Theory of History and the

History of Contemporary Historiography. The first section of this article describes the birth process of the History of Historiography, of the History discipline in general, and how the sedimentation of a new temporality has transformed the Humanities and their epistemological-ethical priorities. In the second section, I define the term “unconventional histories” starting from the contributions of Ewa Domanska. The third and fourth sections of the article explore how the *Critical Quantitative Inquiry*, the paradigm of presence, public history and popular historiographies can be understood as openings for “unconventional histories”. These unconventional stories stress the historical speeches (epistemological and ethical) and paradigms academically instituted through intervention/criticism. In this regard, this article proposes to broaden and disseminate these debates rather than their systematization.

## History of Historiography and Theory of History: the search for its performance function

The formal birth of History as a discipline occurred in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and unfolded from the emergence of Modernity and the crisis of representation. These two phenomena are linked to the discovery of time as an absolute agent of change. According to Reinhart Koselleck, the emergence of Modernity and the crisis of representation indicate a gradual loss of empathy for the past and estrangement to their proper ability to find an orientation due to the emergence of unprecedented experiences, whereas the future would need to be formed by increasingly fast human activities. This phenomenon led to ruptures in how History was experienced and produced. The discipline thus gained unprecedented contours in Modernity. From the modern philosophies of History and later from historicisms, the past and the future (quickly defined as dimensions of meta-historical and transcultural temporality) were shaped by History. In other words, History reorganized, theoretically and methodologically, the past from the projections opened by the futures, and such form of proceeding was something proper to

the historicist worldview (KOSELLECK 2006; 2013). Thus, we must note that the use of "historicism" in this article refers to a social construction of time that claimed for itself specific forms of historical practices.

According to Foucault, modern society lived a "crisis of representation". For Gumbrecht, this was the birth of the "second-order observer", which can also be a "crisis of perspectives" or "temporalization of perspectives," as Koselleck called it. All these denominations describe the same phenomenon that must be considered when one seeks an accurate birth for History (FOUCAULT 2000; GUMBRECHT 1998; KOSELLECK 2006, p. 161-188). This phenomenon refers to a discontinuity in the Western world that happens as a consequence of the loss of the integration of language, space and time, a phenomenon that reached its apex in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, an intense historicity that penetrated all things and assigned a historical character to them, on which everything would be subject to change. With this phenomenon a given language lost its privileged space in maintaining the organicity of the world. Truth would no longer be contained in things, it would be subject to History and mankind, conscious of the multiplicity of points of view, would be responsible for navigating it. Thus, the study of contemporary history was avoided since the analysis of events required a temporal distance that would allow a broader observation precisely because of the passage of time. Truth started to depend on the temporal perspective. The problem that emerged was from which perspective we could "truly" observe the world. From this questioning, the narrativization and historicization of reality surfaced as strategies for coping with the crisis, the world now was associated with a text that had to be constantly rewritten.

The "crisis of perspectives" forced historical knowledge to reevaluate itself. History as a discipline would need to be constantly redone since both the vision and the understanding of events were transformed as time differed and according to the very subject of knowledge. The historiographical production

began to be inserted in more universal conjunctures through the syntheses of the philosophies of history and the historicisms that sought to (re)organize time using historical meanings. In this context, the historiography exercise was born as a critical elaboration of the previously published historiography, this is the History of Historiography, an index of the transformations of History as a discipline and as a space for the thematization of temporal and spatial experiences with their social, cultural and political developments. When related to the Theory of History, the History of Historiography also serves to identify the tendencies and demands of the field of History in general (ARAUJO and RANGEL 2015; KOSELLECK 2006, p. 161-188).

History was developed not only as a result of the concentration of scientific and specialized debates in search for a truth that would surface later on, its political and social dimensions were also recurrent and decisive for the constitution of its characteristics. Similarly, the interest in writing contemporary history was crucial to support it, given that it refers to the existence of competing patterns in the process of disciplining the field (ARAUJO 2015). History echoed a desire for the intervention of subjects in public and everyday life over the course of Modernity, even when it was strikingly marked by a more “scientific” dimension that sought to neutralize individual perspectives in relation to the past. This was fundamental to its institutional formation. Therefore, even if in a conflictive way, History’s process of becoming a discipline fostered demands for a form of History related to the production of presence, impression, orientation and intervention in public debates (ARAUJO 2011).

By establishing a distinction between the “historical past” and the “practical past” Hayden White, in the wake of Michael Oakeshott, points to the disputes and tensions in the institutionalization of the discipline. The “historical past” – the result of the professionalization of history – would have the establishment of “factual truths” that could be empirically traversed as its ultimate goal. The most radical consequence of this process was that historiography distanced itself from

the discussions of its broader social functions for the most part. When History began being produced in a non-passionate way, it would have marked its distance from literature. Such departure in relation to literature implicated in some sort of domestication of the imagination of the past. For White, this “historical past” would have little value in reorganizing/interfering with contemporary debates because a historiography linked to the historical past would not stop thematizing it, consequently leading to a distancing from the critical gaze over the present. In contrast, the “practical past” would deal with the need to act more specifically in contemporary debates, involving discussions of more active actions toward the present. This is a concept of the past that acts in our daily lives, to which we turn voluntarily, and it can be related to the “space of experience” by establishing more intimate commitments to ethics and to imagination (WHITE 2012). Due to the establishment of a new temporality in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, in which the future loses a certain capacity to motivate humans and the “practical past” would be more evoked in relation to the “space of experience”. This experience would be determined by the need for empathy, emotion or some orientation. We must note that this is not a pragmatic orientation based on the assumption that the past has the answers needed for our immediate contemporary challenges.<sup>1</sup>

*1 - This orientation is not to be confused with *Historia Magistra Vitae*, which was characterized by the rhetorical and exemplary artifice related to a circular time experience (KOSELLECK 2006, p.41-61).*

Hitherto the accelerated present and the bet on an open future, both capable of fulfilling the expectations generated by such almost instantaneous present, were the shelter and energy source of the Cartesian self in relation to the crisis of representation. After the second half of the 20th century, and precisely at that moment this perspective became more fragile (GUMBRECHT 2015, p. 93-111). The totalitarian experiences of the 20th century weakened the energy sources that shaped the past and the future into a *télos*. Historical narratives grew in number when faced by the growing uncertainty that reality would be oriented towards the achievement of progress. These historical narratives began to dispute space with institutional and predominant macro-narratives that bet on the accomplishment of a destiny of History. Narratives would

no longer have the strength to become meta-narratives since these transformed the future into what they wanted to avoid: a world permeated by violence, authoritarianism and the growth of social inequalities.

The emergence of this phenomenon is associated with the configuration of a new temporality, as mentioned above. Imagining futures that are distant from tradition is much more difficult in this temporality.<sup>2</sup> The notion of time to which we refer to also changes the relation with the canon, causing its authority to be repeatedly questioned by other emerging narratives (GUMBRECHT 2015, p. 93-111). We must highlight that, according to Achille Mbembe, this process signals the fundamental experience of our time, and that such fundamental experience consists in the fact that Europe is no longer the “world’s center of gravity”, and its decentralization led to a certain weakening of the modern knowledge project (MBEMBE 2014).

When we refer to a social configuration of time in which the future loses importance, we realize that one of the dimensions of the past that stands out is its performative power. In this sense, performance function as an evocation of the past, not only being used by the need to produce causal and sequential explanatory narratives, but by a resumption of its own experience. On the one hand, if this performative dimension frees the risk of a certain nostalgia that intends on recovering moral values and conservative social practices, on the other, it diminishes the relationship with the past from its objectification. In the case of the Humanities, Ewa Domanska argues that the expansion of performance – or the performative turn in that field –, is a phenomenon linked to the return to materiality, a response to the weakening of the “world as a text” metaphor, of the world with meanings to be “identified” and constructed. Performance is understood as something that goes beyond the expected institutional behaviors and the contemplative attitude towards reality. Through performance, the world is now seen as a plurality of actions and possibilities from which one acts, not only something to be interpreted (DOMANSKA 2011).

*2 - For the thematization of contemporary temporality, several works can be referred to, for example, ARAUJO and PEREIRA 2018; BEVERNAGE 2012; CHAKRABARTY 2018; HARTOG 2014.*

In the specific case of the Theory of History and History of Historiography, which open space for this type of relationship with the past, such fields can be constituted for activities dedicated to the criticism of final versions of History. These fields seek to show their character of possibility or, in other words, their plurality. Based on Walter Benjamin, Marcelo Rangel suggests that a historiography that responds to the challenges of our time “would not only be devoted to the knowledge of *every past*, but to the participation and continuation of certain critical entities and performances dedicated to the struggle for differentiation and reorganization of history” (RANGEL 2016, p. 170).

The concern to rethink the founding protocols of History and to understand other spaces and languages available to access the past can be combined with what has been called the ethical-political turn. This turn is a recognition of the need imposed by the current historical horizon in which a several humanists are dedicated to discuss the contemporary world, its own determinations, problems and possibilities. We must note that this is a different ethical demand from that of historicist worldviews that sought to standardize, and to control reality based on a universalist project. To have ethics as a central element in the thematization of the contemporary world is attentive to the imponderability character of History, it seeks to explain possibilities and differences, not control them (ARAUJO and RANGEL 2015; RANGEL and SANTOS 2015).

## “Unconventional Histories”

*And what is really naive about historians is that they always think that the current way of doing history is finally the best way.*  
Hayden White (1998)

Disciplinary protocols are established by the confrontation between experiences, subjects and procedures. Thus, some experiences, subjects and procedures are placed in the center (standardized and normalized elements that become

“conventional” for the production of historical knowledge) and others are left on the sidelines (and to these we may refer to as “unconventional”). In general terms, “unconventional histories” would not only belong to History but would also be associated with the “new humanities”. This is an intervention and criticism speech made to certain sedimented historical interpretations, seeking to take form from “others” who were “expelled” from part of conventional history (DOMANSKA 2004, p. 2). The “others” that the “unconventional” intends to draw from the margins refer not only to new subjects (women, animals, ethnicities, etc.), but also to research methods and procedures, writing and teaching that necessarily “question” the “consecrated” protocols of History. We refer to debate protocols and demands that are responsible for the continuous transformation of the social functions of History and of the Humanities in general.

When listing the main “conventions” of a certain type of academic History, in a simplified way, we would highlight some points: a) “Correspondent” truth as a research principle, something that requires a consensus within a given community about what constitutes true statements; b) scientific objectivity; c) the search for causal explanations; d) linear narratives and a realistic writing style, in which imagination would have to be denied, for example.

If the concept of “unconventional histories” is defined in contrast to these protocols we reach the following transformations in relation to “consecrated” conventions: a) there is attention to the notion of truth as an institution of power; b) subjectivity is defended; c) narratives would not be determined only by causal relations and chronology; d) there are different forms of experimentation from the past and; thus written texts and meaning would not be the only privileged means for this. Moreover, this definition does not mean any rigidity or isolation between the spheres being dealt with (DOMANSKA 2004).

The category of “unconventional” refers to historical theories and practices that impose demands that re-emphasize some



protocols that, until then, were central to the discipline. These criticisms emerge within the disciplinary field itself, but also from non-academic spaces. However, the term “unconventional” – understood as a criticism of the most consecrated academic procedures – can be understood, in principle, as something negative, abnormal or improper, a word constituted from an adverb of negation. Considering this idea, using the term “unconventional” risks creating the impression that these forms of historical productions are inferior (or superior in some cases) to what is produced in traditional and conventional settings, even if this is not the objective of the category suggested by Domanska. Furthermore, I do not ignore the need to create a new category capable of overcoming a possible hierarchical view of knowledge, or even the impression that it is a mere criticism of the “authority” conquered by the subject.

It is important to observe that the criticism made by what we call “unconventional” in the face of conventional protocols is the condition that allows the existence (and survival) of History as a discipline (DOMANSKA 2004, p. 4). Academic History is organized from denial efforts and from the incorporation of different relationships with the past. This means that academic History is formed by a tension between understandings and practices that have been institutionalized and those that are latent or left on the sidelines. Therefore, the conventional and the unconventional establish a dialectical tension with each other. Such dialectical tension of openness and incorporation is precisely what changes through new temporal configurations and according to political and social spaces, bringing new subjects, methods and narrative forms. There is a risk of neutralization as the discipline incorporates such procedures that were not at the center of debates. According to Domanska, this occurs because the process of becoming a discipline depends on the removal of everything that may threaten its existence (DOMANSKA 2004, p. 4). Every process would have a character of violence and segregation, but it would never be free from the tension and openness imposed by the “unconventional”. The dialectic that we mentioned, especially in

contemporaneity, would have as an idea of power the imposition of a tendency to “disobedience” within the discipline History and the Humanities in general. Such disobedience would be based on the recurrence of feelings such as empathy, sincerity, affection, experience, new subjects, new cosmologies, and so on. This set of feelings would bring to light what is left or obscured within the discipline itself (DOMANSKA 2004).

## About Risk Thinking: *Critical Qualitative Inquiry* and Presence

The demands for unconventional practices evoke the possibility of changing the social function of both History and the Humanities, the *Critical Qualitative Inquiry* is an example. In general, what exists is a quest for social justice that takes place within a transformative paradigm. The intention is to challenge the predominant forms that are responsible for inequality, poverty, human oppression and injustice. This proposal is firmly rooted in a human rights agenda and requires an ethical framework based on social justice. The projects involved in the *Critical Qualitative Inquiry* are focused on public education, social policy-making, and community transformation that also occurs via an aesthetic-ethical relationship with the past. The motivation for this type of action is related to a worldview in which “as global citizens, we are no longer called to interpret the world”, but to change it by resisting against injustice and constructing an inclusive and participatory democracy (DENZIN 2017, p. 9). According to Norman Denzin, the *Critical Qualitative Inquiry* community is generally defined by acting through perspectives that cross feminism, queer theory, critical theory, as well as cultural and postcolonial studies. These research lines act both in the centers and on the margins of the intersecting disciplines. The intersection being referred here is found through themes such as communication, race, ethnicity, religious and women’s studies, sociology, history, anthropology, literary critique, political science and economics. There is an interest in creating a safe space capable of reconciling the

qualitative analyses of certain realities with the search for creative alternatives to their confrontation. This points to the configuration of a field in which “writers, teachers, and students are willing to take risks to move back and forth between the personal and the political, the biographical and the historical” (DENZIN 2017, p. 14). To this end, researchers of this field use precisely new performative methods, such as ethno-dramas and social theater. These two methods are able to make oppressive cultural like racism, homophobia and sexism visible.

Particularly, I associate the need for creating new methods – as Denzin argues considering Gumbrecht’s propositions –, as an abandonment of the need to define methodological paths. Although it may seem contradictory, both authors think that their proposals define a certain limit of scientificity in the Humanities. Gumbrecht has “always been convinced that claiming the rigor of a ‘method’ is a trope by which humanists seek an easy escape from their traditional inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* scientists” (GUMBRECHT 1997, p. 425). Moreover, the author believes that the concern of Humanities researchers should be focused elsewhere:

It is both an obligation for, and a privilege of, humanists to practice “risky thinking”. That is to say, instead of subordinating ourselves to rational schemes of evidence and the constraints of systems, we “scientists of the mind” (*Geistwissenschaftler*) should seek to confront and imagine whatever might entail a disruption of everyday life and the assumptions underlying its function (GUMBRECHT 2014, p. XI).

Gumbrecht’s criticism of the conventional protocols of History and of the Human Sciences is, above all, a claim for a distinct relationship with things, beings, bodies and with the past that goes beyond and challenges a conception of anthropology. The anthropology in question is exactly the one in which reason would be superior to bodily and material elements. Gumbrecht’s criticism is also ontological and his works it surfaces from his considerations about *presence*. I would like to address one of

the possible contributions of the presence paradigm using an example related to the History curricula in Brazil.

The Brazilian educational curricula is under a growing demand for the inclusion of History of Africa and the History of Indigenous populations, facing however significant resistance to the historical need for its democratization. To explore the different reasons why this occurs is impossible in a single article, however, I would like to emphasize – although in a general way – how the discussions about university curricula have difficulty transposing the internal debates of universities, debates that are “surrounded by traditional jealousies crystallized in the intense specialization of the field” (BENTIVOGLIO 2017). The centrality conferred on Europe and the chronological-linear approach are just a few examples that evidence the preservation of a “traditional curricula that is still quite similar to the curricula existing since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century” (BENTIVOGLIO 2017).

Among the many barriers that impede the inclusion of Indigenous, African and Asian studies in curricula, I emphasize the insistence on establishing a relationship with the past that is largely given by “meanings” (GUMBRECHT 2010), this is a limitation that occurs in a culture determined by logical-formal statements. These statements aim to exhaust a theme from causal explanations and Western approaches. To explain the implications of this model I turn to a story often told by Ewa Domanska in her classes and interviews, a story she shared with me at one of our meetings.

In 2010, at the 21<sup>st</sup> International Congress of Historical Sciences in Amsterdam, she organized a discussion on “the rights of the dead”. A Dutch historian who was present stated that this table was not intended to discuss the “ghosts of ancestors”. Faced with such statement, a historian from Nigeria who was also present was furious: she argued that the ghosts of ancestors are part of the daily lives of their people and that this does not refer to an irrational or primitive belief, but rather to their lives and how they coexist with their ancestors. Other historians from African countries stood up applauded. For Domanska, this expressed a demand

from African historians present at the congress (although not only from them) that this belief system cannot be discarded or reduced to some kind of folk belief. In reality, what some reduce to a folk belief is a way of existing and experiencing the world that can and should be present when discussing the rights of the dead. Or, leading the question to the case that concerns us: when a study on Africa is claimed.

We can add to this reasoning that the violations suffered by ethnic and religious groups throughout Brazilian history, including the denial of their worldviews, is also related to the insistence on the “reason/sense” pair. This pair is at the basis of the academic discussions and, consequently, of the established curricula. Some examples of how reason/sense determines reality can be seen when we observe the murder of indigenous peoples by the State and by loggers and farmers, the permanent evangelization of these peoples by religious groups, the disrespect and violence that neo-Pentecostal fundamentalists have subjected the religions of others (including murdering their leaders and destroying their religious spaces), the judiciary that has imposed rules that alter the practices of these religions, some vegan critiques that disregard the sacred dimension of Afro-Brazilian religions in their relationship with animals, nature, and so on. All these events are related to practices of violence involving different historical, political and social issues. Thus, my argument is that the criticism and resistance to these violence practices also goes through rethinking the epistemological, ontological and temporal paradigms centered on meaning and representation, even if this criticism is not restricted to that. These paradigms impose monopolies of interpretation that deny and/or hierarchize difference, preventing the diversification of modes of experimenting reality.

By returning to Gumbrecht, we realize that the dimension of risk in his thinking, as previously mentioned, refers to “presence” as an alternative to the emphasis placed by the Humanities on “meaning” (GUMBRECHT 2010).

“Presence” would be an ontological dimension of existence, a non-hermeneutic way of engaging in relationships with the world, in which the attention would be on things-themselves, returning to experiences and their forms of apprehension through the body. “Presence” is also a desire, *the desire-of-presence*, that would act as a resistance to the domestication of the body imposed by the world of techniques. This is also a critique of the “transcendental” foundation in the structure and functions of human consciousness, which led to the wearing away of the body as an important dimension to life and to the triumph of Cartesian rationality (GUMBRECHT 2014).

Similarly, Ewa Domanska argues that thinking about the past in terms of its presence assumes the attention to the relationships between the human and the nonhuman, the organic and the inorganic, between people and “things.” This reflection process is related to the criticism of the anthropocentric character of History that is based on a dichotomous conception between mind and body, and subject and object. Thus, criticism turns to other equally important forms of existence that are not limited to human beings, this is a demand linked to “new material studies” that do not comprehend matter as an inferior reality to the spirit, relating it to the apprehension of the world. In this perspective, the characterization of things as “dead”, “missing”, “absent” or “past” would be a means of neutralizing their threatening *otherness* or a way of disciplining and shaping them into a narrative. Domanska questioned the understanding of the past as a field of absent experiences that can only be assimilated through scientific historical research capable of attributing a causal linear narrative. Rather, the past would be a performative force with impacts that go beyond consciousness. What we treat as the past seems to set up a field of experiences that acts on us from our body, which constitutes us, and that must be considered in addition to a representation (DOMANSKA 2006).

## Public History and Popular Historiographies: the accomplishment of the *éthos* of History

In an article for the *New York Times* opinion page titled "Historians Shouldn't Be Pundits", Moshik Temkin argued that while Donald Trump may be considered a danger to the world, he has been a "boon" to historians. Such blessing is given because of the turbulence being wrought, making historians be called to thematize and elaborate on the meaning of their government through "30-second" speeches on TV or short articles. As a historian, Temkin said he is happy with the well-deserved "publicity" the discipline has gained; however, he is also concerned about the "speediness" and "superficiality" used by historians to synthesize Trump's rise to power and of certain historical analogies that are being made about his administration. Tomkin's motivation for writing the article was to draw attention to the fact that certain thematized analogies can be dangerous, such as the comparison between the Trump administration and the Nixon era. According to the historian, if Watergate had shown the effectiveness of democracy and American institutions, there can be no assurance that the Trump era will meet the same fate. According to Temkin, in the present context it would be up to the historian to provide a critical and unaccommodated account of how this conjuncture was created, answering, for example, the following questions:

1. How did a rich man who never contributed to the public good become a public figure?
2. Why are the opinions, evidently misinformed (and even false), posted by him on Twitter important to millions of people?
3. How has wealth made his access to power and political influence possible?
4. Why has xenophobia been such a force in a country built by immigrants?

Temkin further stated that historians have answered these questions, but that they do not serve the interests of American media, thus reserving the debate to very restricted spaces (TEMKIN 2017).

Another question is the following: will historians sit and allow journalists without History training to do their job? Responding to Temkin's article and also published in the opinion section of the *New York Times*, Keri Leigh Merritt disagreed with him in a text entitled "Let the Historians Speak". To Merritt, the central debate is that historians must figure out how to speak to wider audiences; therefore, the analogy would be a useful hook for creating engagement and inciting people's interest thus leading them to want to learn more. For Merritt, Temkin assumes that most Americans are capable and willing to read longer, more nuanced analyzes, although the disparities in education would indicate the opposite. Merritt argued that historians have to be on the front lines, directly speaking to people, otherwise they would allow a politically determined media to "shape" the American public (MERRITT 2017).

About Temkin and Merritt's views, other questions can be asked: would the appearance of historians in the media suffice for a "more efficient training" in History regarding the public? Would the achievement of a new format of communication aimed at the "non-specialized" public be enough for History to "ethically" and "politically" train people? Would it suffice to say that historians are doing their part, but that media would not be interested in hearing them because of specific political interests that also support it?

These debates are at the heart of the discussions on Public History and Popular Historiographies. These discussions have emphasized the contemporary divergences on the means of production/apprehension/teaching of the contents and forms of History, imposing critics on its path and epistemological priorities. In this sense, Public History and Popular Historiographies, and the places where these debates echo in, can be understood as openings for "unconventional history" according to the previously proposed ideas.



Public History has multiple definitions (ALMEIDA, MAUAD and SANTHIAGO 2016; ALMEIDA and ROVAI 2012), it can be the History made for the public; the history made with the audience; the history made by the public; and yet again, it can be the very relationship between history and public (SANTHIAGO 2016, p. 23-36). Despite the difficulty, or even the impossibility, of defining Public History in the face of the different experiences of the field around the world, we can say that its core is the very interest and interlocution with the ethical-political action. To achieve its goal, such attention to social processes and their conflicts is fundamental, regardless if it means to work outside the university, to broaden audiences, to deconstruct the hierarchy of authority in the production of knowledge, to incorporate non-institutional relationships with the past, to produce a self-reflexivity of the field (SANTHIAGO 2016, p. 23-36) or to deconstruct sedimented historical understandings. Public History also aims at the expansion of the labor market for historians, as well as the insertion of History in the media as one of its objectives (SANTHIAGO 2016, p. 23-36).

Public History is not to be confused with and it is not limited to a translation or adaptation of academic content to “non-specialized” audiences, since this perspective is still at risk of maintaining a hierarchy between “academic” and “non-academic” spaces. A more complex performance of Public History assumes the understanding of this area as a field that would involve research and academic approaches, the production of historical knowledge in non-academic settings, classrooms and different audiences connected to some type of historical interest. Public History is a space where the public historian, the history teacher and the “professional historian” can share the issues that are of direct interest, since these surface from a popular and less specialized demand.

When taken as a meeting place, Public History can bring different interests together through historical knowledge, helping to deconstruct the hierarchy between “academic” and “non-academic” spaces by considering that scientific knowledge

is often a product of social structures starting from common sense. Attention to this perspective may also help to break the projection of the privileged/redemptive character of institutional knowledge. Furthermore, it may question the idea that the public historian should offer his audience only “what they desire”. Public History’s purpose would not be merely to “serve society”, because by corroborating the assumptions of serving society, historians risk treating History only as a product to be consumed, which could lead to the accentuation of prejudices and historical structures that need to be demystified.

We can thus affirm that Public History assumes the expansion of public spaces and historical knowledge. The performance of the discipline in different spheres of the academic environment would be one of the central elements for the characterization of the public historian. Some of the examples of spaces and activities for public history would be museums, radio broadcasting, print and television, literature, films, theater, arts in general, oral history, history teaching, and political activism. In this perspective, the dialogue with the “production” of the historical experience performed by historians who work outside the university is necessary, making it more complex – not in a subordination sense, but considering interdependence. In the same way, allowing the same process to happen in relation to academic knowledge is also necessary. This would require the production of new formats of texts, languages and technologies for communication in all these spheres of conception of History.

However, we must note that when reducing the problem of the encounter between a historian and a wider public to the production of new dialogue formats and to the dominion of technologies we are not exhausting the problem of enlarging spaces and of public for the discipline History. Jurandir Malerba showed, for example, how the production of some historical novels on the history of Brazil and Latin America, written in a way and in a language attractive to the general public, brings negative consequences due to the reproduction of stereotypes, prejudices and violence (MALERBA 2014). Stressing that an

accessible format is not sufficient to establish a new form of communication if it is not accompanied by the care with empirical research and with its ethical implications.

The production of new communication formats related to digital technology must also be discussed. The openness to digital media has forced public historians to face a rapidly changing technological field. The Public History also occurs in virtual universes composed of interactive three-dimensional environments, internet blogs, social networking mashups and mobile applications, often involving large investments and financial risks (HURLEY 2016). However, the question yet to be asked is whether this relationship with technology has improved the ability of public history to achieve its main goals such as stimulating and qualifying civic and democratic activism.

Andrew Hurley highlights that deficits in education (in addition to financial ones, of course) have deprived peripheral communities of the possibility of fully engaging with technology. He raised these data based on a research conducted in a poor neighborhood of St. Louis, Missouri. The initial design proposed by Hurley had to be adapted by combining digital instruments with more traditional modes of communication. As an example, the production of virtual realities and the possibility of three-dimensional immersion, without access to effective educational programs, makes the past function more as a constraint than as a repertoire of ideas and inspiration sources (HURLEY 2016). In these cases, one “consumes the past” as a product through the expansion of marketing; however, the past’s critical, reflective and aesthetic potential is lost.

When emphasizing the thematization of contemporary issues “capable of affecting ways of thinking and political action; themes that inevitably act in the common formation of the public” (SILVA 2016, p. 14), Public History is intensely connected to classrooms. Therefore, classrooms are one of the places that lead the integration between the production and circulation of historical knowledge, its forms of presentation and an audience with a practical demand regarding what is learned.

In this sense, the teaching of History would be an example of the performance of Public History. There is an interest in training people for citizenship and for the amplification of voices and subjects (SILVA 2016, p. 15). This happens when the need for the development of History teaching comes from different methodologies and languages in which the imagination, for example, would have decisive importance to avoid abstract simplifications and distance from the past (BARBOSA 2016; ABREU and RANGEL 2015 ).

David King argued that Public History is a threat to most traditional History departments because of the existence of strong prejudice stemming from the well-defined and settled constitution of “disciplinary boundaries and in favor of texts and research of European and very ancient historical subjects, and the more you distance yourself from any of them [...] the more resistance you will find” (KING *Apud* SANTIAGO 2016, p. 214). King claims that Public History points to an opening of new historical approaches. These new historical approaches tend to be more democratizing and dedicated to difference for acting in the contemporary world, and what would determine a redirection of the social function of History would be precisely such democratizing dimension that is present. If, on the one hand, Public History can be understood as a dialogue/performance of the academic world with different spaces, on the other, it is also the realization of an *éthos* proper to historical experiences. King defined Public History as “the institutionalization of a spirit that many historians have had for hundreds of years – but there was no way to manifest such spirit” (KING *Apud* SANTIAGO 2016, p. 213-214). For Public History, this spirit is the accomplishment of an *éthos* of historical knowledge, defined by me as a demand for the social function of History focused on acting on contemporary debates, aiming at understanding and complexifying issues of its public through different formats and spaces of dialogue. In short, it is the secular effort to reduce the boundary between the conventional and the “unconventional”. However, this effort does not mean that the performance of Public History

is free from the risk of simplifying or impoverishing the experiences of the past while attempting to understand and to mobilize it in a pragmatic sense.

The contemporary debate about History presents a demand for the inclusion of popular visions about the past – running parallel to the development of Public History – that has intensified. We are increasingly investigating the ways in which we popularly assimilate some historical experiences precisely because “professional” historiography does not fully control the access to historical reflection and production. The experiences and narratives produced by and directed to non-specialized audiences, having more impact on the subjects’ relationship with History than with the institutional space (PALETSCHEK 2011, p. 1-16), have been the main object of popular historiographies.

The effort to liberate the past from the constraints of academic History has allowed historical consciousness to be increasingly analyzed via popular understandings. This transformation enables a more pragmatic action directed at the contemporary world (PIHLAINEN 2014, p. 16). Popular historiographies do not concern a standardization of History as the result of a single product but reflect the complexity of the cultural and social interface. The popular apprehension of History can act as a paradigm of important analyses for the ways society thinks about History and as open spaces for reflection, and even for the suppression, of an objectifying relationship with the past (DE GROOT 2009).

Popular historiographies that closely follow the different worldviews and ontologies allow a description of certain relationships with reality and still the power to claim the displacement of consecrated priorities and scientific bases. The works of the historian Luiz Antonio Simas and the pedagogue Luiz Rufino stand out as an example of this power. These researchers started from the experiences of *terreiros de macumba* to propose an “epistemic rapture” that claims the notion of “Enchanted Science” instead of “Human Sciences”. This

is the construction of an epistemology that incorporates Black-African wisdoms brought to Brazil through the African diaspora. These wisdoms were intersected with Amerindian ones and with many others. The book *Fogo no mato: a ciência encantada das macumbas* (Fire in the woods: the enchanted science of macumbas) presents a History of Brazil not as focused on Western values but one situated at a crossroads, one capable of untying us from normativity and from violently and symbolically imposed colonial limits. This is a perspective far from what was conventionally agreed to be understood as science. Moreover, this work offers the valuation of other innumerable possibilities to existence (SIMAS and RUFINO 2018).

## Final considerations

This article sought to highlight some of the ontological, epistemological, ethical and political demands that are directed at the History discipline nowadays, emphasizing that these demands are also aimed at the Humanities in general. Although this article may have incurred in the risk of a generalization by referring to History as a single area, I would like to note that I am aware of the complexity and diversity of this discipline. What I have tried to argue from the History of Historiography and Theory of History is that when these fields are combined and turned to the temporal horizons, they aid in the identification of the more general tendencies of historical thought and of thought as a whole.

Some of the “unconventional” demands of History that have been identified are related to the performative and aesthetic character of the past, to the ethical dimensions concerned with difference (the plurality of stories and their subjects), to the broadening of discussions about the public performance of historians and, more immediately, the attention to the popular elaborations of History. Ignoring these demands means risking insisting on a discipline that denies difference by assigning universal meanings to contingent events and singular subjects. The emphasis on this perspective may reject how

much the discipline owes to other spaces and issues inherent in its institutionalization process that are still under-explored. I am referring to the understanding of how their protocols and contents are born from a conflict/criticism with those who are denied. Moreover, I refer to how this process is crucial for the attribution of new meanings to their epistemological and social orientations. In this sense, understanding the ways in which new historical and historiographic processes claim openness to the “unconventional” can help build more complex historical reflections and practices regarding the responsibility of History with its possibilities and limits in time.

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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

**Thamara de Oliveira Rodrigues** 

thamara\_rodrigues@yahoo.com.br

PhD student in History from the Federal University of Ouro Preto  
Brasil

Translated by Fernanda Miguens.

I would like to thank Hans U. Gumbrecht, Ewa Domanska and Marcelo Rangel for their suggestions and contributions to the production of this article during my visit to Stanford University. I would also like to thank the Center for Studies in History of Historiography and Modernity (NEHM) for providing a space for debate. This research was funded by CAPES and done through the Doctorate Abroad Program, process no. 88881.134194 / 2016-01.

RECEIVED IN: 31/OCT./2017 | APPROVED IN: 15/JUNE/2018

# Experience, symbol and communication: a transversal model for the study of historical thought

Experiencia, símbolo y comunicación: un modelo transversal para el estudio del pensamiento histórico

Rodrigo Escribano Roca

<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6405-7191> 

## ABSTRACT

The article proposes the definition of a heuristic model designed for the transversal analysis of historical thought. We consider historical thought as a set of cognitive practices and public discourses that give meaning to the relationships of human societies with historical times. The premise is that, in order to understand the complexity of the intellectual processes of signification of the historical worlds, it is necessary to combine in a single analytical field the issues concerning the experience, the representation, the conceptualization and the argumentation of history, as well as those concerning its communication and social uses. To that end, we will conceptualize five dimensions of historical thought (experiential, representational, theoretic-argumentative, conceptual and performative), revising the historiographical theories that have been elaborated about each of them, defining their specificities and their mutual relations and, finally, designing a set of questions in order to analyze them in a common framework.

## KEYWORDS

Historicity; Experience; Representation.

## RESUMEN

En este artículo se propone la definición de un modelo heurístico para el análisis transversal del pensamiento histórico, entendido éste como un conjunto de prácticas cognitivas y discursos públicos que dotan de sentido a las relaciones de las sociedades humanas con los tiempos históricos. Se parte de la premisa de que, para entender en su complejidad los procesos intelectuales de significación de los mundos históricos, es necesario combinar en un solo campo de análisis los problemas concernientes a la experiencia, la representación, la conceptualización y la argumentación de la historia, así como aquellas cuestiones referentes a su comunicación y sus usos sociales. A tal fin, se conceptualizarán cinco dimensiones analizables del pensamiento histórico (experiential, representacional, teórico-argumentativa, conceptual y performativa), revisando las teorías historiográficas elaboradas sobre cada una de ellas, definiendo sus relaciones mutuas y sus especificidades y, finalmente, diseñando una batería de preguntas para analizarlas en conjunto.

## PALABRAS CLAVE

Historicidad; Experiencia; Representación.

To think and to enunciate history could be understood as a circus show or an alchemic exercise: a complex game of equilibriums and mixtures that needs to combine disparate intellectual elements. According to Jörn Rüsen, history, considered as an act of thought and enunciation, brings into dialogue the past and the present, the empirical fact and fiction, narrative and theory (RÜSEN 2005, p. 4). Our theoretical proposal is based on the premise that, in order to analyze the complexity of the intellectual processes of signification of the “historical worlds”, it is possible and necessary to combine certain questions, methodological strategies and analytical categories of the main schools and tendencies that, during the last decades, have maintained serious disputes over the epistemological status and social function of historiography, that is, the theories of narrativism, constructivism, experientialism, conceptual history and performativity (ANKERSMIT 2011; ESCRIBANO ROCA 2017; ZERMEÑO PADILLA 2015; SCHOLTZ 2011; FORASTIERI DA SILVA 2015).<sup>1</sup> Even though these tendencies share some important concerns about the intellectual relations of human collectives with the past, each has focused on their own particular agendas and paradigms, tending to stress their own differences in relation to the others and, hence, deepening the fragmentariness and the polarization of the field (DAY 2008, p. 417–419; PAUL 2015, p. 450–458; PETERS 2016, p. 235–236).<sup>2</sup> The contribution proposed here intends to suggest a creative response to the demands for the “unity” of the theory of history which has insistently been expressed during the last years. The main goal is to define an analytical model that aspires to design a theoretical articulation of the tendencies cited. Ultimately, the aim is to define a set of synthetical questions which should permit the practical application of the theories suggested to the study of the diverse voices, actors and spaces that intervene in the cultural systems of signification of the historical pasts.

In order to accomplish these objectives, the point of departure is the definition of “historical thought” as a complex set of cognitive operations that agglutinate experiential,

*1 - The cited contributions are good revisions about the tendencies we have mentioned.*

*2 - These articles are good examples of good diagnosis about the fragmentation of the field.*

symbolical (representational, theoretical, conceptual) and performative dimensions. According to this definition, historical thought would present itself as a form of dialectical and transversal reason, which would need a dynamic combination of empirical, conceptual, theoretical and representational strategies to make historical worlds intelligible. It could be considered as an intellectual system which combines different modes of cognition and expression as a necessary condition for human communities to establish a meaningful relationship with the historicity of the world they inhabit. The historical thought and its discourse would consist, therefore, of the dialogical experience of the traces and “presences” of the past (experiential dimension); the mental generation of concepts, arguments, theories and narratives concerning a prefigured historical issue (conceptual, theoretical and representation dimensions); and their framing in discursive networks that would allow their communication and reception (performative dimension). In this paper we will realize an integrative proposal of analysis for this set of dimensions, aiming to demonstrate their complementarity and their dialectical relationship. Each of these spheres of thought will be conceptualized, departing from a theoretical revision and from the identification of a set of variables and questions which should allow establishing a common analytical framework for all the dimensions.

## Eloquent “presences”: the experiential dimension

To perform the immersion in the experiential realm, without incurring in a renewed positivism, requires the preliminary vindication of a premise that has been well defended by certain representatives of the linguistic turn: the great majority of events that took place in the past have disappeared, they are no longer accessible to experience or observation (MUNSLOW 2007, p. 3–4). However, during the last decades, some theoreticians, such as David Lowenthal (2016, p. 383–386), Paul Ricoeur (2003a, p. 201–205) or Mark Day (2008, p. 417–427), have convincingly identified the existence of numerous traces,

relics and material connections that tend to blur the radical division between past and present. According to these authors, these traces of the past sustain a meaningful relation with the worlds of the past, transcending, in part, the limitations that are imposed by language. In this context, “experientialist” philosophies defended by Frank Ankersmit (2012, p. 157–174) or Ethan Kleinberg (2013a, p. 8–25) have vindicated the need to understand the ways in which the past is ontologically superposed with the present. In this context, the concept of “presence”, defined by Eelco Runia (2014, p. 60–83), as an object, subject or process that is directly accessible to experience and alludes to entities, beings and occurrences of the past has been fundamental.

These “presences” could be accessed through a set of material and intellectual relations that are susceptible to be subsumed under the category of “historical experience” (ANKERSMIT 2012, p. 209–214). Nevertheless, this category has been subjected to very distinct conceptualizations. Firstly, it would be possible to understand historical experience as a kind of direct, not mediated, “impression” or “sensation” of an object of the past. This form of sensorial relation with the things, structures and beings of the historical world would take place in an unthought immediacy. It would, therefore, produce simple cognitive units that would be a condition of possibility to think historically (CARR 2014, p. 8–16; VARELLA 2012). These historical sensations could be both passive or proactive, mundane or sublime, but they would always allow a linguistic, material, aesthetic or emotional relation with the past (PAUL 2016, p. 73). This intuitive and immediate historical experience could be complemented by the cumulative historical experience, emerged as the result of systematic empirical observation and of the recollection and preservation of historical sensations (CARR 2014, p. 32–33). This modality is related to the neo-kantian positions of Reinhardt Koselleck (2004, p. 106–112), Jörn Leonhard (2013, p. 377–383) or Norbert Elias (1992, p. 36). These authors consider experience as the foundational process of historical knowledge, as it would connect the pure sensibility

of time and space with the mental exercises of synthesis and abstraction. The model that we are proposing takes into account all these typologies, conceptualizing "historical experience" as the set of relations with the presences, traces and structures that refer to the past or future temporalities of the vital spheres of a subject. Accordingly, the experiential dimension refers to the experiences of historicity that participate in the configuration of historical thought.

Under these premises it would be possible to classify three types of "presence" of the past. In the first place, we could find all kinds of structures of repetition, not understood as eternal cycles, but as recurrent events and practices that presume continuities in the long term (KOSELLECK 2010, p. 54). We could designate two types of "structures of repetition": natural and social ones. The first typology refers to the ecological, geological and genetic structures that frame human actions (KOSELLECK 2010, p. 55–57). The second typology makes reference to a complex set of social institutions, legal and ethical codes and recurrent cultural, economic and political practices (KOSELLECK 2010, p. 57–63). In the second place, after the structures of repetition, we could identify the artifacts and material traces: buildings, monuments and objects of daily use that, in some occasions, maintain their cultural attributes and functions while, in others, have been resignified. The third type alludes to the written and symbolic testimonies that leave linguistic notice of some befallen event (MANCILLA MUÑOZ 2013, p. 177; PETERS 2016, p. 243).

As a consequence, it is possible to conceive the historical thinker as a subject that is inhabiting an "extended present" backwards and forwards, in which the past would not definitely pass and in which the future would be constantly anticipated (LORENZ, 2010, p. 84; NAVAJAS ZUBELDÍA, 2013, p. 36–39). Hence, the experiences of the present are assumed to include certain "duration" of time. The temporal framework of an event changes depending on the temporality in which it is inscribed: from the forty years of duration of the Spanish democracy to



the thousand years of agriculture. The majority of things that happen in the present take place in fluid, multiple and complex temporalities: in a “now” that is crossed by yesterdays and tomorrows. According to this theorizations about temporality, historical experience can put us in contact with two main types of “past”. On the one hand, a fragmented and strange past that shows itself in its alterity, as a relic or a dead trace. On the other hand, the past as a living entity, that is standing in the present and is sustaining it (LOWENTHAL 2016, p. 585–586; PAUL 2016, p. 58–63).

It seems clear that the inclusion of the experiential dimension in our model allows taking a position that escapes from the Manichaeian debate between objectivism and subjectivism. The notion of an insurmountable separation between the past and the present has been insistently defended by certain narrativists and constructivists, who are skeptic about the possibility of “experiencing the past” or even of reaching meaningful knowledge of it (JENKINS 2003, p. 33–46; PIHLAINEN 2013a, p. 518). However, along with the theories of “presence”, there has been a range of epistemological studies that have refuted the conviction of linguistic relativism. They have re-affirmed the possibility of establishing a meaningful intellectual relationship with the traces of the past, departing from a comprehensive exercise of contextualization, comparison, dating and inference (e.g. MITROVIĆ 2015).

For their part, the experientialist authors have contended that the presences can function as “temporal portals” through which the past can be accessed by its traces, which would be full of meaning and available for their interpretation (RUNIA 2014, p. 82–83). In this sense, it is possible to add these arguments to the ideas that, from Gadamer (1977, p. 329–332) to Ankersmit or Koselleck, have considered “dialogue” as the heart of historical hermeneutics. These thinkers have claimed that historical interpreters are able to establish a meaningful dialectic with the authors and actors that are deceased. Following this supposition, historical interpretation appears as a

dialectical, emotional and comprehensive relationship between the interpreter and the interpreted. This relationship would constitute an act of knowledge in which both subjects would belong to each other reciprocally, dialoguing and “fusing” their horizons. While the horizon of the thinker (configured by the prejudices, the tradition and the authority) would anticipate the meaning, the horizon opened by the testimonies and traces of the past would operate a necessary transformation in the first. This is not to say, as we have already noticed, that the meaning of the presences can be addressed and explained in its totality. On the contrary, the historian raises a set of questions which are always burdened with intentions and political or ethical concerns. By doing this, the historical thinker always modifies the original and forgotten meaning of the traces and presences that allow him to experience the past linguistically, materially and visually (BEVIR 2015, p. 17–18; DAY 2008, p. 419; PAUL 2016, p. 64). These traces, in turn, alter the preconceptions of the interpreter about the historical universe he is thinking about, putting limits to his representational potential and altering his comprehension of the world and his modes of action (KOSELLECK 2004, p. 128; PAUL 2016, p. 62).

Therefore, we would talk about the “historical truth” as a dynamic “verisimilitude” which is dependent on the dialogic relationship between the presences (here as evidences) and the system of symbolical and cultural references of the interpreter (BEVIR 2015, p. 17–18; KUUKKANEN 2015, p. 96–108). Under this thesis, historical experience would be dialectically superposed with the symbolic dimensions of historical thought: the concepts, figurations and argumentative structures that are constructed by the mind of the interpreter would prevent knowledge to limit itself to sensorial receptions and would allow it to structure the experiences that have been received, transforming them into fully signified historical narratives. In this framework, a co-determination between experience, reflection and discourse takes place: the experienced past is situated in a circle with the represented, conceptualized and communicated past. In the model we propose, therefore,

the experiential scope is understood as an immediate sense of the historicity of the world that is constantly mediated by the symbolical dimensions. The narrative, theoretical and conceptual aspects of historical thought articulate the network of relationships between the experiential realm and the social and individual world. Hereafter we will identify three symbolical levels that would function as sub-systems implied in the mental operations that define the unitary system of historical thought, along with experience and communication.

## Necessary Fictions: the representational dimension.

In the first place, we will define the representational dimension that comprehends the set of figurative and narrative operations that are oriented to the construction of a historical representation, or an intentional image of past realities. This is what narratology has named as a "fiction" (GÓMEZ REDONDO 1994, p. 126–128). It is important to take into account that some theoreticians, such as Paul Ricoeur (2003a, p. 198–204;313), David Carr (2008, p. 19–30, 2014, p. 193–223), Julián Zícari (2015, p. 34–38) or the last Hayden (WHITE 2014, p. x–xi), have reminded that the fictional or narrative aspects of historiography could be understood as imaginative devices that are able to generate knowledge about human realities.<sup>3</sup> In this sense, Ivan Jablonka has claimed that history could be considered as an intermediate genre between literature and social knowledge (JABLONKA 2016). Under these premises, the representational dimension would consist in a sub-system of signification that contributes decisively to form coherent and meaningful ideas about the historical worlds, presenting them as universes of facts with narrative form.

In discursive terms, this dimension is the level of form in which the author employs narrative and tropological techniques in order to give formal coherence to the historical statements. It is also the realm of exposition and proposition of contents: it gives presence to the data that are compiled in the experiential dimension, placing them as ordered events.

*3 - Obviously there are profound differences between the diverse theorizations the authors of this tendency have performed concerning the epistemological capacity of narration (ANKERSMIT 2011)*

This narrative dimension of historical thought is composed by a set of identifiable elements: the “story” (as the exposition and factual correlation of characters, temporal frameworks and spaces), the figurative or tropological resources and, finally, the stylistic elements (voice, focalization or verbal time). This conjunction implies an enormous diversity of ways of articulating meaningfully the narrative representation, even though it must satisfy certain rules and standard of scale and consistency in order to generate an intelligible fictional world.

The narrative construction of the past begins with the process of “selection” (DE CERTEAU 2010, p. 18–19; GADDIS 2004, p. 42–45). On the basis of a field of experiences, issues or objects that prefigure the topic of the story, the historical thinker (here as a narrator) selects meaningful events among the unmanageable amount of data that are transmitted by the sources (LOWENTHAL 2016, p. 337). This selection is performed in evaluative terms: the interpreter evaluates the past, granting importance to some facts and including them in the narrative while condemning others to the dust of forgetfulness and silence (DAY 2008, p. 418). Then, the narrator subjects the facts that were selected to a series of processes of description, characterization and classification. These historical facts are then subsumed in typologies that situate them in the field of a concrete topic or problem (the “Discovery of America”, the “Enlightenment”, and the “Revolution”). In this moment these facts are narratively connected with a new set of facts, becoming an intelligible succession of historical events and acquiring a meaning that they would not have had in isolation.

Therefore, by following the structural theories of narrative stories (BARTHES 1974, p. 9–44; WHITE 1992, p. 17–25) we could suggest that the meaning in the representational realm is given by the narrative connections that the historical thinker weaves between the facts selected. The interpreter gives them coherency, organizing them in chronological events that are chained in expositive structures with discernible beginnings, transitions and ends (LOWENTHAL 2016, p. 353). Following this

reasoning, the “story” should be understood as a meaningful way of locating historical events in a representational framework. This representational framework would put into interaction the characters, time and space selected by the interpreter from the data, giving them a unitary meaning. Thus, the historical narrator would define a set of epochs, moments, rhythms, scenarios, objects and subjects, characterizing them, modeling their scales and their modes of action and articulating meaningful dichotomies between the “before” and the “now”, the “here” and the “there”, the “self” and the “Other”. The historical narration would be a coherent synthesis that mediates between the experiential time and the symbolic time; between the perceived and the imagined spaces; between the referenced historical characters and the conceptualized ones. Finally, narration would also allow the mediation between experience and expectation, modeling the existential dialectics between identity and change and between collective and individual time (ERKKILÄ 2015; RÜSEN 2005, p. 11).

At this point, it is necessary to indicate the relationship of difference and complementarity between narration, as a “diegesis” that “tells” the world, and representation, as a “mimesis” that imitates, substitutes and “shows” the world through tropological resources as metaphors, personifications or allegories (GENETTE 1983, p. 30). Tropes serve to organize knowledge through the presentation of complex ideas under familiar and accessible forms for the understanding and sensibility of the receptor (GONZÁLEZ DE REQUENA 2016, p. 289–290). They are a mode of cognition and creation that is defined by a game of substitutions, which allows accessing a thing (the represented) through other things (the representations) (ANKERSMIT 2001, p. 41–49; RICOEUR 2003b, p. 42, 274–282). There is no doubt that the historical thinker uses the metaphors and their derivatives as a very important means of comprehension and transmission of historical meanings: most of the historical narrators need to play with an abundance of allegorical evocations of lights and shadows, with metaphors of life and death, of youth and decadence, of maternity and filiation.

This narrative and representational dimension is observable, either in bigger or smaller scale, in all the intellectual exercises of historical reconstruction: even positivist or structuralist historians, who tend to refuse narration as a scientific form of accessing the past, need to design a spatial-temporal framework to select certain characters and situate their actions in an organized structure. However, it is true that, as Renata Geraissati Castro Almeida (2017), Jörn Rüsen (2005, p. 68–72) or Carlo Ginzburg (2014, p. 11–12) affirm, while the literary writer has total creative freedom, the historical narrator owes the receptor a compromise with verisimilitude, which forces him to base his representational construction in the presences, traces and sources that are imposed by the past.

### Logical questions: the theoretic-argumentative dimension.

The representational dimension is also situated in a dialectical relation with the theoretic-argumentative dimension. As Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen (2015, p. 101) or Mark Bevir (2015, p. 21) have recently indicated, the interest of the historian does not simply reside in the production of a narrative representation, but also in the rational elaboration of a set of ideas organized in theories through synthetical arguments, which must be based in demonstrable evidences and experiences (BELL 2016, p. 93; PAUL 2016, p. 145–148). Thus, the theoretic-argumentative dimension would consist of a set of logical operations based on the construction of rational arguments (sums of premises, evidences and conclusions) that deal with a problem or issue related with certain aspect of historical times. The historical argumentation would be, therefore, a systematic process of synthesis that aims at a theoretical formulation.

The historical argumentation would, then, consist of a discursive response to a specific set of questions by using evidences that have previously being organized narratively as premises. The historical argument would be the sum of the premises in the form of narrative and of the conclusion drawn

from it. All this would be possible thanks to the “historical hypothesis”, that is to say, the deductions and inferences performed in order to initiate the reflective and investigative process. Obviously, the condition of possibility for this process is the existence of a delimited topic or issue and access to a significant amount of historical experiences (PAUL 2016, p. 149–151). The historical discourse usually resorts to different types of argumentation that have been defined by the studies of critical thinking and are, essentially: causal arguments (mechanistic reasoning), conditional arguments, generalizing arguments (based on organicist reasoning) and comparative arguments (HERRERO 2016; WHITE 1973, p. 11–21).

Considering all this information, it is possible to deduce that the discourse of history is not necessarily holistic: despite its representational nature, it is possible to decompose it and to read it synthetically, recognizing its central theories and ideas (KUUKKANEN 2015, p. 131–147). An important part of professional historiography exposes its theories and arguments explicitly, in the form of introductions and conclusions or, directly, in the form of an essay (KUUKKANEN 2015, p. 62–70). Additionally, no matter how narrative, literary or inductive a history is, no matter how it resists displaying its ideas synthetically, there will always be central arguments that will be deduced from the narrative account. There will always be central ideas that will guide the selection of facts, characters and chronotopes. Historical thinking always implies an argumentation about the past that consists in analyzing, evaluating, comparing, prioritizing and debating. Kuukkanen or Paul do not deal with the superposition between the argumentative and fictional realms.<sup>4</sup> However, it is possible to propose that the evidences that sustain the historical arguments and theories are not presented directly from the chaos of experience: in order to argue about something, it is necessary to organize the evidences (that is, the data, the presences) in narrative chains of events. In historical thinking there is not such a thing as an exercise of argumentation without representation and experience, neither the articulation of a

*4 - Hayden White in fact did it, but he presented the modes of argumentation as subordinated to the tropology and the narrative.*

historical experience or of a historical representation without a structure of questions, hypothetical ideas and synthetical arguments (are they explicit or implicit). Thus, we reiterate the idea of historical thought as a dialogical process of multiple exchanges between dimensions and scopes, giving birth to transversal kind of knowledge and discourse.

## Dictionaries of time: the conceptual dimension

As the last dimension of the symbolical devices, the conceptual realm provides the syntactic and semantic frameworks that give the historical thinker the chance of connecting dialectically experiences, arguments and stories. Concepts are the semantic nodes that allow to articulate reflections and discourses about history: they are at once enablers, constrainers, stabilizer and transformers of a field of historical ideas (KOSELLECK 2012, p. 7–21). Concepts are thereby polysemic and plurivocal indexes which include logical, imaginative, experiential and emotional referents.

Partially following the theorizations of Elias Palti, it is possible to conclude that concepts do not have a fixed or intrinsic meaning, but they are simply “indexes of problems”: syntactic items that allow to articulate debates departing from shared codes (PALTI 2014, p. 387–404; WOLOSKY 2014, p. 90–91). In this aspect, they are characterized by their synchronic use and their performativity, appearing as inherently dialectic, unstable and contestable. For this reason, instead of following the semantic track of an only concept, it is convenient to make an onomastic analysis of certain historical vocabularies or languages, that is to say, of conceptual fields that conform semantic networks, constructing meanings through their mutual associations (BÖDEKER 2013, p. 3–30; WOLOSKY 2014, p. 89–90). Additionally, it is recommendable to attend to the considerations of Koselleck and the new history of ideas, which state that concepts, in spite of their instability and contingency, are able to accumulate certain groups of meanings that attach to language, establishing frameworks of thought of



long duration (ARMITAGE 2012, p. 493–496; KOSELLECK 2004, p. 155–192). Because of this, concepts can conduct historical-philological analysis in the long term: in the contemplation of their birth, their multiple uses and their transformations, it is possible to trace the ruptures and permanencies in the systems of historical thought.

To think historically implies, consequentially, to reason and imagine drawing from conceptuality. Concretely, as Kuukkanen (2015, p. 97–115) and Ankersmit (1983, p. 90–97) have indicated, historical thought stresses the “coligatory” dimension of concepts. Terms such as “colonialism”, “state”, “revolution” or “neolithic” would serve as synthesizers apt to refer, in one single word, to the plurality of meanings that are implied in a set of historical events. Furthermore, concepts are essential to model temporality: depending on their enunciation, they allude to different scales, rhythms and durations that determine the historical meaning of a discourse. As a consequence, they participate in the construction of the synchronizations and temporal frameworks that we have mentioned in the previous realms (JORDHEIM 2014, p. 498–518; STEINMETZ 2017, p. 63–68). As we have seen, concepts appear in the narrative dimension acting a narrative substances, characters and categories of time and space. In the theoretic-argumentative dimension, concepts act as categories that articulate the premises and the conclusions. Lastly, in the experiential dimension, they appear as the means to access the empirical world linguistically. Historical concepts are the seams that allow the union of the different materials that compose the representational, argumentative and experiential dimensions.

## Histories in action: the performative dimension

All the previous dimensions lead us to last realm: communicative or performative dimension. This field makes reference to the pragmatic aspect of discourse and thought, this is to say: to the set of rhetorical and communicative

movements that are present in the precedent dimensions; to the set of contexts (political, social, cultural, institutional) that surround the acts of creation and enunciation of historical discourse; and, lastly, to the political and ideological intention that lies behind such acts. The performative dimension involves diverse emitters and receptors in a game of communication and power (CARR 2014, p. 223–231; LOWENTHAL 2016, p. 338; SÁNCHEZ MECA 2012, p. 544–545). This dimension is that in which the historical thought transcends the individual level, configuring itself as a cultural practice of social dialogue. This set of social dialogues would configure a “historical culture”, understood as the set of voices, spaces and actors that are implicated in the socialization of historical meanings in the public sphere. In the context of this historical culture, social actors would organize their collective experiences of temporality and historicity (CARR 2014, p. 43; SEIXAS 2017, p. 77). Thus, the performative dimension allows the study of the relations of unequal communication that are established between the social actors that actively produce interpretations about the past. This also allows the study of the interactions between different spheres of enunciation (the academy, the church, the state, social movements, etc) and between different voices or discursive modes (textual, iconographic, oral, audiovisual, recreational, etc) (GREVER; ADRIAANSEN 2017, p. 79–81; PIHLAINEN 2013b, p. 12).

In any case, it is patent that the historical thinker constructs his discourse with a communicational intention: he does not try to make the past intelligible simply for himself, but for a specific group or for a set of social collectives. Therefore, historical discourses can be analyzed as illocutive speech acts: rhetorical movements that intend to “do something”, influencing in a specific context and provoking transformations in it (POCOCK 2009, p. 52–85; SKINNER 2007, p. 127–156). The historical thought would produce illocutive acts of assertive type (a proposition is presented as depiction of the state of things of the world), directive (the emitter expects the receptor to act in a specific manner) and expressive (the emitter wants to

express his feelings and postures regarding a specific issue) (ESCANDELL VIDAL 2014, p. 117–138). The performative dimension is present in all the dimensions previously defined: the conceptual, fictional and argumentative constructions are also conceived as elements for participating in a public debate. All of them are constituted as rhetorical actions that aim to influence the “historical debate”, considered as an emotional and rational struggle of different social actors for establishing the meanings of historical past and historical future (GONZÁLEZ MANSO 2011, p. 33–35; PERNAU; RAJAMANI 2016, p. 46–50; PETERS 2016, p. 242).

In this sense, the historical thinker has a clear rhetorical agency: he wants to add didactic representations to the mind of his interlocutor (informative intention); to modify the representations that already exist (persuasive intention); to make the receptor change his ways of acting (directive intention); or to impose his representations to alternative ones, appealing to his own epistemological superiority (normative intention) (ESCANDELL 2014, p. 100–101; FROEYMAN 2016, p. 231–232). Historical discourse would be endowed with perlocutionary power, that is, the capacity to transform the perceptions and experiences of the receptors, that would assume or reply the historical representation they receive (POCOCK 2009, p. 67–70). This analytical framework allows the connection of the events of social life with the history of historical representations, arguments, experiences and concepts (PALONEN 2017, p. 95–101).

These issues form part of what some authors have called the “politics of History”, as the set of disputes and consensuses about the historical past that takes place in a certain society or group. It is assumed that human communities define their identities, rights, legitimacies, projects and structures of governance in reference to the meaning of time and History (GREEN 2016, p. 37–56). In this context, we could distinguish various political, moral and existential functions of historical thought: identifying, justifying, preservative, critic and

guidance. In the first place, the “identification” function would consist in the activity of generating feelings and ideas of belonging, which would connect the individual with the groups or institutions in which he is immersed, permitting him to transcend his own particularity and facilitating his adscription to different ethical and political communities (GADAMER 1977, p. 297; CARR 2014, p. 47–55). The next one would be the function of “justification”, which would endow with legitimacy certain existing institutions and practices, normalizing them and portraying them as authentic and stable (POCOCK 2009, p. 187). The preservative function could be added to these, consisting in the conservation and active recovery of historical experiences and practices, which would allow a transgenerational transference of knowledge and customs (COLLINGWOOD 1919, p. 226; DAY 2008, p. 419–420). The function of justification has its counterpart in the critical function: an exercise of contraposition to the hegemonic historical ideas and myths that allows defining protests and proposing alternative projects (reactionaries or progressives) (SOUTHGATE 2005, p. 31–46; WINTER 2010, p. 18–19).

These functions would be crossed by the function of orientation that would be dedicated to the generation of collective modes of conduct oriented towards the future and understood as intersubjective projects that aspire to establish a control over social expectations. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary a co-determination between the experienced and the projected, between the historical conscience of the past and anticipations of possible futures (LEAL RIQUELME 2011, p. 131–140; RÜSEN 2005, p. 22–23). Therefore, historical thought would be fully implicated in the social conflicts for the control and *planification* of the future, having an enormous influence in the debates that define the horizon of expectation, mostly in modern societies (ALMEIDA 2014, p. 51–69; FRIESE 2010, p. 405–417; KOSELLECK 2003, p. 73–96). Thus, historical thought is generated within cultural dialogues that associate the experience in the present with the interpretations of the past and with the expectations of the future, linked to political and ethical issues that preside the present (HARTOG 2015, p. 15–20; MUDROVICIC 2016).

## Conclusion

This article has consisted of a dialogue between theories that, so far, have maintained a contrived divorce, over-dimensioning each of the partial aspects of an intellectual object which is inherently transversal. There has been a tendency to occlude the complex nature of historical thought, whose practices are at the same time factual and symbolical, theoretical and narrative, linguistic and experiential, objective and subjective. In the multidimensional framework that we have proposed, neither there would be a precedence of language to experience, nor vice versa. Neither the prevalence of metaphors to concepts nor of stories to rational argumentations. All the framing of historical thought would consist of a circle of cognitive practices that maintain a dialectic relation between them and that potentiate mutually the final meaning of the whole. The proposal of analysis by "dimensions" has not intended to give a definitive definition of historical knowledge. On the contrary, we have simply suggested a set of questions that, combined, allow a more complete comprehension of the intellectual processes of construction and communication of histories. These questions could be synthesized in five realms, each of them with its own analytical ramifications: what experiences of historicity operate in the broaching of a historical reflection?; which are the fictional or representational devices that the historical thinker employs?; which forms of argumentation are being used and which theories are being enunciated?; Which concepts are being chosen and how are they being signified?; what is the relation between the discourse of the interpreter and the context of emitters, receptors and intentions that is surrounding the historian?. This questionnaire allows the exploration of the very diverse and rich intellectual processes of cultural signification of the historical world, departing from the unity of interests of the theory of history and from a systematic application of the analytical strategies of some of the tendencies that participate in it. It seems the only way of advancing in the knowledge of the diverse and rich processes of cultural signification of historical time and in the intellectual relations with the historicity of the world.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND INFORMATION

### Rodrigo Escribano Roca

rodrigo.escribano@edu.uah.es

Teacher assistant and PhD student at the University Research Institute of Latin American Studies (IELAT) and PhD student the School of Humanities and Communication Arts of Western Sydney University (WSU)  
University of Alcalá

This article forms part of the project: “Histories of the Old Empire. The Early Modern American World in the Historical Thought of Spain and Great Britain”, funded by the Ministry of Education and Culture of Spain with the: Scholarship for university staff training (FPU): FPU14/04695.

RECEIVED IN: 19/FEB./2018 | APPROVED IN: 22/AUG./2018



# Time, History and Subjectivity in an “atopic” approach to Walter Benjamin’s theses *On the concept of History*

Tempo, história e subjetividade em uma abordagem “atópica” das teses de Walter Benjamin em seu ensaio *Sobre o conceito de história*

Marta Mega de Andrade

<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6437-0479> 

## ABSTRACT

This article seeks to reflect upon the problems of time and subjectivity in the production of historical knowledge. Its approach is deeply inspired by the thinking of Giorgio Agamben and begins by citing the relationship between history and poetry in the 1451 (a, b) section of Aristotle’s *Poetics*. The passage aims at establishing a difference between history and poetry, which is discussed here with reference to three mythical dimensions of Greek temporality — *Aiôn*, *Chrónos*, *Kairós* — with the objective of characterizing sketches of a conception of time that is different from ours and to which the image of the “body of time” is here proposed. The dialogue that follows with the theses on Walter Benjamin’s *On the concept of History* brings closer the problem of the body of time to the question of action and historical subjectivity, questioning the possibility of conceiving an image of time most appropriate to the constituent action of the historical subject and its relationship with the possible.

## KEYWORDS

Time; Subjectivity; Walter Benjamin.

## RESUMO

Neste artigo, busca-se refletir acerca dos problemas do tempo e da subjetividade na produção de conhecimento histórico. A abordagem escolhida é profundamente inspirada no pensamento de Giorgio Agamben e parte da citação da relação entre história e poesia no trecho 1451 (a, b) da *Poética* de Aristóteles. O trecho procura estabelecer uma diferença entre história e poesia, que é discutida aqui com referência a três dimensões míticas da temporalidade grega — *aiôn*, *chrónos*, *kairós* — com o objetivo de caracterizar esboços de uma concepção de tempo diferente da nossa e para a qual se propõe aqui a imagem do “corpo do tempo”. O diálogo que se segue com as teses incluídas em *Sobre o conceito de história*, de Walter Benjamin, aproxima a problemática do corpo do tempo à questão da ação e da subjetividade histórica, indagando sobre a possibilidade de conceber uma imagem do tempo mais adequada à ação constituinte do sujeito histórico e a sua relação com o possível.

## PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Tempo; Subjetividade; Walter Benjamin.

*Aion is a child playing draughts; the kingship is a child's*  
(HERACLITUS, fr.52)

The image of history I cherish is "atopic". It comes from the time when I was a history student and was preparing a work on the *sans culottes* that ended with a question: "Yes, after all, the fall of the Bastille happened, but it also happened that a child crossed the street to get some loaves of bread at grandma's house". Naive questioning, for sure; many children crossed the street, many women hung clothes on lines through the ages, many people passed by, just as the click of a camera saved forever their portrait on the background in another moment of revolution. However, all these "lapses", small daily absences, are outside history, that is, they have no place in an explanatory chain of causes and effects of the event itself, in the realms of history. Out of place, therefore, outside the historical time in which we produce our texts.

This recurring image of being out-of-history, I found again years later in a reading of H. Lefebvre's *Critique of Everyday Life* (1958, see intro and chapter 6). But it is in *Everyday Life in the Modern World* that an atopy, very close to that of mine, is expressed:

Suppose you have before your eyes the collection of calendars printed since 1900. From that pile you take one at random, which comes to be a year at the beginning of the century. Then you close your eyes and mark a blind day with the tip of a pencil. It is the 16th of June [...]

[...] Leaning on the press and the periodicals of this not so distant time, [...] you can now dream. On this day, wouldn't there something essential, which did not appear in the news, have happened? [...] No one can blame you if you think that on that day an imperceptible, but irreversible slip (an apparently unimportant decision of a banker or a minister) has accelerated the move from a competitive capitalism to another capitalism [...] You can even imagine, at the beginning of the summer, under the sun of the Solstice of Gemini, among the usual noises of a village or of some city, the birth of children destined (but why?) to become acutely aware of these things and of this time. (LEFEBVRE 1991, p. 5-6)



Lefebvre immersed himself in a potent dialogue with literature, drawing on Marxist philosophy and the context that enabled him to elaborate the fundamental and critical links of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, moving towards the problem of alienation and freedom of the subject by the footprint of the *possible* in everyday life. However, the enormous importance of his thought for history, the preoccupation with temporality, formulated in the first volume of *Critique*, unveils its horizon in literature, theater, and cinema, and does not explicitly propose as a problem the way of writing stories that have time as its fundamental landmark, historiography; after all, a conjecture such as "suppose that Einstein between lucidity and delirium had formulated on June 16 the theory of relativity [...]" (LEFEBVRE 1991, p. 5-6), it *still* presupposes a judgment of posterity on significant and universal facts, and therefore presupposes a certain attitude before what becomes historical. However, what if it were not Einstein, but his first wife, for instance, while sipping some tea? What if the theory of relativity had never happened, and the afternoon of June 16 had been nothing but an afternoon of study and calculation in the life of a public official dedicated to science? And what if Einstein had not been delirious; would he still be an ordinary Einstein *a posteriori* acknowledged as subject, portrait and biography in historical time? The valorization of the historical *leap immanent* to everyday life delineates a frontier, which is precisely that which is fundamental to Marxism, the frontier of becoming, of historical time thought dialectically as crisis and mutation (GANDLER 2009, p. 118-127). The boundary of linear time, or rather, dialectical linearity (or spiral) of historical time (MARQUES 2016).

Can historical time be *another*? In *Futures Past* (2006), Koselleck delineates the concept of *historical time* from the fundamental dynamics at play in the various conceptions of time and mutation present in historical literature, but also in the newspaper texts, in the images and ideas that he analyzes. Koselleck, thus, sheds a light and gives some unity to our expectations regarding human history as a *present* link between

past and future. In this process, he differentiates historical time from natural, chronological time grounded in the measurements of mathematics and physics, making historical time look like the image delineated from the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation”, even though anchored effectively (but not necessarily) in the natural movement of time (KOSELLECK 2006, p. 308). Historical time, therefore, is human time; and its dynamics depend on a horizon of expectations that is also human. It is this historical time presupposed at the heart of a horizon of expectations that I need to put in question. Therefore it is necessary to make our expectations of historical time (and natural time) somewhat stranger.

To find time “odd” means “to be surprised”, in principle, with the linearity past - present - future in a chain of causes and effects. We already do this when we propose, for example, studies on memory, truth, orality, etc. However, what about contexts, what are they? In other words, what is this that is theoretically designated as “time” for a “space”? In Agamben’s words, we must affirm the possibility of another approach to time as kairological, and an understanding of the temporality of *Kairós* as time as a whole, without a line, and thus without instant, without before and after. Time that comes to be in a whole, in a conjuncture.

The time of gnosis is therefore an incoherent and non-homogeneous time, whose truth lies in the moment of abrupt interruption in which man takes up, with a sudden act of consciousness, the very condition of resurrection [...] Coherently with this experience of interrupted time, the attitude of the Gnostic is resolutely revolutionary: it rejects the past, but reassesses in itself, through an exemplary presentiment, precisely what had been condemned as negative... but without expecting anything from the future. (AGAMBEN 2008, p. 123)

An interrupted time, but whose “denial” of continuity needs to be experienced without the support of the line and the circle. The challenge is, therefore, to express conceptually a historical temporality “setback”, de-structuring it. For this, unlike the way Agamben presents Greek thought according to a western



conception of temporality, I believe that a mythical image of time among the Greeks may indeed provide us with an idea outside of that line and thus helps us to rethink the eternal return as an opening rather than a closure. Therefore, I begin by citing three dimensions of Greek temporality, discussing how they are articulated to the historiography and / or poetics of their time. I try to evoke, in fact, myth and poetry, bringing them to the center of a contemporary questioning about time and history.

## The *hístor* and the myth

Greatly simplifying it, "History" is a Greek word linked to popular justice in its quest for the truth of events (see FOUCAULT 2002, p. 53-55; HARTOG 2003, p. 53-76; CERQUEIRA 2009). The *hístor* is the one who saw and can testify what happened. From this condition of eyewitness emerges among the Greeks the figure of the historian as someone who can, according to oneself and its own pretension, address the people to witness what under what circumstances something has happened (VEYNE 1984, p. 15-26; DARBO-PECHANSKY 1998, p. 48-82).

The historian in the polis coexists with other religious and intellectual figures capable of plotting events in a *myth*, in a story that is told: the poets, the rhapsodists, the fortune-tellers, the decipherers of divine oracles, and so on. The word may be Greek, but the meaning it has acquired throughout the last centuries of European history must be imputed only partially to the ancients (see the studies organized by LIANERI 2011). The first measure that must be taken for the historian to become the narrator / questioner of past events is to separate this time, to make it distinct, to confer upon it a certain status with respect to knowledge: the time between the near and the distant, between the causes and the effects of our present life is the one in which the linearity of the eyewitness unfolds. Even though in Greek and Roman ancient times this temporality has assumed a role in the historical narrative (FONTANILLE 2015, p. 171-192), the connection between linear time and mutation

by the becoming of a society / civilization will predominate only from the nineteenth century on (MOMIGLIANO 1983; VLASSOPOULOS 2007, p. 11-95).

Therefore, this measure was not taken first hand by the people who used the word “history” to designate the inquiry. Neither Homer, nor Herodotus, nor Thucydides created “history”. As Finley affirms (FINLEY 1989, p. 3-27, and seq.), they were certainly interested in the memory of past deeds, mainly as a kind of proof — in the agonistic sense of the term — than as a science. In his constructive criticism of the myth, the history of Herodotus, as Thucydides’ paleography, did not claim his primacy over the truth of the facts at a time of a yesterday, but sought to erect “truer” monuments/ memorials that... However, “truer” does not mean (yet) more real or factual, but, precisely, purged from the mythical, critical elements of its vain words (VEYNE 1984, p. 71-83; GINZBURG 2002, p. 47-63).

There is an effective closeness between poetry and history in this Athenian context, which means a closeness between agents — poets, philosophers, historians — and between techniques and knowledge from the perspective of a social field. Aristotle affirmed in *Poetics* 1451a-b that poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history, for the first speaks of the universal, whereas the domain of the latter is the particular, that is, one brings to light what *could happen* and the other addresses “what Alcibiades did”. But how can we understand this statement without situating it in the discursive and rhetorical context of the *Poetics*, without placing, at the same time, a minor question about the “community of interpretation” implied by the Stagirite as it provides us with those lines that overflow from the specific subject of the *Poetics* and proceed towards a (possible) debate among “intellectuals” of that time?

What is of history and what is of poetry do not differ because of the pronouncing with or without meter. In fact, what is in Herodotus could be put in meter and still it would be a type of History, in meter or not. Otherwise, they both differ because one [history] talks about what happened and the other [poetry] about what had to happen. For this reason, poetry is more philosophical and



more zealous than history, for poetry speaks of the universal, while history speaks of the particular. By "universal", I call what one will do or say according to what is possible or necessary. "Particular" is what Alcibiades did or suffered. [...] From what he said it is clear that the poet should not be a maker of verses but of myths, since he is a poet by virtue of mimesis, and what he mimics is the action. Even supposing that he mimics what happened, he is still a poet, for there is nothing to prevent some events from being the kind of ones that would happen, possibly or inevitably, and that is why he is the "fabricator" [...]. (ARISTOTLE, *Poetics*, 1451 a-b).<sup>1</sup>

The narrative of history is that which deals with the events that have taken place and which derives from the *particularity* of an agent — "what Alcibiades did or *suffered*". Poetry differs from this because even when it tells what happened to Achilles or Odysseus, it is not about this or that person but of *characters*. Alcibiades is someone who lives in the ephemeral and human-mortal time (birth, growth, death). Heroes, like the characters of poetry and tragedy, are *poeticized* by the activity of mimesis, constituting themselves, therefore, not as persons who live in time, but as characters who unfold timeless lines of action (*ethos*). On the other hand, the historian does not "poetize", he talks about what he knows / saw in relation to what happened in the past. This separation that leads poetry to the universal (and thus the lines of characters to the universal) and history to the particular (of the life "in that day" of this or that person) is not yet the one between the real and the fiction. The distance between "what Alcibiades did" and the action of a hero like Theseus, who in this sense is understood under the sign of the particular and the universal, escapes from what has "happened" in a human time and goes in the direction of the question of truth. In short, Aristotle's solution leads us to distinguish the truth or truer philosophical, poetic, universal order, from human time-space of events or deeds, suggesting that there is no "more truth" to be sought, in principle, in man's lived time (WEISS 1941, p. 173-180, and seq.).

1 - The passage is part of an ongoing translation of the first part of *Poetics* by Marta M. de Andrade and Stephania S. Giglio, based on an edition by Paulo Pinheiro (2015).

Such controversies are expressed elsewhere in the way historians criticize the myth. The Herodotean *autopsy*, for

instance, could be considered, according to Darbo-Pechansky (1998, p. 185-214) and Hartog (1999, p. 15-30) an instrument that seeks to give the author's opinion a more credible *status* in contrast to poetry and myth. To convince by shifting the credible in the sense of the visible and the lived, being careful to keep the lines of action of the heroes and the narratives of the poets intact, was part of the work of Herodotus: Agamemnon led the Greeks in the Trojan War, the kidnapping of Io caused the kidnapping of Helena and the insane Greeks retaliated against the barbarians because of a woman... (Herodotus, *Histories* I, 1, 1-5) Thucydides does differently: Agamemnon led the Greeks into the Trojan war, but they were all looters and that is all about that war (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* I, 1, 23); his concern seems to have been to criticize these events with much more interest in those who were contemporaries to him, based on documents that he had at hand or could consult and traditions which he knew and depurated; no mythical element would survive in his archeology of the Peloponnesian War (GINZBURG 2001, p. 42-84). This historian seems to have overcome the problem of autopsy, having placed the narrative of the deeds of men in the record of that eternity and of the universality that Aristotle would still preserve after him for poetry.

Aristotle taught poetic lessons to his disciples at least a generation after Thucydides, and twice as much in relation to Herodotus. The interposition of history in the lessons of poetics suggests the presence and the debate around a very lively problem that separated the truth of ideas (poetic, religious) from the truth of the facts, the one that was verified in the courts and depended on certain procedures of investigation. Poetic, religious and philosophical truth having at its side this other homonymous truth applied in separating from the false through investigation and submitted to the scrutiny of the courts of the city. If the *Poetics* of Aristotle refers to the first and the *Histories* of Herodotus to the second, the paleography of Thucydides constitutes a good step on the bridge between one and another, but with a detail that separated it from historians and philosophers: having as a





purpose an eternal good in the form of a true narrative about the events that led to war and combating vehemently the mythical elements, Thucydides sought to formulate the connection between the factual and the *possible*.

What it means to say that, as far as the field of knowledge is concerned, both for Thucydides or the Aristotle of the *Poetics*, truth would not be experienced as a revelation by time, but as a spectacle out of time, a spectacle of the universal "truer" drama. The time of poetry is integral (myth, at least in tragedy, implies the closed circle of recognition and turnaround). Thus, no construction, whether of the word (narrative), spectacle, or characters, can be anything other but total: drama must open and close a cycle (PIRES 2014, p. 71-72). It is no wonder that Thucydides defines his paleography — writings about ancient things — as *ktema es aei*, an eternal good, forever (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* I, 22, 4). He postulates identifying from the particular events of the Peloponnesian War and its protagonists a wisdom concerning the *cyclical* unfolding of human tendencies. What we call "history" in Thucydides is a binding of events to the eternal return; because the temporality of the ephemeral, of what is born, grows and dies, does not unfold in the same temporal dimension of the past, present, future. What was, what is and what will be belong to the *Aiôn*, "forever", as *Chrónos* (the movement of becoming). In this dimension, it is not what is happening, but what returns equal in the form of the different that constitutes the *ktema is aeí*.

## Aiôn, Chrónos, Kairós

When historiography bases its foundations vividly interested in the truth contained in the mutation, inscribed in the becoming and perceived as historical time, it also postulates other images with which historical time is filled and that allows it to act as an instance capable of conferring intelligibility to facts and significant factors: time, but also space, individual and

society. Foucault draws attention to this appropriation of time (past, present, future) when he approaches the archaeology of the human sciences in *Order of Things: Man, subject and object of knowledge*, in his natural vital movement, a being that is born, grows and dies; a being who works and speaks; a being that constitutes and transforms one way of life in time (FOUCAULT 1999, p. 417-474). A subject who does not master *his* past and for whom the future is a *promise*. A subject who is rational measure of the godless world, in whom the myth causes shivers. From then on, the becoming is the becoming of man into civilization. And each stage of the process is a dialectic construction of the future, overlapping layers, remains, ruins and new buildings embedded in them.

The living body of time had, at the very beginning of Greek philosophical thought, at least, the three dimensions of *Aiôn*, *Chrónos*, *Kairós*, dimensions present in various myths (BAPTISTA 2010, p. 85-100; BOCAYUVA 2010, p. 399-412, for a brief overview of the theme of temporality, for a reflection on the three dimensions, see MARRAMAIO 2008, p. 397-405, for the connection between *Aiôn* and *Chrónos*, see WEISS, 1941 and HEIDEGGER 1983, p. 454-469). *Chrónos*, "is the time in its indefatigable sequence" (BAPTISTA 2010, p. 87), the running of the river, events and the (necessary) differentiation. We know the origin of our "chronologies": important dates, regardless of their system of notation, they are points that mark the turning of a continuous process. Now it is Heraclitus who gives us also the most famous image of the continuum and the flow, in the fr. 91:

For, according to Heraclitus, it is not possible to step twice into the same river, nor is it possible to touch a mortal substance twice in so far as its state is concerned. But, thanks to the swiftness and speed of change, it scatters [things] and brings [them] together again, [(or, rather, it brings together and lets go neither again nor later, but simultaneously)] it forms and dissolves, and it approaches and departs. (HERACLITUS, fr. 91).<sup>2</sup>

Our sieve directs attention to the becoming as a movement of differentiation, equating it with linear time: "You cannot step twice in the same river"<sup>3</sup> as the waters run inexorably

2 - <http://www.heraclitusfragments.com/files/ge.html> (access 4 Feb. 2018)

3 - As in Burnett's version of fr. 91. See <http://philoctetes.free.fr/heraclite.pdf> (access 4 Feb. 2018)



towards the mouth and are never the same waters. However, it is the whole interpretation by ancient quotes of the fragment that speaks of becoming (including by the interventions of its commentators) and, according to his sentence, one cannot enter twice in the same (river): the *same* is what's remarkable. This *same* river disperses and gathers, associates and dissolves, approaches and drives away. There is an identity, the same one, that acts as the waters pass and they *always* become different. This means that before we take *Aiôn*, eternity, by inertia or continuity in an undifferentiated time, we must consider a continuous, cyclical movement of return of an agency (of the same river, in this case), for nothing and for no reason because it simply "is". Thus, *Aiôn* would be the "soul" of becoming — "the original sense of *Aiôn* is 'vital force', as evidenced by its approach to *psyché*" (MARRAMAQ 2007, p. 8-10) — in the same movement in which *Chrónos* is its impression in a transitory world of sensitive experiences. And about this "sensitive soul" of becoming, Heraclitus says that it is child's play; reign of the child (fr 52, see epigraph).

For some views of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the child, *paîs*, does not immediately experience a chronological shape of time. In the child's reign, it plays undoing, disarticulating the gears of that machine, until such gears are *incorporated* after the age of seven (BERGER 2005, p. 507-510). Of course, the chronological time of the development of subjectivity and inscription in the body of the "self" and the "other" is the starting point of this understanding, and therefore a starting point is a gradual abandonment by the subjectivity of non subjective (in) formalities, *infans*, as De Certeau, for example: the scriptural machine that constitutes us liberates (as repressed) quotations of infinite voices themselves *infans*, empty of language and playful. (DE CERTEAU 1998, p. 221-258). It is the playfulness of the child in the realm of "always", whose past, present, future have not been incorporated and will not be incorporated into the game of identity / otherness.

There is a life before birth that gives it dating. There is a world before the world in which it arises. There is a fetus before the

*infans*. There is an *infans* before the *puer*. Incessantly, there is a previous one without language in time: it is time. Fetus, *infans*, before identity are, one and the other, without language. The scene where every scene originates in the invisible without language is an *ever active virtuality* (emphasis mine) (QUIGNARD 2002, p. 14-15).

Therefore, it is not the equality, the inertia, the immutable of a kingdom of God, but precisely the soul of a child who presides over the game of the eternal return of difference. *Aïon* is like a soul in the body of time. Because it is inspired on this infantile reign in the soul, "time" has neither head nor face, but has long limbs that love the interlace, as if they were contortionists; they go far, they are archaic. In their passage through human territories, they walk in a row like *Chrónos*, from the spring to the mouth of the river, that same god that in diverse iconographies appears as a very old gentleman threatening to cut off the wings of a baby *Eros*.<sup>4</sup> If it were not for time, the same time as always, bringing back the game, starting again unsuspected of the self, of life, of death, if it were not *for that virtuality always active, so active* that the Zeus of the sharing of cosmos and the prerogatives of the gods had to swallow *Métis*, reversing the *Kairós* (the "coup") in his favor, if it were not for that and *Chrónos* would follow indefatigably towards the end. However, the "right time" connected to the circular wisdoms of *métis*, or simply the time when *everything* opens, Zeus *knows*, it is genesis, always. When swallowing *Métis* (HESIOD, *Theogony*, v. 887, seq.), Zeus gives birth to Athena, which means that, curiously, something escapes him by the head. Zeus, who knows everything, foresees all, knows everything that happens, will happen or has happened. This makes him invincible, unbeatable in the intents, but at no time does the omniscience of Zeus refer, in mythical accounts, to the eternal return that is characteristic of the *coup*. Mastering the right time for the *coup* is a technical art shared by hunters, fishermen, warriors, politicians, fortune-tellers, sponsored by Athena, this daughter of Zeus and *Métis* (DETIENNE; VERNANT 2008, p. 9-14); Zeus is created, not The Creator, and therefore the opening of the *Kairós*, the instant, is recorded in the body

4 - See [http://masp.art.br/masp2010/acervo\\_detalheobra.php?id=770](http://masp.art.br/masp2010/acervo_detalheobra.php?id=770) (access 13 Mar. 2018)



of time as vision and gestation without language, without face, without power, without time.

This *mystery* favors the transmutation of *Kairós* into a religious concept with a very long history of theological, mystical and philosophical interpretations, on which I will not dwell. The scope of *Kairós* in Jewish-Christian theologies since the Antiquity itself is immense and is far beyond my purpose here. But as it plays a crucial role for understanding the revolutionary instant in Benjamin, the notion of *Kairós* has a fundamental meaning in the discussion about time and the body of time in philosophy of history. It is from Benjamin's theses that I can properly discuss the *Kairós*, the instant of danger and reminiscence, stating that *Kairós* is the return, the *possible* and even the *impossible* of transformation and differentiation in the body of time (AGAMBEN 2008, p. 127-128), the instant that opens itself to the event, and for this reason is always active virtuality (AGAMBEN 2008, p. 111-128; MARRAMAO 2007; MARRAMAO 2008; NEGRI 2003, p. 63-70).

## The angel of history

I will follow Lowy (2005, p. 13-32), Sarlo (2007), Cantinho (2008) and Agamben (2008, p. 129-150; 2015, p. 185-210) closely, seeking an analysis of Benjamin's theses *On the Concept of History*, particularly those in which the importance of the three dimensions of Greek temporality to the question of the eruption of the instant in the historical process can be perceived in spite of the foundations that the problem may have for the author himself. We are accustomed to creating a correlation between the philosophy of history in Benjamin and Jewish theology, considering not only its explicit references, but also the evocation of the mystical and Jewish thinker Walter Benjamin by Scholem (SCHOLEM 1976; 2008; see MOSÈS 2008). The approximation I will make here between the historical time of the theses and the three Greek dimensions of the mythical body of time is

my responsibility, although Agamben (2015) has opened this possibility insofar as it also deals with the insertion of the theses – mostly with the figure of the angel of history – in a more encompassing tradition, including Greco-Roman philosophy.

Certainly, the problematization of temporality is fundamental in all theses. It is fundamental and intriguing as, for example, in the changes of the second thesis, whose text is long and proposes the connection between happiness, past and redemption, but not exactly through the choice of chains of events; rather, “happiness” and redemption come from a subtle relationship with non-event, with the possible experienced in the “same air we breathe” – we and the generations that preceded us, in what we did not have. From this long text we extract the question:

[...] Does not a breath of air blow upon us, which enveloped those who were before us? Does it not resonate in the voices to which we hear an echo of those who are now silent? And the women we court, don't they have sisters they've never met? [...] (BENJAMIN, thesis II, p. 48)

And the conclusion of the proposal:

[...] If so, a secret meeting is marked between the past generations and ours. So, we were expected on earth. Then we were given, as well as to each generation that preceded us, a weak messianic force, to which the past has pretension [...]. (BENJAMIN, thesis II, p. 48)

The linear, circular or instantaneous time will not be of great help here. Because the generation that has come before us is present, as well as are the sisters who may never be known by the women we court. Instead of representing time spatially, the myth or *tale* of the waters of the same river is the one that best assists us in understanding what, in this thesis, has the impetus to modify our understanding of historical time. This secret meeting between generations is *always* marked, just as we *always* find the same course of the river in the passage of time. The messianic force is the driving force and unites what should never have been separated in the conception of *becoming*: the positivity of the destructive force that ends



and creates at the same time, leaving behind "possibles" that accompany us *during the whole time*. In this sense, the encounter marked with the generations that preceded us, just as we have preceded other generations, is the dynamics that makes us careful and attentive, *à l'ordre du jour* (thesis III). And historical time does not "walk", rather it stops and urges.<sup>5</sup>

To articulate the past historically does not mean to know it "as it really was". It means appropriating reminiscence, just as it flashes in an instant of danger. It is up to historical materialism to fix an image of the past, as it presents itself at the moment of danger to the historical subject, without being aware of it. Danger threatens both the existence of tradition and those who receive it. For both, the danger is the same: to surrender to the ruling classes, as their instrument. In each epoch, one has to tear tradition apart from conformism, which wants to seize it. For the Messiah does not come only as a savior; he also comes as the vanquisher of the Antichrist. The gift of awakening in the past the sparks of hope is the exclusive privilege of the historian convinced that the dead too will not be safe if the enemy wins. And this enemy has not ceased to win. (BENJAMIN, thesis VI, p.65).

*5 - The historical materialist cannot renounce the concept of a present that is not a transition, but in which time stagnates and remains immobile... BENJAMIN, thesis XVI, p. 128*

In terms of the factual, that is, of the writing about "what happened", "seizing history" takes us back to a past that is reminiscent, and to appropriate reminiscences according to another point of view is a compelling task of a historian who recognizes the danger of the present: surrendering to the traditions of the ruling classes (thesis VII). According to the theses, historicism in its rigor applied to a single causal process favors the reproduction of the same significant events, of the same facts, of the same heroes. As long as the oppressed do not seize history, they will not seize the future. In the dimension of historical thought, of the perception and consciousness of the revolutionary subject, history (reminiscence) and the future are present at the same instant, a flash. In terms of becoming, seizing history means interrupting it, diverting it and blowing up the timeline.

The explosion of the line refers to a small text of 1979, in which Foucault tries to reject criticisms in *Le Monde* that had been made to him for having given sympathetic declarations to the Iranian revolutionary process. In the beginning, according to him, a revolutionary outburst; later, a fundamentalist government that is inadmissible to European liberals. In explaining himself, Foucault emphasized the moment when the rebellious man assumes the absolute risk and imposes a “no” to the prevailing order. I read Foucault’s text on the Iranian revolution with deep attention to the echoes of Thesis VI, even though there was no intention on the part of the author to refer to it. In *Is it useless to revolt?* Foucault says that the uprising is a fact, for “that is where subjectivity introduces itself into history and gives it the breath of life”. (FOUCAULT 1979, p.12)

There are different ways of interpreting this movement. For example, are we facing a process of growing awareness that transforms action and unfolds *praxis*? I do not think so, since the urgency and absolute risk spoken of by Benjamin and Foucault involve a leap rather than a consciousness or the representation of the self in action. In addition, I would agree with Lefebvre’s critique upon the philosophies that separate everyday life and praxis by throwing the everyday life out of history itself. The relationship between everydayness and alienation marks the philosophies of Marx, Hegel, Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and it is in his critique to that mark that Lefebvre perceives in everyday life the concrete conditions of appropriation and revolt. That is where subjectivity enters history... and therefore, it was not in history before, it will not be there after, but now, that is, *always*. This is a problem. “Something” that is always there, whose historical nature is to stop, to erupt, to urge and not exactly to walk in line, to think or to exist. What is this subjectivity that is so devoided of the substance contained in the very philosophical definition of *subjectum*?

It is a filament of *ethos*, subjectivity from the perspective of the universal that literally introduces itself into history in an instant of danger, giving it the breath of life: a *daimon*, the





flapping of the wings of a terrifying angel. A *non subjective subjectivity*, therefore; because *ethos* does not refer to the psychological tendencies of individuals, but to universal lines of becoming, lines of possibility in the dynamics of becoming "someone" or the *daimon* that dwells in man, as Heraclitus says (HERACLITUS fr.119).<sup>6</sup> "Demonic" in the Greek sense of *daimon* — different from the demonic as criticized by Agamben in Scholem (SCHOLEM 1976, p. 198-236) — the subjectivity that introduces itself in history, history in the face of the *universal*, constitutes an impasse at the same time, a negation and a point of mutation. Foucault had in mind the irreducible in the uprising, when an ethical subject imposes to power an absolute not on the horizon of his own death and thus of his annihilation. But what is history in the light of the annihilated subject? Does it not seem contradictory that a breath of life "enters" at the very moment when the rebel decides to die? A utopia tears the threads; the subject of history does not change oneself without an instant of decision: "Messianic time is rather a time of action, because only through action we become revolutionary subjects, subjects capable of effecting a conversion from the political to the messianic" (MARRAMAIO 2008, p. 402). Paradoxically, this instant is the point of annihilation of a life, an infinitesimal point in which free will is impossible simply because infinity does not concern it. This cosmic place is one in which the moment happens dangerously, releasing the chains of events from their assumed, past, present, and future identities. It is important to point out that when Benjamin connects the instant to the Last Judgment and to the Redemption in a Philosophy of History, the philosopher allows us to glimpse what is out of history but in no way transcends the being in the world. Like the "demonic", subjectivity *exists* and *does not exist*.

6 - <http://www.heraclitusfragments.com/files/ge.html> (access 4 Feb. 2018)

In this sense, the historical subject becomes a revolutionary. I do not understand this revolutionary (the historian by whom Benjamin claims) as the subject of the sentence, nor as that localized atom which a tradition fixes as the point of origin of acts, causes, and intentions: Man. I do not understand it either, primarily (recognizing that for Benjamin, differently,

this was an important point), as that individual willing to do everything to change reality. I do not understand it as a *person*. I understand as revolutionary the subject of history from the point of view of an engagement that deconstructs subjectivity as the representation of oneself, its particularity, and incorporates it into the body of time, at the moment when the possible remembrance opens the nature of things, giving meaning to the daily lived experience by the memory of what was *not* (as said in the second thesis discussed above); when what was said is *not* a question, *not* what was done, *not* what was built; when the potential to destroy is urgent.

Thus, the angel of history presented in thesis IX is not the master, but the perpetrator of that power. He does not rule and should not rule the mutation, he is moved by the necessary ruin that the flapping of his wings contributes to accumulate (GANDLER 2013, p. 537-1238). The ruined image of the past (BENJAMIN, thesis IX), the image of a future that risks *retaking* the past is therefore fundamental. Because the reminiscences, the debris, are presented to the one who will come. Entering history, claiming its potency outside linear time, in the interim in which the imagination stops and receives the *breath* of reminiscence in a flap of wings, is the anti-historicist gesture capable of remaking the *truth with which the author walks* (BENJAMIN, thesis XVI, p. 128); this is the horizon of *praxis* in which an expression such as "historical subjectivity" gains, in my understanding, a more adequate conceptual foundation than those that separate "subject" and "object", "experience" and "narrative", "representation" and "practice", "conceived" and "lived" at the very core of action (CRANE 2006, p. 434-456; TUCKER 2013, p. 205-229).

7 - "Who would believe! It is said that they were irritated against the time / New Joshua, at the foot of each tower, shooting the chimes to stop the day". Excerpt quoted by Benjamin in the thesis XV, p. 129.

## Final considerations

Qui le croirait! on dit qu'irrités contre l'heure  
De nouveaux Josués, au pied de chaque tour,  
Tiraient sur les cadrans pour arrêter le jour.<sup>7</sup>



Future-past dialectics in the experience of historical time impels our understanding of the becoming towards a representation of the nature of mutant things as process, procedure, development, unfolding, ultimately, chains of combinations that "lead" in one direction (even if that direction is only apprehended *a posteriori*), often towards the "new", as if to differ was largely the same as to innovate. The evolution of the species, millennialism, the end of capitalism, the expanding universe, all imply transformation in linear time. Even dialectics has often been taken in a unique sense in the movement of contradiction in the eternal return of transformation. A mythical narrative, thus, makes no sense as "History"; it does not have this statute for us, also because, since it is generally associated with the rite, we tend to see it as a ritual operation and not as a presentiment of the past, a retaking of the *ethos* to the cosmos and to the child kingdom of "always"; and when we see this, we call it "religion", mysticism. But what if the theology and mysticism of a philosopher like Benjamin create a possible language for the expression of a philosophy of materialist History? It is symptomatic that immanence in historical materialism and other historiographical strands depends entirely on the concreteness of facts in a linear time; but the question of how to reach a verdict on the concreteness, meaning and relevance of the facts is not as it should be, inasmuch effectiveness, meaning, and importance are values rather than laws. It is encouraging that Benjamin and others, like Agamben, provide us with mystical concepts for effecting a profoundly materialistic thought which significance is devoided of the primacy of the acknowledgment of events disposed in causal threads driven by the time of the passing hours, a political historical thought that observes scintillations in the margins, details on the edges, folds in the remains of what we build, proceeding by leaps. A thought that preserves the memory of destruction and the recovery in each new unfolding.

Every conception of history is always accompanied by a certain experience of time which is implicit to it, which conditions it and which must therefore be brought to light. In the same way, every culture is, first, a certain experience of time, and a new culture is not possible without a transformation of this experience.

Therefore, the original task of an authentic revolution is not imply to “change the world”, but also, and above all, to “change time” [...] (AGAMBEN 2008, p. 111).

Can we change the way we understand History by “changing time”? The image of the boy running in the square of the French Revolution is understandable as a historical image considering this questioning. The temporality lost and regained in the body of vivid time of becoming is not expressed by the ticking of the clock and is not expressed in a concatenated process, it does not need it in order to *change* the way of being of things, the way of seeing things, the action, the imitation of the action does not, in fact, produce capital, but waste, scintillations, especially in fragmentary vestiges in built castles - “as dust, rain takes its revenge on the arcades” (BENJAMIN 2009, p. 143 [D1a, 1]). We need, therefore, to experience histories with *possibles* (BENJAMIN, thesis XVII, p. 130; I also refer to TARDE 2007, p. 193-233). That is to say: to write history by bonding with that which potentially reconfigures the world not because it is necessary to give it a new face, but because it is necessary to repeat the feat of Prometheus: to steal the fire of the gods and give it to mortals. Political achievement par excellence, an arduous attempt to undo the divine deed, as the myth of the origin of the gods in Hesiod tells us — which can also be read as the myth of the origin of time, according to Jacques Fontanille (2015, p. 117-192). To undo the deed, the first step is to disconcert natural time from its normal course, which, in fact, mystifies us more than the mythical body of time. For our relationship with history, what puts us before the mirror as individual and collective subjects of conjunctures and processes is not the concatenated narrative of facts, but precisely the rejoicing of remembrance, that is the *now* of the past. The possibility of remembering brings with it the staggering force of destroying worlds; but the return of the historical narrative to a univocal image of linear time condemns us to the reproduction of the line of a single drama: the drama of repetition by the oppressed of the oppressor’s model of history.



It is necessary to emphasize that it is not the truth of the explanations of the concatenated historical processes that is in question since the problem of temporality is a problem of magma, of what underlies and is safeguarded in the writing of history, outside of it. We know that you do not have to make the same connection to everything; maybe it is not even desirable and probably something impossible. We know the value of de-structuring processes, denaturalizing rhythms and change, to which I add only one final note: events, causality, and history do not walk under the guidance of the hours, despite our expectations. They walk with the power. Perhaps this is one of the happiest lessons of the theses: is no good to those who intend to change the course of a life to experience in time something that weighs on their back and escapes under their fingers without redemption. It is no good to reproduce yesterday's powers, that is to say, the powers of yesterday, today and tomorrow. Thus, it is not of our interest to go on reproducing a line or a lineage. The mythic body of time, its image as soul (*Aiôn*, eternity of becoming), limbs (*Chrónos*, the dynamics of passage), the "pulse that still pulses" (*Kairós*, the urgency of the right time of action) gives to those who need to change the course of life — of their life and of the common life<sup>8</sup> — a horizon to dialogue with things, a horizon that is opened to what has been muted in them or simply *were not*, in the course of their invisibility. The body of time is a juncture or rather a co-juncture, and the challenge is to make History a science for the transformation of the present by its tenacity — *a weak messianic force* (thesis II) — in the excavation of ruins. For me, in particular, history is an instrument of sewing in a horizon of utopia.

8 - "Just as [historical materialism] explodes a definite life of an epoch, so it also does to a particular work of the work of a life" (BENJAMIN, thesis XVII, p. 130)

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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

**Marta Mega de Andrade**

[martamega@gmail.com](mailto:martamega@gmail.com)

Professor of the History Institute

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Brazil

Research funded by CNPq

RECEIVED IN: 02/NOV./2018 | APPROVED IN: 03/DEC./2018

## *Entender ou defender o Santo Ofício? Negacionismo, apologética e usos da história inquisitorial em Para entender a Inquisição (2009), de Felipe Aquino*

*To understand or defend the Holy Office? Negationism, apologetics and uses of the inquisitorial history in Para entender a Inquisição (2009), by Felipe Aquino*

Igor Tadeu Camilo Rocha

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2660-8260> 

### RESUMO

Este artigo analisa o livro *Para entender a Inquisição*, do missionário católico Felipe Aquino, uma obra apologética que propõe uma revisão histórica sobre os tribunais de fé católicos medievais e modernos, partindo da premissa de que existem usos da história secular da Inquisição contra a Igreja Católica e, por isso, é necessária sua releitura para a defesa de sua doutrina. Os objetivos aqui são os de analisar os usos da história nessa obra, discutindo sua articulação com uma tradição de escrita histórica de intelectuais conservadores e negacionistas sobre as Inquisições. A hipótese defendida é de que o negacionismo sobre o passado inquisitorial, ponto central na narrativa de Aquino, serve mais a um conservadorismo do presente, conferindo-lhe sentido histórico, do que a uma disputa pelo passado real. Pretende-se ainda levantar uma breve discussão sobre o papel do historiador profissional em relação a isso.

### PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Negacionismo; Inquisição; Usos da história.

### ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the book *Para entender a Inquisição*, written by the Catholic missionary Felipe Aquino. The book is an apologetic work that proposes a historical review about Medieval and Modern age's inquisitorial courts, starting from the premise that there are uses of the Inquisition's secular history against the Catholic Church, thus requiring a review for his doctrine's defense. The aims here are to analyze the uses of history in this work, discussing its relationship with a historical writing tradition by conservative and negationist intellectuals about the Inquisitions. The hypothesis advocated is that negationism about the inquisitorial past, the central point in Aquino's narrative, serves to further a conservatism on the present, assigning a historical meaning to it rather than a dispute for the real past. This article intends to raise a succinct discussion about the role of the professional historian in this regard.

### KEYWORDS

Negationism; Inquisition; Uses of history.

## Por quê se defender a Inquisição

No começo do livro *Para entender a Inquisição*, publicado pela primeira vez em 2009 e que chegou à nona edição em 2016, o radialista, apresentador da tv *Canção Nova* e missionário Felipe Aquino afirma que a arma mais utilizada contra a Igreja Católica é, sem dúvida, a Inquisição (AQUINO 2016, p. 11) e completa que muitas vezes ela é mal interpretada e analisada fora do contexto social, cultural e religioso em que se realizou. Além dos anacronismos, Aquino aponta para outra responsável pelas análises falhas da história dos tribunais: a ideologia. Diz que a Inquisição é usada como uma forma maciça de propaganda contra a Igreja Católica, fazendo com que muitos jovens [...] passem a odiar a Igreja e se afastar da fé. Conclui que tais tribunais são para os adversários da fé católica nada mais que “a marca do obscurantismo dessa época cristã” – que, para o autor, é a Idade Média – e são estudados com o único objetivo de denegrir a imagem da Igreja, fazendo deles um símbolo de intolerância, violência e maldade católicos. Assim, é normal que se desperte nas pessoas “de maneira fácil a simpatia pelos perseguidos de qualquer ordem, mesmo que sejam culpados de erros graves”.

Aquino (2016, p. 19) faz questão de destacar o fato de não ser historiador, o que não lhe impede, em suas palavras, de se basear em fontes históricas sérias e, ainda, tomar uma posição veemente sobre a historiografia tocante ao Santo Ofício. Os historiadores sobre o tema desconsideram, segundo ele, valores morais, éticos, políticos, religiosos e jurídicos dos períodos em que existiram os tribunais. Trata-se de um procedimento tomado por inimigos da Igreja Católica intencionalmente, constituindo uma narrativa anticatólica hegemônica que, por assimilação aos valores modernos de tolerância e não violência, facilmente convence leitores que se identificam com sujeitos e ideias perseguidos. Urge, assim, uma *revisão histórica*, sem a qual, conforme o título indica, não é possível *entender* a Inquisição, já que a *verdade histórica* sobre ela é *encoberta* por mediações permeadas por idealismos modernos.

Tal obra de Aquino se configura como atualização de uma escrita negacionista e apologética da história inquisitorial, afiliada a vertentes mais conservadoras da doutrina católica, o que conecta o autor a uma tradição de escrita da história dos ditos tribunais que existe desde o século XIX. Trata-se de narrativas que consistem em produzir negações, feitas sob o pretexto de contextualizar fatos considerados infamantes sobre as Inquisições, como a violência – sobretudo os autos de fé e torturas – e seu obscurantismo – censura de livros e da ciência, além das perseguições a grandes pensadores. A negação e/ou minimização se estende ao envolvimento da Igreja Católica na fundação, funcionamento e procedimentos da Inquisição. O argumento de *Para entender a Inquisição*, também, conflui com a construção de um regime de verdade no qual tais tribunais teriam sido uma espécie de imperativo civilizatório, de um lado, e uma invenção anticatólica da modernidade, de outro, não se excluindo mutuamente ou se contradizendo. Assim, confere-se sentido histórico a um tradicionalismo católico atrelado à ideia de um Ocidente idealizado, exaltando-se valores antimodernos, conservadores e refratários a ideais como o pluralismo religioso e as liberdades democráticas em geral.

Importante destacar o que se entende como conservadorismo que, tomado no seu significado político e histórico, não se resume a mera reação ao que é considerado moderno. Uma definição mais adequada seria a feita por Huntington (1957, p. 461), segundo a qual o conservadorismo engloba uma resistência articulada, sistemática e organizada às mudanças, do ponto de vista prático e teórico. No caso específico de Aquino, observam-se aspectos como os que Quadros (2014) aponta sobre o neoconservadorismo dos Estados Unidos, similares a outros analisados em estudos sobre as novas direitas no Brasil em trabalhos como os de Pierucci (1987) e Cowan (2014), que são o discurso da permanente crise moral na modernidade, a afirmação da religião – cristã – como base de todos os valores e relações sociais, a rejeição aos princípios democráticos liberais e o apelo a um tradicionalismo construído sobre um discurso moralizante da vida pública.

A noção de regime de verdade, proposta por Foucault (1988), também cabe ao propósito de se entender qual verdade Aquino disputa e com quem, sobre o passado inquisitorial, bem como problematizar o porquê de o fazer. Conforme o autor francês, cada comunidade possui sua política geral da verdade, que engloba tipos de discursos que uma comunidade acolhe e valida. Refere-se a mecanismos e instâncias que permitem distinguir enunciados verdadeiros de falsos, sancionando uns e vetando outros, além de procedimentos tidos por válidos para a obtenção de veracidade. Tais regimes apoiam-se em instituições que transmitem e validam verdades de maneira a produzirem e a reproduzirem relações de poder ou, como no caso de Aquino com uma direita católica, coesão identitária.

## Rever, negar e falsear o passado

Há debates historiográficos acerca do uso de narrativas sobre o Santo Ofício como meio de ataque à Igreja Católica. Bethencourt (2000, p. 335-376), bem como Marocci e Paiva (2013, p. 433) mostram que a chamada *lenda negra* – termo que sintetiza a imagem negativa e, muitas vezes, superdimensionada da crueldade, incivilidade, do obscurantismo e do anticristianismo das Inquisições – foi formada ao longo da Idade Moderna, difundida por escritos como os do teólogo neerlandês Von Limborch e por narrativas de ex-presos, como a de Charles Dellon e a do maçom John Coustos, dentre outros, sobretudo na Europa protestante. Os argumentos dessas obras frequentemente confluíam com críticas fortes ao catolicismo em si. Importante frisar que no próprio clero católico – como é o caso do padre Antônio Vieira – houve, também, a produção de críticas contra a Inquisição (MATTOS 2014).

A *lenda negra* das Inquisições impactou em estudos históricos posteriores à extinção dos tribunais. Um trabalho que problematiza tal questão é o de Fernandes (2011), defendendo que, tributária a tal lenda, se desenvolveu uma longa tradição de pesquisas históricas que repetem vários erros metodológicos decorrentes do foco excessivo nos processos, motivado pela

identificação do historiador com vítimas das perseguições. Tal problema é acompanhado pela negligência dos pesquisadores nas leituras dos manuais e regimentos inquisitoriais. Estes, segundo Fernandes, são fundamentais para se cotejar as informações dos processos com o pensamento jurídico-religioso de contextos da Idade Moderna (raciocínio que vale também para as Inquisições medievais). Com tais problemas, o historiador fica fadado a reproduzir linhas gerais da lenda negra, de forma acrítica e panfletária.

Porém, há um problema análogo e de sinal inverso: ao não se contextualizar (ou o fazer de maneira enviesada) deliberadamente os procedimentos e o pensamento jurídico inquisitoriais, também pode-se incorrer numa *lenda branca* da Inquisição, segundo a qual a empatia com a vítima se desloca para a exaltação de uma suposta brandura dos tribunais. São os apologistas, nos termos de Fernandes. Embora o autor não aprofunde na discussão sobre eles, livros como o de Aquino mostram que eles existem e são relativamente numerosos. Pergunto se essa literatura não pode ser tratada como um tipo de revisionismo ou negacionismo, ou, pelo menos, se aproxima deles em sua construção lógico-narrativa.

É necessário discutir os usos dos termos na historiografia, diferenciando-os, à forma que Pereira (2015, p. 865-866) fez, em artigo recente, sobre negação, revisionismo e negacionismo, aplicados ao tratamento da memória e do passado. O primeiro define uma contestação da realidade, fato ou acontecimento, na qual percebe-se uma dissimulação da factualidade que ou procura negar o poder de veto das fontes ou fabrica uma retórica com base em provas imaginárias e/ou discutíveis/manipuladas; o segundo trata de uma interpretação livre, que não nega necessariamente os fatos, mas os instrumentaliza para combates políticos do presente; o negacionismo, por sua vez, seria a radicalização da negação e/ou do revisionismo, a falsificação do fato. Aquino, em *Para entender a Inquisição*, recorre, como pretendo demonstrar, a uma construção mais próxima da negação e do negacionismo.

Sobre reelaborar e reescrever o passado, Adorno (1995, p. 29-31), em texto clássico, coloca questões fundamentais. Para ele, tal procedimento não significa, necessariamente, reelaborar algo que passou a sério, rompendo seu encanto por uma consciência, ou, noutros termos, disputar-se uma verdade ou um esclarecimento histórico no âmbito científico-acadêmico, constituído segundo protocolos e critérios de verdade. Pode ser, porém, encerrar tal passado e recontá-lo de outra maneira. Constitui reduzir alguma questão que remeta a ele, como um trauma, injustiça ou evento limite, de maneira a circunscrever nesse recontar a história apagamentos de memória, fazendo com que na narrativa histórica haja uma reelaboração completa do que se pensa sobre contextos e eventos passados, sobretudo naquilo se relacionam com culpas de grupos hegemônicos do presente. Adorno sintetiza linhas gerais daquilo que é possível encontrar em narrativas históricas negacionistas ou revisionistas.

O termo revisionismo em si é, comumente, associado a formas mais ou menos radicais de se questionar pontos sensíveis relacionados à história da II Guerra Mundial e ao Holocausto. Tem suas origens nos anos 1950, ganhando força duas décadas depois com as publicações de Faurisson. Na década posterior, publicações de Nolte e Hillgruber deram outro fôlego para essa discussão, ao apontarem duas tendências para esses estudos, sendo uma para negar a realidade das câmaras de gás e execuções em massa, no primeiro momento e, num segundo, voltado mais propriamente ao apelo para um debate público e aberto, desconsiderando tabus em torno dos temas. Neste último caso, há uma tendência clara de se minimizar os crimes do nazismo ou relativizá-los, ainda que haja algum nível de reconhecimento e condenação deles; no primeiro, a negação e falsificação do passado são mais claros (FONTE; LOUREIRO 2010, p. 88-92). A origem dos revisionismos e suas intencionalidades já foram bastante analisadas pela historiografia em trabalhos como os de Vidal-Naquet (1988), para o qual há um assassinato da memória nessa operação de apagamento e atenuação de culpas remetentes ao passado. São ideias já um





tanto rediscutidas e com seus debates ampliados. Afinal, como mostra Pereira (2015, p. 878-880), a construção de concepções que aludem a negações, negacionismo e revisionismos sobre o que aconteceu e como elas se cristalizam e dão sentido a ações do presente, ao que servem e o que significam, englobam processos bastante amplos e repletos de nuances. Envolve um entrelaçamento de concepções e disputas sobre o passado, fundado, muitas vezes, em retórica que idealiza, distorce ou justifica ações consideradas intoleráveis aos valores contemporâneos e milita pela autoabsolvição de algum grupo, tornando-se parte constituinte de sua identidade.

Pereira complexifica pressupostos clássicos de Vidal-Naquet ao discutir disputas de memória tocantes à Ditadura Militar Brasileira, mas cumpre aqui perguntar se operações similares podem ser feitas em relação a um passado mais remoto. Um apontamento que sugere resposta positiva a isso vem em artigo de Loureiro e Sandra Della Fonte (2010, p. 91), quando discute o uso político-prático de negações sobre o passado colonial brasileiro. Demonstrem isso analisando caso referente à empresa Aracruz Celulose, acusada em 2006 de distribuir uma cartilha em escolas de uma região no interior do Espírito Santo, onde há interesses conflitantes entre a empresa e demarcações de terras indígenas. Na cartilha, se diz que os índios Tupiniquins e Guaranis não estavam lá quando a Aracruz se instalou, nos anos 1970. A acusação, além de focar no teor racista e discriminatório do material, aponta para a intenção contida de disputar uma versão do passado na qual a posse da empresa sobre aquelas terras é legítima, negando a expulsão violenta dos nativos.

Ainda sobre a história colonial do Brasil, é notável a crítica que Venâncio (2018) publicou sobre o *Guia do politicamente incorreto da História do Brasil* (2012). Para Venâncio, as revisões, negações e reelaborações do passado feitas no livro por Leandro Narloch sobre temas da colonização brasileira, como a afirmação da suposta culpa dos africanos na escravidão negra ou a dos indígenas na destruição da Mata Atlântica, minimizam violências históricas do processo colonial e se

articulam com posições neoliberais, refratárias a conquistas de direitos por essas populações e seus descendentes. Uma conclusão parcial que se pode tirar desses apontamentos é de que há uma estrutura lógica no negacionismo histórico que é aplicável a várias realidades, não somente às recentes.

No *Para entender a Inquisição*, tal operação é muito clara. Na obra, se usam as relativizações e negações da violência cometida pelos tribunais católicos como meio para uma crítica a valores modernos, ou ainda para desqualificar uma historiografia tomada por secular e anticatólica. Há uma particularidade, no caso, que é a intenção explícita, talvez seu objetivo central, de se defender a doutrina católica da Modernidade. O negacionismo histórico, por essa via, vai ao encontro do conceito filosófico-teológico da apologética.

## Negação e narrativa apologética

Em termos filosóficos, apologética é definida, *grosso modo*, como a defesa de algo através de argumentos. Assim, a apologia a alguém ou a algo seria usar de argumentação para justificar ou defender suas ações e/ou ideias. Um texto paradigmático para tal definição é a *Apologia de Sócrates*, diálogo no qual Platão defende seu mestre (SCHÜLER 2002, p. 57). Aplicado à teologia, o termo define o resguardo da doutrina a partir de uma reflexão crítica que tenta apresentar o conteúdo da fé diante das exigências da razão (FISICHELA 2003, p. 44-45). Empregando a apologética à escrita da história das Inquisições, formou-se uma tradição intelectual de revisões histórica sobre elas desde o século XIX. Essa tradição tem de fundo a ideia de que essa forma de mediar o acesso ao passado inquisitorial traz em si a própria defesa da doutrina católica e de um ordenamento social segundo seus valores.

Segundo Marocci e Paiva (2013, p. 449-468), no início do oitocentos se formou uma historiografia que se valeu de discussões tópicas como a da importância das Inquisições para evitar as guerras de religião nos países ibéricos e Itália,



ou a que clamava pela necessidade de contextualização dos procedimentos inquisitoriais em sua época. Formou-se uma tradição historiográfica que disputou espaços com uma outra tributária da lenda negra. Essa historiografia foi motivada pelas disputas de memória sobre o Antigo Regime, dentro da efervescência política daquele contexto. É o caso dos escritos de Joseph-Marie de Maistre (1852), importante contrarrevolucionário francês, que em texto apologético sobre a Inquisição ressalta tanto a necessidade de ela ser analisada criticamente conforme pensamento de suas épocas históricas, como também o devir histórico dos tribunais na defesa de uma ordem e hierarquias sociais consolidadas. Também se desenvolveu uma vertente dessa historiografia em resposta a teses como as de Lea (1993, p. 531) e Herculano (2002) que atribuíram às Inquisições ibéricas razões para o atraso cultural, científico e econômico de Espanha e Portugal. Destaca-se, aí, a obra de Menéndez y Pelayo (1880, p. 197-412), que defendeu que os tribunais de fé foram o último bastião de resistência da nação espanhola e de sua tradição católica contra tendências externas, como os efeitos das reformas protestantes e de correntes modernas como o jacobinismo e o enciclopedismo.

No século XX, aparecem novas discussões tópicas nessa escrita do passado inquisitorial. Um exemplo importante está nas conhecidas *Letters* (2011), publicadas no contexto da II Grande Guerra por David Goldstein. Nas cartas 16, 17 e 18, se questiona a natureza preconceituosa das fontes que falam das perseguições inquisitoriais, além de apontar a insistência na narrativa de perseguidos pelas Inquisições como uma das causas da desagregação e enfraquecimento das comunidades judaicas. Além disso, Goldstein atribui uma origem na tradição judaica dos fundamentos da perseguição religiosa, que foram somente retomados pela Inquisição.<sup>1</sup> Aquino, em *blog* no site da editora Cleofas (mesma do livro aqui analisado) publicou uma tradução parcial de uma das cartas de Goldstein, sob o título *Por que céus, um judeu como você, haveria de se tornar Católico?*.<sup>2</sup>

1 - As cartas de Goldstein são encontradas facilmente em diversos sites de orientação católica conservadora ou ligados a correntes da Renovação Carismática. É comum que não se cite quem traduziu.

2 - Disponível em: <https://goo.gl/CQwW-rw>. Acesso em 19 dez. 2018.

Martina, importante autor católico e que escreveu a biografia do papa Pio IX, num dos volumes de sua *História da Igreja Católica* (1974), menciona a importância das Inquisições para o surgimento do processo investigativo criminal e do direito à defesa do réu, aspectos fundamentais ao direito liberal contemporâneo. Aponta, ainda, para uma relativa brandura dos tribunais de fé em relação à justiça secular, sobretudo entre a Baixa Idade Média e Idade Moderna. Martina endossa uma discussão tópica bastante repetida na escrita apologética às Inquisições, ao colocar nas palavras de Lea a afirmação que se os cátaros não tivessem sido exterminados, certamente, a Europa voltaria à barbárie,<sup>3</sup> ressaltando uma possível necessidade delas em nome da formação do Ocidente cristão e da civilização.

Martina é uma das principais referências de Aquino em *Para Entender a Inquisição*. Porém, há destaque maior de outra publicação apologética, de João Bernardino Gonzaga, intitulada *A Inquisição em seu mundo* (1993). Ambas obras receberam *imprimatur* (aprovação para publicar conforme os cânones 824 e 832 do Direito Canônico) da diocese de Lorena, São Paulo. Essa obra, tal como a de Aquino, parte da mesma premissa de que a história das Inquisições é usada como instrumento de ataque contra a Igreja católica. A própria estrutura dos dois livros é muito semelhante e, como será visto mais à frente, há uma diferença substancial nos capítulos finais.

De toda forma, o que se pretende frisar aqui é a inserção de Aquino e sua obra analisada numa tradição já longa de publicações apologéticas sobre a Inquisição, constantemente atualizada. O autor busca frisar isso logo no início do livro, ao analisar o *Simposio Internazionale di Studio sul Tema L'Inquisizione*, realizado em 1998, promovido e organizado pela *Comissão histórico-teológica para a preparação do Grande Jubileu*, na qual o papa João Paulo II discursou na sua abertura (1998) e suas atas foram publicadas como livro (BORROMEIO 2003). Aquino dedica um capítulo para falar do *Simposio*, dividido em dois subtítulos, e que é basicamente feito de citações, na maioria indiretas. De início, Aquino (2016, p. 20) destaca que se trata da reunião

3 - Lea discute pontos de vários documentos dos séculos XII e XIII que justificaram a cruzada contra aos albigenses. Entre as acusações, consta a ameaça de espalhar a corrupção e a barbárie em toda a Europa. O autor analisa criticamente tal ponto de vista, não o reafirma (MARTINA 1974, p. 138-143; LEA 1887, p. 128-208).



de 30 renomados historiadores, listados ao final, conhecidos internacionalmente. As diversas citações, maior parte retiradas do portal católico *Zenit*<sup>4</sup> e de fontes jornalísticas seculares como a *Folha de S. Paulo* (2004), destacam o reconhecimento da Igreja da necessidade de rever por sua própria iniciativa os aspectos obscuros da história da Inquisição, “avaliando-os à luz dos princípios do Evangelho”. Completa, apontando que o objetivo do *Simposio* era o de fazer um correto juízo histórico, sem prescindir dos condicionalismos culturais da época (AQUINO 2016, p. 21). Aquino conclui, citando o historiador Agostinho Borromeo, que o *Simposio* recolheu os elementos necessários para fazer uma história da Inquisição [...] sem cair em preconceitos negativos ou na apologética propagandista (AQUINO 2016, p. 22).

Na segunda parte da apresentação sobre o *Simposio*, observa-se pouco rigor na separação entre as Inquisições medievais e modernas, além de haver grande destaque a números, segundo Aquino, baixos, de condenações à morte pela Inquisição na Europa durante a Idade Média – o autor inclui aí números referentes às Inquisições Modernas de Espanha, Portugal e Itália. Esses números sustentam uma conclusão parcial, que, segundo o autor, “demoliram algumas ideias falsas sobre a Inquisição”. Que ideias falsas são essas? Basicamente, um conjunto de pressupostos e informações que superdimensionam a violência inquisitorial e que, como premissa do autor, predominariam na historiografia. Isso fica claro na mesma página em que fala sobre a caça às bruxas, na qual Aquino diz que alguns adversários da Igreja falam absurdamente em milhões de bruxas queimadas na fogueira, sem, no entanto, apontar nenhum historiador ou obra que tenha feito tal afirmação (AQUINO 2016, p. 23). Mais à frente, retoma o ponto sobre a suposta afirmação de que os tribunais do Santo Ofício tivessem vitimado milhões de pessoas, mencionando Dan Brown, autor de *best sellers* polêmicos como *O Código da Vinci* (2003), além do prefácio escrito por Rose Muraro de uma versão em português do *Martelo das Feiticeiras* (AQUINO 2016, p. 122), no qual a autora não faz tal afirmação. O que Muraro diz (2016, p. 9-23) é que a construção do feminino demonizado, observada no manual escrito por Sprenger e Kramer

4 - Portal dedicado a transmitir discursos e declarações do papa, além de notícias sobre o Vaticano, bem como analisar notícias do ponto de vista católico, tendo versões em sete línguas (inglês, francês, espanhol, português, italiano, alemão e árabe). Disponível em: <https://zenit.org/>. Acesso em: 19 dez. 2018.

no século XIII, em grande medida, contribuiu para a produção de um arquétipo ligado à legitimação de muitas violências de gênero que, aí sim, teriam vitimado milhões.

Um falso problema – o suposto consenso na historiografia de que Inquisição matou milhões –, somada à comparação de números de condenados sem um devido tratamento qualitativo, além da asserção de que, sem dúvida, este simpósio representa o que há de mais atual e histórico no estudo da Inquisição (AQUINO 2016, p. 24) formam o ponto de partida do *Para entender a Inquisição*. Aquino apresenta o Simpósio e suas atas como sendo uma referência mais isenta e neutra em matéria de critérios científicos que as estudadas anteriormente, contaminadas por sentimentos contrários à Igreja romana. Assim, logo de início, se introduz o argumento de que existiria uma história verdadeira ou secreta das Inquisições que o leitor terá revelada para si nas páginas seguintes.

Aquino recorre, na imensa maioria das vezes ao longo da obra, a citações de autores católicos. Por exemplo, nas referências bibliográficas são listados 46 artigos da revista *Pergunte e Responderemos*, criada e editada pelo beneditino Dom Estevão Bettencourt, publicados entre 1961 e 2004. Tal periódico se apresenta como a primeira revista apologética do Brasil.<sup>5</sup> Todavia, a obra não prescindiu de menções a autores de fora desse nicho. Aquino cita, por exemplo, Francisco Bethencourt e sua *História das Inquisições* (2000) na bibliografia, embora não apareça nenhuma menção ao mesmo autor e obra no corpo do texto, além de clássicos como Henry Charles Lea e menções a um trabalho de Sônia Aparecida Siqueira, pesquisadora referência sobre estudos inquisitoriais no Brasil. No capítulo sobre a Inquisição Portuguesa, sua argumentação é feita inteiramente organizando-se uma sequência de citações do artigo publicado pela autora (1996) na *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, que acompanhou a transcrição dos regimentos do Santo Ofício de Portugal. Todas são feitas indiretamente, por meio de um artigo de Dom Estevão Bettencourt, publicado na 460ª edição da *Pergunte e Responderemos* (AQUINO 2016, p. 186-196).

5 - Revista mensal, criada e editada pelo mencionado religioso e teólogo da ordem de São Bento, no mosteiro da ordem, no Rio de Janeiro. Publicada entre 1958 e 2008, teve 555 números. O foco da revista era discutir temas diversos na perspectiva católica. Disponível em: <http://www.pr.gonet.biz/revista.php>. Acesso em 20 dez. 2018.



É recorrente, quando Lea é citado, Aquino frisar um possível anticatolicismo do autor estadunidense. Por exemplo, no subcapítulo sobre a Cruzada contra o Albigenses, Aquino (2016, p. 93) afirma que “até mesmo o historiador protestante Henry Charles Lea, avesso à Igreja (católica)”, teria endossado seu argumento de que a supressão dos cátaros seria necessária para se preservar a paz e segurança na Europa, no século XIII, citando-o, também, indiretamente, através do terceiro volume do livro de Daniel-Rops, *A Igreja das catedrais e das cruzadas*. O mesmo procedimento se nota em outras citações indiretas de Lea e de Bartolomé Benassar, retiradas da obra de Gonzaga, no subtítulo sobre o inquisidor espanhol Tomás de Torquemada. Nelas, Aquino defende o argumento de que a imagem negativa do famoso inquisidor geral do tribunal de Castela se deve à propaganda protestante, a erros da historiografia e, também, a abusos da monarquia na jurisdição papal sobre os tribunais de fé. O autor sempre reforça que a não ligação de tais historiadores ao catolicismo os torna insuspeitos em afirmações que concordam com pontos centrais de seu livro (AQUINO 2016, p. 172-185). O que se percebe é que, apesar de o fundamento central da obra ser o de se revelar uma história verdadeira e revisada da Inquisição ao leitor, que foi historicamente ocultada por uma historiografia hegemonicamente secular e anticatólica, o recurso a essa última tem uma função indispensável. Colocar nas palavras de historiadores seculares argumentos que sustentem sua apologia à Inquisição e à doutrina católica constroem, na narrativa, um efeito de verdade, vincado à noção de neutralidade.

A discussão feita por Ankersmit (2001) acerca da pós-modernidade, destacando as implicações sobre o acesso ao passado pela escrita e pesquisa histórica pós-modernas e as considerações que fez a respeito da importância da estética na construção dessas narrativas, traz alguns pontos que servem a reflexões importantes sobre o livro de Aquino e obras similares. Em termos de implicação ontológica quanto ao passado histórico dessa forma de análise, Ankersmith diz que a multiplicidade de maneiras de narrar fatos e contextos

passados faz com que o passado, propriamente, passe a ser entendido pelo historiador não mais enquanto acessível na sua totalidade, mas como apreensível somente por meio de linguagem e construído enquanto discurso. Tal entendimento sobre alcance do conhecimento sobre o passado assume o lugar de sua abordagem enquanto coisa em si, em termos de hierarquia do que se analisa. Diante disso, a agudez, o estilo e a forma como se constroem narrativas históricas não são vistos mais como dissociados do seu conteúdo. Eles produzem efeitos de verdade no texto, dentro de uma conjuntura em que objetivismo das grandes narrativas perde relevância. O *Para entender a Inquisição* apresenta uma construção possível sobre o passado inquisitorial, feita do ponto de vista apologético. Sua forma de argumentação busca criar ao leitor um efeito de acesso a um passado heurístico, ocultado por uma produção histórica cujas análises são, via de regra, turvadas por ideologias. É como se o leitor do livro de Aquino fosse convidado a ler uma grande narrativa, mas uma que seja alternativa aos cânones clássicos anticatólicos. Um passado total, mas oculto sobre a Inquisição. A estética da construção narrativa adotada na obra, intercalando textos apologéticos com cânones seculares do tema (ainda que citados indiretamente e lidos de maneira enviesada ou mesmo falsificada/distorcida, como o mencionado caso de Lea), torna-se parte do conteúdo dos argumentos que negam violências do passado inquisitorial ou as minimizam como produtos de anti-propaganda e/ou interferências externas.

Cabe, também, questionar qual uso que esse tipo de mediação com o passado inquisitorial, feita por Aquino, possui numa dimensão pública. Parte da resposta pode estar no ensaio feito por Rüsen (2009, p. 168-170) sobre usos e sentidos do passado, pensando em categorias como memória e consciência históricas. Para ele, há diferença entre a memória, constituinte de um passado que confere orientação cultural a indivíduos e sociedades, e os procedimentos racionais do pensamento pelos quais o conhecimento do que aconteceu de fato é constituído criticamente. Esses procedimentos, tradicionalmente se interessam pelos modos de fazer e





manter o passado no presente, não estando necessariamente preocupados com a inter-relação cultural entre memória e expectativa e, por isso, ignoram o papel que as intenções para o futuro colocam nas representações do passado. Porém, a narrativa histórica, que constitui uma mediação do acesso ao passado pelo presente, interseccionando a construção crítica da narração do que aconteceu com memórias e expectativas do presente, conflui, de certa maneira, com a criação de uma consciência histórica, que inclui em si a racionalidade dos mecanismos de produção de sentido do espírito humano, especialmente interessado nos modos de representação que dão ao passado uma forma distintiva de história (enquanto ciência). Além disso, essa consciência histórica tematiza o impacto da história nas perspectivas futuras da vida humana. Tomando tais pontos, é possível pensar que o *Para entender a Inquisição* empreende uma construção narrativa do passado inquisitorial com intencionalidade de conferir uma orientação cultural e identitária a grupos do presente, interessados numa autoabsolvição quanto a possíveis problemas éticos de ações da Igreja católica, no presente e no passado. Ao mesmo tempo, toca a constituição de sentido histórico a um ideal de sociedade norteado por uma idealização de um passado medieval, orientado pelo e para o catolicismo.

## Inquisição e a Idade Média

Para entender a Inquisição, segundo Aquino, é necessário analisá-la em seu tempo. E o tempo da Inquisição é, na obra, a *Idade Média*, ainda que o termo corresponda a uma caracterização mais *valorativa* que *cronológica*. Por exemplo, Aquino toma por Inquisição quaisquer sistemas de punição de diferença religiosa empreendidos por Estados ou por grupos confessionais ou seculares em qualquer época. Assim, os valores da época – ou termos similares que Aquino usa ao se referir ao pensamento jurídico e a princípios ético-morais e religiosos de todos os períodos em que houve atuação do Santo Ofício – acabam por se aplicar às justificativas de

ação dos tribunais de fé medievais e modernos, católicos e protestantes. Isso fica claro quando se observa que, apesar de se vincular a origem e a justificativa das Inquisições no direito, nos costumes e nos valores medievais, há, na sequência, capítulos sobre as inquisições da Espanha, de Portugal e Itália (AQUINO 2016, p. 153-185; p. 124-128), bem como sobre uma Inquisição Protestante,<sup>6</sup> dentro da qual inclui um subtítulo chamado Massacres brasileiros, que trata de perseguições a católicos por protestantes invasores franceses e holandeses durante a colonização, bem como de “mártires eclesiásticos”, mortos no processo de catequização de nativos, instigados por invasores que professavam confissões reformadas (AQUINO 2016, p. 213-215). Há também capítulos dedicados aos casos famosos, como os de Galileu, Giordano Bruno e a Noite de São Bartolomeu (1572), sendo os dois primeiros referentes aos tribunais da Inquisição romana moderna, e o último aos conflitos de religião na França do processo das Reformas (AQUINO 2016, p. 226-238; p. 256-261; p. 262-267).

Como foi dito, a caracterização do período medieval no *Para entender a Inquisição* tem característica *valorativa* mais evidente que a *cronológica*. Aquino, assim como sua principal referência, Gonzaga, segue uma concepção de medievo muito tributária à utilizada pelo historiador, romancista e ensaísta católico francês Henri Jules Charles Petiot, que assinou maior parte de sua obra como Daniel-Rops. Tal concepção aparece na sua monumental obra *Histoire de l'Église du Christ*, publicada em dez volumes entre 1948 e 1965. Alguns apontamentos feitos por Sorrel (2000, p. 672) a respeito da obra de Rops devem ser mencionados de maneira a entender parte da argumentação feita por Aquino. Primeiramente, a concepção de história de Rops que, segundo Sorrel, deveria ser propositiva e prescritiva antes de científica – uma história-lição. Assim, sua apologética deve buscar edificar seus leitores segundo princípios morais que o autor considera positivos sem prescindir de rigor e protocolos acadêmico-científicos, mas abrindo-se mão de um objetivismo, considerado contraproducente para o fim

6 - Não existiu uma “Inquisição protestante”. Houve perseguições religiosas nesses contextos, com práticas e instituições, além de fundamentação jurídica e teológica distintas das católicas (BETHENCOURT 2000, p. 347)



primeiro da narrativa histórica. Além disso, em *História da Igreja Católica*, Rops (1991; 1993) não abria mão de algum providencialismo, ao considerar pontos convergentes ao dogma na sua análise do passado, como a imutabilidade da Igreja em relação às vicissitudes do tempo, o que provaria sua santidade e eternidade – ponto reafirmado por Aquino (AQUINO 2016, p. 62).

Acerca da concepção de Rops sobre a Idade Média, várias vezes mobilizada pelo autor do *Para entender a Inquisição*, importa aqui sintetizar alguns pontos gerais. Eles aparecem especialmente no terceiro volume da tradução para a língua portuguesa da obra de Rops, o mais citado por Aquino, embora também haja menções ao segundo. São três os pontos centrais: a) uma concepção valorativa *ambivalente* sobre a Idade Média, pois, ao mesmo tempo que ela encerra barbárie, violência e incivilidade, também é uma era do florescimento da civilização ocidental na medida em que é domada pelo catolicismo, formando o Ocidente cristão, sendo a Inquisição parte desse processo. Isso explica um certo fatalismo histórico, ao atribuir ao Santo Ofício tanto o papel de impedir o regresso à barbárie, como de ser marco civilizatório do direito; b) admite-se que houve violência no processo ambivalente anterior, mas se isenta a Igreja católica da mesma. A violência é sempre produto de ingerência das autoridades régias sobre assuntos eclesiásticos e inquisitoriais, de falhas isoladas do clero ou são explicáveis, de maneira geral, tanto pelos valores da época, quanto pelas sobrevivências do barbarismo no processo civilizatório conduzido pela Igreja; c) há uma caracterização da Europa ocidental entre o ano 1000 e o século XIV como a Primavera da Cristandade, quando o continente e civilização ocidental experimentaram seu auge de unidade, prosperidade, efervescência cultural e científica, sempre guiados pela Igreja católica e que, na medida em que se aproximou do Renascimento, conheceu sua decadência, crescente e constante dali até a contemporaneidade. Triunfalismo e decadentismo, juntamente, formam tal concepção ambivalente da história que tem um Ocidente católico, idealizado no passado medieval.

Essa construção da Idade Média aparece na explicação de Aquino sobre como os tribunais do Santo Ofício foram aceitos plenamente em sua época. A princípio, a obra apresenta o período medieval marcado pela precariedade, fervor religioso e violência. Nas palavras do autor, a vida do homem medieval era de “muitos sofrimentos”, pois “as condições materiais eram aflitivas”, e “sabemos que o sofrimento coletivo é uma escola de vícios”. Completa, afirmando que no século XI:

Diariamente essa gente via surgir bandos de bárbaros normandos, de sarracenos, grupos de húngaros (magiares), destruindo aldeias, incendiando cidades, matando gente de toda a forma. Imperava ainda o barbarismo das segundas invasões bárbaras [sic]. Soldados mercenários assaltavam e roubavam; e as frequentes guerras e crises na agricultura traziam bandos esfomeados para as cidades. E não havia polícia como hoje, patrulhando e mantendo a ordem (AQUINO 2016, p. 55).

A isso, segue uma descrição das pestes, comuns, segundo ele, pois a desnutrição e a falta de higiene causavam os horrores das epidemias que levavam a enterrar os mortos em valas comuns, criando-se um homem acostumado com a morte. Aquino ainda aponta que a expectativa de vida no medievo variava de 20 a 25 anos e que a “cada período de mais ou menos dez anos uma peste se repetia matando de 20% a 40% da população”, embora não cite a fonte desses dados (AQUINO 2016, p. 56-57).

Suas descrições são repletas de detalhes que ressaltam um clima violento e miserável, no qual se produziu um homem insensível à violência e embrutecido pelo constante contato com a morte. Dessa forma rude de viver e ver o mundo surgiu um sistema penal tão duro quanto essa sociedade, na qual os procedimentos inquisitoriais eram plenamente aceitáveis. Seguindo significativamente as análises de Gonzaga (1993, p. 21-65), Aquino (2016, p. 105-107) descreve que do barbarismo do homem medieval surgiu uma justiça chamada de feudal, sem presunção de inocência ou garantias aos



acusados, baseada em sistemas como os ordálios e os duelos, dependentes sempre do arbítrio do senhor feudal e fortemente explicada pelo fervor religioso dos povos.

Porém, dialogando mais diretamente com Rops, Aquino desvia do mito da Idade das Trevas, de maneira até mesmo a inverte-lo, transformando a Idade Média, ou parte dela, numa Idade do Ouro, com a Igreja católica sendo sua guia. A violência anteriormente apresentada formou um arquétipo de homem que possibilitou a Europa e a Cristandade conquistarem o mundo. Aquino diz que:

O homem da Idade Média era acostumado com esse sofrimento, isso fazia parte de sua vida; mas isso não impediu que fosse grande o desenvolvimento das artes, da música, da arquitetura, da escultura, da literatura, do teatro e das universidades, tudo impulsionado pela Igreja [católica] (AQUINO 2016, p.57).

Numa época que, segundo Aquino, “tudo era por Deus e para Deus”, todos os campos do pensamento floresciam sob a tutela da Igreja, que teve o papel de civilizar a população europeia, anestesiada pela precariedade e ainda herdeira de costumes bárbaros. Assim, foi possível levar tal ideal civilizatório, formado pela Cristandade medieval, para o restante do mundo – num dos raros momentos do livro em que Aquino separa a Idade Média da Moderna com mais rigor:

Esse impulso ao conhecimento científico e tecnológico continuou nos séculos seguintes: no início do século XVII a Europa contava com 108 Universidades, enquanto o resto do mundo não havia uma só [...]. Isso põe um problema ao historiador. Por que é que o desenvolvimento ocorreu somente em área cristã, e não fora desta? Por que, hoje ainda, dos dez países mais evoluídos e ricos do mundo nove são de tradição cristã? [...]: há na mensagem cristã alguma coisa que leva os germens do desenvolvimento e do progresso. A antropologia da Bíblia exalta o homem e o põe no centro do universo. Além disto, pregando a igualdade, ele cria uma sociedade livre, sem barreiras sacrais ou de castas; não há, pois, como se surpreender se, alimentado por tal mensagem, o europeu conquistou o mundo (AQUINO 2016, p. 33).

Conclui que “sem esta nossa maravilhosa Europa, o mundo, como conhecemos, não existiria”. Essa conclusão do autor sobre o Ocidente cristão acaba por direcionar seu argumento apologético, conectando a Idade Média das trevas à de ouro, tendo a Igreja como catalizador da transformação de uma na outra. O Santo Ofício foi, para ele, um instrumento dessa transformação.

Aquino, em algumas passagens, fala do histórico de a Igreja nunca ter sido favorável às conversões forçadas, nem a penas a hereges. Também, que tais conversões forçadas eram feitas somente pela autoridade civil. Aqui há uma aparente contradição, que é explicável pela natureza apologética do texto: ao mesmo tempo em que Aquino menciona o entendimento de que o Estado também zelava por assuntos religiosos baseado na teoria das duas espadas, e que a tolerância religiosa era considerada indesejável e prejudicial ao bem comum dos súditos (AQUINO 2016, p. 79-84; p. 28), o autor separa a ação e a decisão eclesiástica e, sobretudo papal, quanto aos assuntos da Inquisição. Em outras palavras, injustiças puderam ser cometidas pelo Santo Ofício enquanto estivesse sujeito a interferência dos monarcas, mas nunca por algum erro de julgamento de Roma. Por exemplo, atribui ao Estado e ao rei Felipe IV, o Belo, a condenação dos templários, ressaltando mesmo uma oposição a ela feita pelo pontífice. Operação similar em relação à Joana D’Arc (AQUINO 2016, p. 216-225; p. 239-255).

Quando Aquino, enfim, analisa os erros cometidos por inquisidores, apresenta-os como “pecados dos filhos da Igreja”, pelos quais a Santa Sé não é responsável, dada sua natureza individual (AQUINO 2016, p. 130). Dentro da narrativa, esse ponto é reforçado, ao se reafirmar os dogmas da imutabilidade e infalibilidade da Igreja (AQUINO 2016, p. 17).

Para Aquino (2016, p. 100-110), concordando com Gonzaga (1993, p. 45-46; p. 79-91), a Inquisição, apesar da mencionada resistência católica a quaisquer violências em nome da religião, foi produto de uma época de ouro da Cristandade e teve um papel fundamental para a construção do Ocidente, em dois processos distintos e concomitantes. No primeiro, ela civiliza



o direito feudal através do direito canônico, que teria introduzido garantias individuais, presunção de inocência, apuração de delitos e penas mais brandas que a justiça civil. Dessa forma, explica o autor, a Inquisição foi um tribunal que “ajuda o herege”, pois tende sempre a absolvê-lo para a sua reconciliação (AQUINO 2016, p. 98), contrariamente à “fábrica de culpados” descrita e analisada por vários historiadores sobre a Inquisição (BENNASSAR 1979; SARAIVA 1994). No segundo, o Santo Ofício teria protegido a Cristandade de se afundar na barbárie que a ameaçava, como no caso do catarismo, descrito como “seita revolucionária” que objetivava destruir a Igreja, a que chamavam “sinagoga de Satanás”, que rejeitavam a sua tradição, moral, e dogmas, criando, segundo Aquino, um clima de guerra de religião de ambos os lados. Estes lados seriam a Inquisição, para proteger o Ocidente cristão católico dos vícios, imoralidades e crimes dos cátaros; e, de outro, os próprios, movidos pela heresia, em “bandos fanáticos, às vezes apoiados por nobres senhores que provocavam tumultos, ataques às igrejas e fazendas, na França, Itália, Alemanha, Países Baixos [...]” (AQUINO 2016, p. 72-74). Importante frisar, ainda, que a violência, licenciosidade sexual e mesmo invocações do demônio, feitas pelos cátaros, segundo a descrição de Aquino, teriam sido enfrentadas pela Igreja, a princípio, com missões pastorais, e que o uso da força veio com maior vigor da autoridade civil, aqui, separando funcionalmente as coroas e a Igreja, quando o assunto é a violência inquisitorial.

Assim, a negação de qualquer culpa da Igreja quanto a violências e crimes que as Inquisições tenham cometido mistura-se no *Para entender à Inquisição* com uma exaltação dos tribunais religiosos como meios necessários à construção da civilização e evitar-se o retorno ao barbarismo. O negacionismo e o fatalismo histórico, assim, encontram-se. Por outro lado, a mentalidade da época ou qualquer necessidade de proteção contra ameaças político-religiosas são muito menos destacadas quando o autor analisa a “inquisição” protestante, na qual inclui perseguições religiosas empreendidas por anglicanos, calvinistas e luteranos, assim como quaisquer perseguições que tenham os católicos no lado perseguido.

Existe uma clara diferença nas justificativas e na mobilização de aspectos atenuantes de violência. Em suma, sua caracterização da Idade Média – que vale também para a Moderna – ambivalente, ora bárbara, ora dourada e guiada pela Igreja, serve na sua argumentação para reforçar o papel civilizatório da Igreja de Roma e da Inquisição, mas também para destacar culpas de seus detratores. De fundo, ainda prepara a narrativa para seu clímax: a crítica ao Mundo Moderno.

## Contra um mundo moderno em ruínas

Ao final do *Para Entender a Inquisição*, Aquino desenvolve de maneira mais direta a resposta à questão colocada logo na Introdução, quando diz que narrativas do passado que condenam os procedimentos inquisitoriais são movidas por um “moralismo histórico”, derivado de modernas opiniões políticas ou religiosas abraçadas (AQUINO 2016, p. 14), incoerentes, segundo ele, com o fato de que:

Nosso século não tem a mínima autoridade moral para condenar a Idade Média e a Inquisição; pois mesmo nos seus piores momentos, ela não pode ser comparada com os horrores dos regimes totalitários do século XX: a Primeira Guerra mundial matou cerca de 16 milhões de pessoas; a Segunda fez 50 milhões de vítimas; o nazismo assassinou 6 milhões de judeus e o comunismo ateu levou à morte milhões (AQUINO 2016, p. 272).

Nesse ponto está a diferença mais substantiva na organização da obra de Aquino com a de Gonzaga, que não dedica partes específicas inteiras às questões relacionadas ao presente. A pergunta colocada por Aquino, sobre se, do ponto de vista moral e ético, a modernidade pode condenar as Inquisições, tem por objetivo fomentar uma discussão ética no presente. Tal apontamento, desdobro num segundo: para o autor, estariam aqueles que defendem valores considerados modernos (tolerância, igualdade, liberdade, etc.), estejam em quais grupos estiverem ou seguindo quais ideologias modernas



seguirem (comunismo, socialismo, liberalismo, pós-modernismo, esquerdas, etc.), na contemporaneidade, aptos, do mesmo ponto de vista, a julgar a Inquisição ou a Igreja católica? O autor responde negativamente a isso, produzindo algum sentido histórico para a rejeição sistemática desses valores e ideologias, com todas as implicações ético-políticas que isso traz em si. A meu ver, tal uso do passado deveria provocar ao historiador sobre as Inquisições, em particular, e também noutros que se dedicam a temas de contextos pré-Revolução Industrial, no geral, a reflexão sobre tais usos da história.

Nesta altura do livro, Aquino foca no que denomina Outras Inquisições, partindo de outro falso problema segundo o qual a historiografia não se dedica criticar, com a mesma veemência que faz com a Inquisição, outros grupos, eventos e contextos marcados por assassinatos, perseguições ideológicas e outras violações aos direitos humanos. O autor tenta demonstrar seu argumento, apontando que crimes cometidos no período do Terror, da Revolução Francesa, pela Klux Klux Klan, nos EUA, ou as ações contra as religiões feitas por governos revolucionários motivados por um "comunismo ateu" na União Soviética, Cuba ou Camboja foram exponencialmente maiores que os atribuídos aos tribunais católicos. Contudo, ao contrário desses, contariam com alguma absolvição dos historiadores (AQUINO 2016, p. 272-277). Esses contextos e fatos, aos quais Aquino se refere como inquisições modernas, são exemplificados em subtítulos em que o autor destaca perseguições a católicos, construindo outro argumento importante: que os seguidores da Igreja de Roma são, contrariando o que diz a historiografia secular, as maiores vítimas das perseguições religiosas, não seus maiores culpados.

Aquino fala de uma Inquisição japonesa, referindo-se aos missionários portugueses que foram mortos no seu processo de expulsão do Japão, no século XVII (AQUINO 2016, p. 282), sendo esse o único subtítulo, no capítulo, que não trata do século XX. No título A Inquisição espanhola do século XX, o autor se refere à Guerra Civil (1936-1939), na qual, segundo ele, as grandes vítimas foram os católicos, pois "o ódio à Igreja

e aos fiéis cresceu tanto que os assassinatos foram monstruosos por parte das autoridades do Estado, agentes comunistas e sindicalistas anarquistas". Também chama de Inquisição mexicana uma "orientação anticristã do Estado" do México, que se cristalizou na Constituição de 1917, mas que se estende a tudo que aponta como efeitos da secularização do país após a Revolução de 1911, com ações diretas contra bispos, padres ou ordens religiosas colocadas no mesmo patamar que a laicização da educação, cemitérios e outros. Ao fim, no item As Inquisições, hoje, no Oriente, perseguições a católicos em países do mundo islâmico e da Ásia, como Mianmar e Índia, são enumeradas, tendo como fonte de suas informações portais apologéticos católicos (AQUINO 2016, p. 277-286).<sup>7</sup> Aquino conclui que:

Houve muitas "inquisições" no passado longínquo e no passado recente, mas só se fala daquela que envolveu a Igreja Católica na Idade Média. Esta não foi a única e nem a pior de todas. Houve muitas que julgaram pessoas e as condenaram à morte pelo "crime" de defenderem suas ideologias ou crenças julgadas intoleráveis contra os "dogmas" do Estado. Essas "inquisições" ideológicas de vários tempos, fizeram muito mais vítimas, em nome dos seus intocáveis dogmas do laicismo, que a tão falada Inquisição que aconteceu nos países católicos (AQUINO 2016, p. 281, aspas do autor).

Aquino, então, fecha sua narrativa de maneira que as concepções negativas sobre a Inquisição são atenuadas e/ou negadas, além de os próprios tribunais católicos terem uma importância para a construção do Ocidente cristão (idealizado) fortemente exaltada. A isso se soma a afirmação de haver uma negligência dos historiadores ao não condenarem perseguições empreendidas pelos dogmas laicos, à maneira que fazem com a Inquisição. Tal operação dá a entender dois aspectos importantes: primeiro, que a modernidade secularizada comete atrocidades em função de suas doutrinas, e elas são infinitamente piores que quaisquer outras atribuídas a ordem pré-moderna, conduzida pela Igreja católica; segundo, que o moralismo histórico dos que escrevem tradicionalmente sobre o passado e que predomina na condenação da Inquisição e

7 - São os portais Zenit, Agência Católica de Informações, Fátima Apologética e Veritatis Splendor. Disponíveis em: <https://www.acidigital.com/>; <https://www.veritatis.com.br/>; <http://www.olavodecarvalho.org/>, <http://www.fatima.org/>. Acessos em 20 dez. 2018.



da Igreja católica é derivado da mesma modernidade e suas ideologias, naturalmente inimigas do catolicismo. Essas ideologias são, mais que isso, fatores de degradação da humanidade e de todas as sociedades. É possível depreender da narrativa de Aquino algumas intencionalidades e usos práticos do passado (WHITE 2014, p. 3-24) que indicam, ao menos por alto, funções no debate público das narrativas históricas *para defender a Inquisição* ou similares.

## Negações do passado, rejeições no presente e o papel do historiador

Na página Medieval Guido MXCVII, no Facebook, foi publicado em 31/10/2018 um meme que contém templários carregando tochas em torno de uma sombra feminina voando em uma vassoura, uma bruxa. Nele há uma mensagem dizendo “Feliz dia das bruxas” (Figura 1). Na postagem original, há uma legenda que acompanha a imagem que diz “À todas as netas das bruxas desejamos os nossos votos de calor e afeto”. É possível identificar em publicações como essa um sinal de que alguns pontos até aqui analisados de narrativas negacionistas-apologéticas como a de Aquino são relativamente difundidos, cristalizados e apropriados. Alude-se, no meme, ao *slogan* feminista de que elas seriam “as bruxas que os inquisidores não conseguiram queimar”, misturado a um *cliché* sobre as Inquisições (queima às bruxas). Há clara valoração positiva do último, ironizando e rejeitando o primeiro, o que aponta para o fato de que negações e falsificações do passado inquisitorial tenham, aí, servido de substrato a guerras culturais contemporâneas.



Figura 1 – Disponível em: <https://goo.gl/oJN1tU> Acesso em 28 fev. 2018.

Entre medievalistas, tem se discutido com afinco como que leituras/negações de um passado pré-moderno podem servir de arcabouço para a formulação de discursos político-ideológicos no presente. É o caso do ensaio de D’Arcens (2014, p. 11-18) a respeito do humor contemporâneo inspirado em cenários medievais. Analisando os filmes *L’armatta Brancaleone* (1966) e *Brancaleone ala Crociate* (1970), renomadas comédias italianas, a autora, cruzando narrativa e referências contidas nela com entrevistas do diretor Lorenzo Codeli, declarado socialista e antifascista, demonstra como a sátira sobre a Idade Média, usando o ridículo e a inversão de posições entre o europeu e o bárbaro, serve de contraponto crítico ao conservadorismo europeu, sobretudo no que toca a xenofobia. Mais recentemente, há outro debate a respeito do fato de haver uma proliferação, em grupos supremacistas nos Estados Unidos, de alusões em seus nomes a termos como

cruzadas, cavaleiros e outros associados imagetivamente à Idade Média, e como isso funciona na construção de sentidos históricos a grupos de extrema direita, nas suas formações identitárias (SYMES 2017; FRANKE 2017).

Assim, não é estranho que negações e falseamentos da história da Inquisição, na forma tomada por Aquino, muitas vezes apareçam em publicações conservadoras diversas, articulando tal concepção do passado com ataques a agendas progressistas. É o caso do uso do *Para entender a Inquisição* como referência pelo jornalista Reinaldo Azevedo (2012), então ligado à revista *Veja*, no artigo *E os milhões mortos pela Santa Inquisição? perguntam. E eu respondo*. Azevedo se dirige a feministas, dizendo que “não se aprende nos colégios e nos cursinhos” a contextualizar as Inquisições em seu tempo, como se não houvesse “diferença entre práticas do século 17 e do 21!”. O jornalista cita Aquino, Gonzaga, Rops e outros fundamentando sua defesa da brandura dos tribunais inquisitoriais, além do superdimensionamento de sua violência nas narrativas históricas sobre eles em função de agendas de esquerda. Noutra publicação, assinada por Emerson de Oliveira no blog Logos Apologética e direcionada contra militâncias ateístas, o trabalho de Aquino é referenciado para responder sobre o número de mortos pelo Santo Ofício, em *A Inquisição e a Igreja Católica – respostas aos críticos*.<sup>8</sup> Tais críticos, no caso, seriam agendas secularistas, laicistas ou ateístas modernas.

O mesmo acontece na reprodução da discussão tópica de haver distorções feitas pela historiografia sobre uma verdadeira história da Inquisição. É o caso do texto *A verdadeira face da Inquisição e os fatos manipulados* pelos livros de história, publicado no portal Catolicismo Romano e assinado por Mônica Romano, apresentada como catequista no post.<sup>9</sup> Idêntico tom é adotado pelo próprio Aquino em seu blog, no portal da editora Cleofas, em texto que propõe fazer esclarecimentos sobre a história inquisitorial. Seu primeiro subtítulo, *Não, o seu professor anticlerical e marxista não contou a você a história real, documentada e objetiva*,<sup>10</sup> é bem explicativo: o

8 - Disponível em: <https://goo.gl/kkYWta>  
Acesso em: 20 dez. 2018.

9 - Disponível em: <https://goo.gl/P7HkcZ>  
Acesso em: 20 dez. 2018.

10 - Disponível em: <https://goo.gl/NZtT2L>  
Acesso em: 20 dez. 2018.

autor defende que a objetividade, necessária a se alcançar a verdade histórica sobre a Inquisição, é encoberta pelo anticlericalismo e marxismo – aqui, tomado como sinônimo a qualquer tipo de agenda progressista – dos professores de história e historiadores acadêmicos. Por essa via, os acessos tradicionais ao conhecimento sobre passado são questionados (ou sumariamente rejeitados?) em processo coevo a recusas de ideias e ideologias tidas por modernas. Importante, ainda, frisar a difusão dessas discussões em vários programas de redes de televisão católicas.<sup>11</sup> Assim, autores como Aquino podem ser, para além da atualização contemporânea das narrativas negacionista-apologéticas sobre a Inquisição, um elo entre a tradição intelectual de escrita negacionista sobre os tribunais e as guerras culturais próprias do século XXI, marcadas pela reafirmação de conservadorismos em diversos âmbitos que tem um anti-intelectualismo como um dos meios de ação.

Diante disso, fica a pergunta a respeito de como o historiador pode lidar com esse tipo de narrativa do passado. Nicolazzi e Caroline Bauer (2016) apontam para duas questões substantivas a serem tidas em conta diante de narrativas como a feita por Aquino: em primeiro lugar, é necessário o entendimento de que mentiras, amparadas com dados que podem ser falseados, enviesados ou distorcidos, podem assumir, em determinados espaços de circulação, status de verdade; em segundo, que não necessariamente tais dados precisam ser distorcidos ou falseados, mas podem ser organizados e performados de maneira a repercutirem mais amplamente, reforçando seu caráter constituinte de identidades e de regimes de verdade. Assim, a refutação baseada na crítica acadêmico-científica contra autores como Aquino, feita por historiadores profissionais, torna-se ao mesmo tempo ingênua e insuficiente. Há dimensões mais complexas na disputa por espaços e públicos, em relação a suas verdades sobre o passado, com esse tipo de negacionismo. Nesse ponto, concordo com as observações de Araújo (2017, p. 191-216) sobre usos da história na contemporaneidade, que propõe que a historiografia, entendida como o espaço privilegiado

*11 - Por exemplo, na entrevista dada pelo padre Wander Maia à rede católica Século XXI, em 2016. Disponível em: <https://youtu.be/iIH7Mt7B-mgE>. Acesso em: 20 dez. 2018. O próprio Aquino é apresentador da rede Canção Nova.*



do historiador contar a história baseada na análise crítica e metódica de fontes e bibliografia, deixe de pensar-se como espaço irradiador de conhecimento histórico, para ser um *locus* de acolhimento de outras narrativas. Assim, ela poderia lidar com um pressuposto básico das relações humanas: que todos os grupos e indivíduos, sendo históricos, têm um direito de produzir e apresentar suas próprias narrativas sobre o passado. Obras como a de Aquino não deixam de suprir demandas por passado de grupos católicos ultraconservadores que, como quaisquer outros, possuem esse tipo de anseio.

Ainda em concordância com o mesmo trabalho de Araújo, é fundamental estabelecer parâmetros éticos, como o compromisso com a honestidade intelectual, verdade histórica, direitos humanos e liberdades democráticas nesse acolhimento de narrativas. Parâmetros os quais Aquino claramente não cumpre, importante frisar. As respostas a respeito de como se fazer isso em termos de pensamento crítico não são fáceis, estão em aberto e colocam questões sobre todo o circuito de uma produção de conhecimento do passado, envolvendo sua escrita – por profissionais ou não –, as mídias em que circulam – livros, revistas, web 2.0 etc. – além de sua recepção e usos numa realidade cada vez mais complexa de narrativas fragmentadas e, por vezes, precariamente conectadas (MALERBA 2017, p. 135-174). No caso dessa forma de narrar a história do Santo Ofício, fica ainda a necessidade de compreender os regimes de autonomia e produção de verdades aceitas como legítimas pelos públicos atingidos por Aquino ou a rede *Canção Nova*. Compreender seus circuitos de produção, sua estética de apresentação e disputas por reconhecimento e legitimidade em espaços públicos e, ao mesmo tempo, combater seu negacionismo – e os efeitos dele – disputando tais regimes de verdade por vias distintas da afirmação nostálgica da autoridade do historiador acadêmico, aqui, se impõe como desafio.

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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

**Igor Tadeu Camilo Rocha**

igortcr@gmail.com

Doutorando em História - CAPES/PROEX

Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - Brasil

RECEBIDO EM: 15/MAIO/2018 | APROVADO EM: 10/JAN./2019

# Com a metodicidade das obras de jurisprudência: o julgamento histórico a partir da *Guerra civil no Rio Grande do Sul*, de Tristão de Alencar Araripe (1879-1881)

With the methodology of the juridical works: historical  
judgement in *Guerra civil no Rio Grande do Sul*, by Tristão de  
Alencar Araripe (1879-1881)

**Juliano Francesco Antonioli**

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8296-8880> 

## RESUMO

Neste artigo, analiso o julgamento histórico como parte integrante da produção historiográfica no século XIX. Para isso, exploro o confronto de interpretações acerca da Revolução Farroupilha (1835-1845) iniciado em 1879, em torno da memória documentada de Tristão de Alencar Araripe, e da recepção desse documento na Corte e na província do Rio Grande do Sul. A memória e as respostas que ela gerou permitem refletir sobre a construção de juízos pelos historiadores na sua prática de representação do passado. Nesse sentido, exploro duas possibilidades de interpretação. No primeiro momento, trato de refletir o condicionamento social dos julgamentos históricos, salientando, para o caso de Araripe, os aspectos relativos à sua formação e atuação como letrado e como político. Em seguida, debruço-me sobre alguns princípios que fundamentavam o ofício do historiador, tais como a seleção das fontes e a imparcialidade na apreciação dos fatos, por meio da crítica à memória formulada por Karl von Koseritz.

## PALAVRAS-CHAVE

História da historiografia; Julgamento histórico; Tristão de Alencar Araripe.

## ABSTRACT

In this article I analyze historical judgment as an integral part of historiographical production in the 19th century. This article explores the dispute of interpretations around the Farroupilha Revolution (1835-1845) that began in 1879 with Tristão de Alencar Araripe's documented memories and its reception in Court and in the province of Rio Grande do Sul. Araripe's work and the responses it generated allow us to reflect on the production of judgments by historians in their practice of representing the past. Thus, two interpretation possibilities are explored. First, the social conditioning of historical judgment is analyzed, highlighting Araripe's training and practice as a scholar and a politician. Following, the principles that grounded the historian's craft are discussed, such as the selection of sources and impartiality in the appreciation of facts, based on Karl von Koseritz's critique.

## KEYWORDS

History of historiography; Historical judgement; Tristão de Alencar Araripe.

## Uma memória acerca da Farroupilha é lida e publicada na Corte

O ano de 1879 marca um novo capítulo sobre a memória farroupilha, pois na oitava sessão do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (IHGB), no dia 22 de agosto, Tristão de Alencar Araripe (1821-1908) dava início à leitura de uma memória documentada acerca dos acontecimentos dos quase dez anos de conflito que conflagraram a província mais ao sul do Império, entre 1835 e 1845. Desde 1870 Araripe era um político e um letrado consagrado. Em 1869, fora eleito para a Assembleia Geral pela província do Ceará e nomeado Desembargador da Relação na Corte, sendo aceito como membro do IHGB (HRUBY 2012, p. 75-76). Em 1874, alcançou o topo da carreira política do Império, sendo agraciado com o título do Conselho. A memória intitulada *Guerra civil do Rio Grande do Sul*, lida aos membros do Instituto naquele ano, ganharia as páginas da revista desse Instituto em 1880. Nos anos que se seguiram, não só a memória foi publicada em livro, em 1881, como a partir de 1882 a *Revista do IHGB* (RIHGB) passou a publicar anualmente os documentos coligidos por Araripe para a futura escrita da história do evento.<sup>1</sup>

Foi, contudo, a publicação em livro da memória de Araripe que despertou a reação de uma parte dos letrados em São Paulo e no Rio Grande do Sul. Tão logo o livro se tornou conhecido, vozes se levantaram para defender a memória do evento e oferecer outra interpretação acerca do seu significado. A recepção negativa do trabalho de Araripe deu-se pelo julgamento histórico do regime republicano instalado pelos farroupilhas, em 1836, e das suas principais lideranças, o qual questionava o caráter heroico que lhes fora atribuído.<sup>2</sup>

De acordo com Araripe, a república rio-grandense nascera de um “movimento revolucionário” notável, que “começou sob a forma de sedição, vacilou sobre o seu procedimento, até que em Novembro de 1836 tomou o carácter de rebelião, e proclamou a república” (ARARIPE 1880, p. 115-116).

1 - O debate gerado pelo livro de Araripe já foi bem explorado em trabalhos recentes. Limiteme a mencionar os mais recentes sobre o assunto: LAZZARI 2004, p. 208-226; GRIJÓ 2006; HRUBY 2012, p. 152-228; LAMB 2012, p. 44-65; BOEIRA 2013, p. 218-237; RODRIGUES 2013, p. 164-169; e, SOARES 2016.

2 - Preservo a grafia dos nomes próprios, dos títulos dos trabalhos e dos excertos dos documentos consultados, optando por não atualizar a ortografia.

Como uma revolução, o movimento fora tratado como uma ameaça potencial à ordem, produtor de anarquia na província sulina. Assim, muitas das tentativas da Corte de reprimir os rebeldes tiveram como consequência, segundo Araripe, “vigorar as tendências revolucionárias na província anarchizada” (ARARIPE 1880, p. 172). Além disso, o autor da memória tratava as lideranças da Revolução de 1835 como caudilhos, termo pejorativo utilizado pela elite do Império para se referir aos chefes militares e às lideranças políticas que disputavam o poder nas Repúblicas do Prata. Desprezado pelos políticos brasileiros, em sua maioria bacharéis educados na arte das palavras, o caudilho era visto como o tipo social responsável pela situação belicosa e anárquica da região Platina. Além disso, o governo instituído pelos caudilhos farroupilhas não zelava pelos direitos individuais e pela propriedade privada, valores maiores que deveriam ser resguardados, segundo a máxima da elite política imperial.

No que se refere ao caráter republicano e democrático da revolução que separou a província do Império, Araripe afirmava que, “embora sob especiosa denominação democrática proseguisse o movimento revolucionário, a realidade da couza bem longe estava da sua epigrafe”, uma vez que “nunca a democracia afastou-se mais de um governo do que do da república de Piratinin” (ARARIPE 1880, p. 116-117). O autor da memória elencava alguns pressupostos ausentes no governo instituído pelos farrapos que depunham contra seu caráter republicano e democrático:

[...] nunca o xefe supremo d’essa intitulada república, [...] foi erguido pelo voto popular em comícios regulares; antes pelo contrario o Presidente da república de Piratinin jámais teve outro titulo de legitimidade sinão o arbitrio de poucos caudilhos, autores da rebeldia (ARARIPE 1880, p. 116).

O trabalho elaborado pelo conselheiro Araripe atingia em cheio as apropriações que liberais e republicanos da província sulina faziam da Revolução de 1835. Seus juízos acerca do



caráter separatista do movimento e de seus líderes acabaram por receber a atenção de alguns letrados rio-grandenses que buscaram contrapor os julgamentos do historiador do IHGB.

Através da imprensa rio-grandense surgiram as primeiras reações ao trabalho de Araripe. O jornal *Gazeta de Porto Alegre* publicava em 1881 uma série com doze artigos do seu editor, Karl von Koseritz. Pouco tempo depois se iniciava a publicação na "Secção Historica" da *Gazeta* do trabalho de Ramiro Barcellos acerca da "revolução de 1835", que posteriormente apareceu também nas páginas do *Jornal do Commercio*, em 1882, e ganhou o formato de livro no mesmo ano através da tipografia do periódico. Além dessas, outras manifestações surgiram nas páginas dos periódicos locais. Contudo, são os artigos de Koseritz que veiculam as críticas mais elaboradas publicadas na imprensa em resposta à memória documentada de Araripe. Além disso, elas serviram de suporte para a crítica mais contundente a Araripe, formulada pelos rio-grandenses estudantes da Faculdade de Direito de São Paulo, agrupados no *Club Vinte de Setembro*, que mobilizaram novos critérios de cientificidade na contraposição ao trabalho. Mesmo no Rio Grande do Sul, entretanto, havia falta de consenso acerca do significado do evento, o que fica claro nas diferentes manifestações literárias e políticas que trataram da Farroupilha (LAZZARI 2004; SOARES 2016). Contudo, o material aqui analisado compreende somente a memória documentada de Araripe e a crítica que lhe dirigiu Koseritz, uma vez que neles é possível reconstruir as condições de enunciação e refutação de juízos históricos.

## O condicionamento social dos julgamentos históricos

De acordo com Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1978, p. 19), as ferramentas conceituais dos historiadores são socialmente constituídas. Para o historiador alemão, vemos o passado sob uma perspectiva definida pelo nosso próprio posicionamento na sociedade, compreendendo a história da sociedade em virtude dos conceitos desenvolvidos à luz do presente, uma vez que toda história é história contemporânea (MOMMSEN 1978, p. 20).

Assim, a estrutura dos julgamentos históricos seriam determinadas, segundo a perspectiva de Mommsen (1978, p. 22), não só pelo objeto de investigação, mas também pela tendência epistemológica e as ferramentas conceituais do historiador. Nesse sentido, Mommsen (1978, p. 23) enumera os elementos constitutivos que destacam os esquemas teóricos e exegéticos que usamos, de maneira consciente ou não, para organizar nosso conhecimento do passado e dar-lhes sentido: em primeiro lugar, a autoimagem do grupo social do historiador; em segundo, a noção de quais fatores provocam a mudança social; e, por fim, a perspectiva do futuro desenvolvimento social, que oferece o ponto de orientação (o *télos*) para a interpretação histórica. Assim, analisando esses elementos, poderíamos tornar os julgamentos históricos compreensíveis intersubjetivamente e verificáveis objetivamente.

Minha primeira tentativa de interpretação da *Guerra civil do Rio Grande do Sul* começa, então, pela análise do condicionamento social do julgamento histórico de Tristão de Alencar Araripe. Assim, seguindo a estrutura da análise proposta por Mommsen, identifico, em primeiro lugar sua formação como letrado e político no Brasil imperial, para, em seguida, apontar o grupo social do qual o autor fazia parte.

Araripe ingressou na Faculdade de Direito de Olinda em 1841 e se formou bacharel em 1845, pela academia paulista (VAMPRÉ 1924, p. 338; STUDART 1907, p. 52), período no qual as revoltas regenciais mostraram aos estudantes das academias o perigo que uma interpretação “exaltada” do liberalismo representava à unidade do império e à manutenção da ordem pública (KIRKENDALL 2002, p. 31-34; CARVALHO 2008, p. 130). Entendo que frequentar o ambiente das faculdades imperiais nesse momento foi fundamental para a definição de valores conservadores que marcariam não só sua identidade política, mas igualmente a de grande parte da elite dirigente do Império. Araripe foi membro do Partido Conservador, o qual, desde o período do Regresso, fixara a linguagem política da elite do Império. Sua formação apontava, portanto, para a valorização da monarquia constitucional como promotora da ordem e mantenedora da unidade do Império.

Da mesma forma, é preciso ressaltar que o trabalho de Araripe fora apresentado no IHGB, e, posteriormente, aparecia nas páginas da revista do Instituto, considerado uma instância legitimadora da escrita da história nacional (GUIMARÃES 2011, p. 118). O Instituto mantinha um relacionamento próximo com o Estado, indicado não só pela presença do imperador nas suas sessões ou pela grande quantidade de funcionários do governo que compunham suas fileiras, mas fundamentalmente devido ao entrelaçamento dos temas de interesse que transparecem nas páginas da sua revista (GUIMARÃES 2011, p. 252). Esse entrecruzamento da prática historiadora promovida pelo Instituto e a política do Império parece-me um aspecto importante para a compreensão da memória documentada de Araripe, ainda que seja problemático buscar generalizar qual seria a posição do IHGB acerca do passado nacional.

Trabalhos recentes apontam para a variedade de posturas sobre quais eram as funções e as maneiras de escrever a história brasileira ao longo do século XIX, dentro e fora do Instituto (SANTOS 2013; 2015; ARAUJO 2015). Nesse sentido, sugiro apenas que Araripe partilhava com outros historiadores do oitocentos alguns princípios caros à elite política imperial, uma vez que, em seu trabalho historiográfico acerca da Farroupilha, buscava defender a monarquia contra os desvios e a exaltação das ideias de alguns setores da elite letrada nacional. Vale lembrar que desde a orientação da Karl von Martius acerca do modo como se deveria escrever a história do Brasil, tomada pelos historiadores brasileiros do IHGB “como uma espécie de manual de introdução aos estudos históricos” (CEZAR 2011, p. 179), essa já era uma premissa da prática historiográfica: ele deveria convencer os leitores, mas principalmente aqueles que portavam “idéas políticas immaturas”, acerca “da necessidade de uma Monarchia”, exortando que o historiador escrevesse “como auctor Monarchico-Constitucional” (MARTIUS 1845, p. 401-402; ver também CEZAR 2003).

Desde a década de 1870, contudo, havia na Corte um Partido Republicano pregando o fim da monarquia. A radicalização de um setor dos liberais com o fim do período da Conciliação,

em 1868 (CARVALHO 2008 p. 21-27), era sentida também nas faculdades imperiais, especialmente em São Paulo. Lá, a propaganda republicana e abolicionista crescia, o que se pode atestar pela fundação de associações e periódicos estudantis que pregavam a mudança de regime político (ANTONIOLLI 2017). Não menos importante, deve-se considerar a passagem do magistrado pela presidência da província do Rio Grande do Sul, entre abril de 1876 e fevereiro de 1877, período de intensa agitação política, no qual a memória farroupilha servia de referência para o discurso do Partido Liberal rio-grandense (PICCOLO 1993, p. 156; LAZZARI 2004, p. 208; HRUBY 2012, p. 168). Essas experiências (de um lado, o crescimento da propaganda republicana; de outro, o resgate da memória farroupilha como herança de um setor importante da política no Rio Grande) me parecem fundamentais para o exercício de coleta e organização da documentação referente à Farroupilha (LAMB 2012, p. 52-53; BOEIRA 2013, p. 235-236).

Logo, entendo a memória de Araripe acerca da Farroupilha como uma resposta de um historiador do IHGB, conselheiro do Império e membro do Partido Conservador – que zelava, portanto, pela manutenção da ordem construída pelo regime monárquico –, às referências de liberais e republicanos a um dos mais resistentes movimentos que ameaçaram a unidade do Império no período regencial. *A Guerra civil no Rio Grande do Sul* pode ser lida, então, como um trabalho que organiza e dá ao evento um sentido mais afeito à linguagem política, aos valores e preceitos da monarquia constitucional. Trata-se, nessa perspectiva, de convencer e persuadir o leitor (rio-grandense, simpático ao Partido Liberal; republicano, seja ele da província sulina, da Corte ou das faculdades imperiais, focus da propaganda oposicionista) das ameaças efetivas que um movimento revolucionário republicano representou à ordem e à unidade nacional, e mostrar que somente a monarquia, dadas às condições penosas em que se encontrava a população brasileira, seria capaz de garanti-las. Refiro-me à categoria explicativa *retórica da nacionalidade*, que buscava persuadir os brasileiros acerca do seu passado comum, e, portanto, de uma identidade

partilhada no presente, através da história e de outras formas de discurso (CEZAR 2006, p. 29). A memória documentada pode ser entendida, então, ao meu ver, como uma tentativa, no contexto de crise do regime, de conter e resistir à clara dispersão do discurso construído pelos saquaremas em torno da monarquia (MATTOS 2011). Assim, retomando a perspectiva de análise de Mommsen para compreensão dos julgamentos históricos, torna-se evidente um fator interpretativo ligado à mudança social que transparece da leitura do trabalho de Araripe: a resistência às formas violentas de alteração de regime de governo, devido ao risco que representavam para a manutenção da estrutura social, e a aposta na continuidade da monarquia como solução de longo prazo para a conservação da ordem e do progresso gradual nas sendas da civilização.

Segundo Mommsen (1978, p. 32), contudo, para não se reduzir o julgamento histórico a uma estrita determinação social, é preciso compreender que ele é aberto *para* e está sujeito à crítica, já que pode ser “testado” em termos das suas suposições subjacentes, assim como do material documental que mobiliza. Encaminho, então, minha análise ao seu segundo momento, que trata da recepção do trabalho de Araripe na Corte e no Rio Grande do Sul. Acredito que, na resposta de Koseritz à memória documentada, podemos evidenciar alguns fundamentos do ofício do historiador os quais orientaram a crítica aos julgamentos históricos enunciados pelo historiador cearense, assim como o questionamento da historiografia do produzida no IHGB.

## O ofício do historiador face ao juízo do passado I: a memória documentada lida na Corte

No relatório anual do primeiro secretário do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, lido durante a “Sessão magna aniversaria” da associação, em 15 de dezembro de 1879, o então secretário José Ribeiro de Sousa Fontes, ressaltou a leitura do trabalho “judicioso e imparcial” de Araripe, “ainda quando o assumpto não fosse de tanta transcendencia”.

De acordo com José Ribeiro, a memória “prepara mais proficua leitura dos documentos, porque o leitor a iniciará tendo já noção do complexo dos factos, das suas relações de successão e contingencia, e do exito d’elles” (RIHGB 1879, p. 302), algo que o próprio Araripe desejava com a escrita da memória, como veremos. Mais adiante no relatório, o secretário afirmou: “Pretende o autor que, lida a exposição e consultados os documentos, poderá cada um formar por si juizo sobre os protogonistas [*sic*] d’essa revolução politica por que passou o sul do Imperio em um tempestuoso decennio” (RIHGB 1879, p. 303). Tem-se, aqui, um aspecto importante: o juízo acerca do passado é deixado a cargo do leitor; voltarei a isso em breve.

As considerações do secretário, entretanto, vão além. Mais do que facilitar a leitura dos documentos coligidos ou permitir que cada leitor formasse seu próprio juízo acerca dos fatos, a memória de Araripe era vista como o próprio processo, responsável por julgar os acontecimentos da Farroupilha: “A memoria tornar-se-ha, pela maneira que n’ella se trata do assumpto, um verdadeiro processo da revolução rio-grandense” (RIHGB 1879, p. 303). O juízo sobre o passado, portanto, poderia ser atribuição do leitor, mas não deixava de ser, em parte, também do historiador, responsável pela montagem do processo a partir do qual os acontecimentos históricos seriam julgados. Chamo a atenção para o jogo de metáforas judiciárias: seu uso é um aspecto marcante não só da avaliação do secretário do IHGB. Da mesma forma, Araripe fará grande uso delas, como também alguns dos seus críticos. Nesse momento, contudo, quero destacar outro aspecto: antes de se configurar como juiz (aquele que emite a sentença), o historiador aparecia sobretudo como organizador do processo que levaria ao julgamento histórico deixado a cargo do leitor, algo próximo da tradição retórica de deixar falarem os fatos por eles mesmos (KOSELLECK 1997, p. 214).

Araripe, por sua vez, era da mesma opinião. Queria apenas colaborar com a montagem do processo, e não com o julgamento histórico da Farroupilha. É o que ele afirmou no texto

que publicou nas páginas da revista em 1880, considerando importante o serviço prestado pelos historiadores do Instituto de “preparação do processo histórico” (ARARIPE 1880, p. 126).

Em 1879, numa espécie de prefácio oral que precedeu à leitura da memória aos seus colegas, Araripe (RIHGB 1879, p. 242) destacava que o principal mérito do seu trabalho repousava na coleção dos documentos que coligira e apresentava. Essa ênfase nos documentos e o fato do texto apresentado aos colegas e publicado na revista se tratar de uma *memória* (que o autor caracteriza também como “ensaio”), e não de uma história propriamente dita, indicam que a prática de escrita obedecia a um critério que se definira entre os consócios do Instituto, a partir do qual o tempo se apresentava como um agente “na demarcação de uma perspectiva histórica a servir de fundamento metodológico para as atividades do historiador” (OLIVEIRA 2009, p. 155), já que, segundo Araripe:

Ainda não temos a historia da época d’este successo, *nem é ainda tempo de escrevel-a*, visto não ter ainda xegado o remanso das paixões para que o escritor, *como juiz imparcial*, possa expender a verdade sem preterir considerações individuaes. Escrever dos contemporaneos, *emitindo juizo*, é correr o perigo de exagerar a apologia pela amizade, ou engendrar censuras pelo odio. (ARARIPE 1880, p. 125, grifos meus)

Araripe alertava, então, aos perigos de uma história que não primasse pelo distanciamento temporal. Ao mesmo tempo, a interdição lançada pelo historiador tirava legitimidade de qualquer futura tentativa de escrita de uma história do movimento que não respeitasse o tempo necessário para que os ânimos estivessem todos acalmados. Somente com o remanso das paixões a verdadeira escrita da história poderia ter lugar. Uma escrita na qual o historiador estaria apto a tomar o lugar de um juiz imparcial. Para isso, era preciso que existisse um elemento que garantisse a imparcialidade daquele que iria julgar o evento: esse elemento era o tempo, porque:

*O historiador é juiz; e o juiz deve ser competente, e julgar pelo processo.*

*A competência dá o tempo; o processo organiza-se pelos depoimentos, acumulando-se os documentos, em que estes se contêm. Escrever antes do tempo é ser *juiz ilegítimo*; é proferir sentença sem processo regular.*

Os contemporâneos não são historiadores; são apenas testemunhas e organizadores do processo. (ARARIPE 1880, p. 125, grifos meus)

Era somente com a ação do tempo, quando o passado deixava de agir sobre o presente, que seria possível atuar como juiz legítimo do processo. Era a distância do presente em relação ao passado que garantiria a legitimidade do trabalho do historiador como juiz. Essa distância carregava em si uma perspectiva de tempo que tendia a valorizar o presente (e o futuro, a quem a tarefa da escrita da história estava reservada) como único ponto de vista legítimo, não sobre si mesmo, mas sobre o passado. Essa é sem dúvida uma temporalização do aspecto moralizante do trabalho do historiador (KOSELLECK 1997, p. 52), mas que não lhe retira a responsabilidade pelo julgamento histórico. Contudo, se Araripe parece acreditar que somente o futuro guardava as chaves para a formulação de juízos acerca do evento, não me parece ser devido à crença numa justiça que se realiza na própria história, tal como no tribunal da história hegeliano, mas graças ao ganho cognitivo que a distância temporal era capaz de instaurar (KOSELLECK 1997; 2006). O papel de proferir sentenças sobre o passado, portanto, ainda era reservado ao historiador (ou ao leitor). Sua atuação legítima, contudo, só viria com o tempo. Contudo, mesmo no Instituto, o veto à historiografia do presente não foi unânime, como lembra M. Oliveira (2009), apontando que, mesmo com a suspeita acerca de uma história imediata, alguns sócios do IHGB realizaram o registro de acontecimentos contemporâneos (ver também CEZAR 2004 e TIBURSKI 2011).



A tarefa do IHGB, segundo Araripe, não era, portanto, a de escrever a história da Farroupilha, mas dispor o material para que os futuros historiadores cuidassem da elaboração da escrita. Nesse sentido, o trabalho assumia as feições das memórias históricas herdadas da tradição das academias letradas do século XVIII, uma vez que se tratava de um gênero propedêutico à história (SILVEIRA 2016, p. 145). A própria seleção dos documentos operada por Araripe visava contribuir para que no futuro o historiador responsável pela escrita pudesse melhor elaborar seu juízo sobre o evento, como se pode perceber no seguinte trecho:

Na seleção dos documentos procurei reunir todos aqueles, que vierão ao meo conhecimento, e que me parecerão convenientes para esclarecer os factos, e *abilitar o escritor a emitir juizo sobre os acontecimentos*, quer no tocante á cauza d’elles, quer na parte relativa ao character dos autores do drama representado por dez annos na extrema meridional do imperio brasileiro (ARARIPE 1880, p. 129, grifo meu).

Mas julgar era também tomar parte, o que poderia afetar o pressuposto de imparcialidade do historiador, paradoxo que atravessa a prática historiadora do século XIX. Vemos, por exemplo, no discurso de Januario da Cunha Barbosa, de 1839, que T. Cezar (2011, p. 95) considera ter produzido normas para a prática historiadora no IHGB, o historiador representado como dispensador imparcial de juízos sobre os homens do passado, “austero sacerdote da verdade” (BARBOSA 1839, p. 13-14). Da mesma forma, no “Prólogo” da segunda edição da sua *Historia geral do Brazil*, Varnhagen (1877, p. XII) reanimou esse paradoxo reafirmando a história como tribunal perante o qual o historiador deveria se portar como “um verdadeiro juiz”, ainda que devesse narrá-la com imparcialidade (VARNHAGEN 1877, p. I; ver sobre GUIMARÃES 2011, p. 217).<sup>3</sup> Embora à primeira vista as prerrogativas do historiador de ser imparcial e dispensador de juízos pareçam incompatíveis, a análise de R. Turin acerca do *ethos* do ofício no oitocentos auxilia a compreender o paradoxo aparente.

3 - Para reflexão sobre as funções judiciária e moral realizada pelos historiadores na sua pesquisa dos fatos e no julgamento de personagens e ações, ver KOSELLECK 1997, p. 214.

Turin argumenta que foi justamente o método histórico, de crítica erudita dos documentos aliada ao compromisso com a verdade, que valorizava a narrativa como neutra, ainda que patriótica (TURIN 2009, p. 17-18). Dessa forma, o aparato metódico para o tratamento das fontes que garantia um discurso histórico imparcial mesmo que tal discurso assumisse o ponto de vista nacional, sustentava também a legitimidade e a pertinência dos juízos formulados pelos historiadores.

Contudo, em sua memória, Araripe não se sentia à vontade, apesar de ter recolhido muitos documentos acerca do movimento rebelde dos rio-grandenses, de assumir o papel de juiz, o que se pode perceber no seguinte excerto:

Omitiremos as considerações politicas e moraes, que poderão envolver julgamento dos omens e dos factos especiaes: o nosso fim é, com a simples expozição narrativa, dispôr o leitor a melhor comprehender o valor e significação dos documentos, que, lidos dezacompanhados da lembrança dos sucessos, não serão devidamente apreciados. (ARARIPE 1880, p. 128)

A escolha do gênero de escrita parece desempenhar um papel que merece ser destacado. Pedro Telles da Silveira (2016, p. 143) indica que a memória histórica era, no século XVIII, um gênero relativo ao debate erudito, anterior ao estabelecimento da narrativa histórica, a qual possuiria um caráter mais acabado e definitivo. No caso de Araripe, contudo, apesar da escolha do gênero da escrita reivindicar algumas das características da memória histórica do século XVIII, o aspecto da linearidade da narrativa oferecida pelo historiador ultrapassa as prerrogativas do gênero. A reivindicação do texto como uma memória oferecia à Araripe, ao meu ver, duas vantagens: em primeiro lugar, um subterfúgio que contornava a interdição à história de períodos recentes; em segundo, uma escrita que, justamente devido a seu caráter preparatório, concedia ao autor um espaço seguro para propor juízos que, posteriormente, poderiam ser revisados. A memória de Araripe, assim, poderia ser lida como uma tentativa de propor

um julgamento à avaliação dos pares historiadores do IHGB, primeiro lugar de enunciação do trabalho.

Portanto, mesmo que a distância temporal não permitisse um trabalho de historiador que assumisse as vestes de juiz imparcial, uma narrativa deveria orientar a leitura das fontes, para que ficasse bem entendido aquilo que o movimento foi, ou seja, a narrativa dos fatos, mesmo que diferente de uma história propriamente dita, visava atribuir sentido, orientar o leitor na interpretação dos episódios e acontecimentos que os documentos apresentavam. Nesse sentido, é interessante atentar para o primeiro capítulo da memória, “Observações acerca da revolução rio grandense, e sobre os documentos a ella referentes”, que faz as vezes de prefácio do texto. Nele, Araripe condensou os pontos que depois seriam criticados e debatidos pelos letrados rio-grandenses. Suas observações, como vimos, configuram uma série de juízos que condenavam o governo rebelde a não ser uma república, essa assim declarada república a não ser democrática, questionava o valor moral dos seus líderes, e caracterizava o novo regime como um governo militar, de anarquia, conduzido por caudilhos.

Assim, Araripe parecia efetuar um julgamento à revelia da sua declaração de intenções. Tratava-se, então, de um sentença expedida pelo historiador juiz que não desejava julgar? Em sua tese, H. Hruby (2012, p. 156) sinaliza a tomada de posição de Araripe, “ao lado da ordem, dos paladinos da causa legal, dos brasileiros”. Vê-se, portanto, que outro ator assume o papel de juiz do passado Farroupilha: não só o leitor (como indicava o secretário do IHGB), não só o tempo (como queria Araripe), mas também o próprio historiador era o dispensador de juízos sobre os acontecimentos históricos.

A peça de acusação da Revolução de 1835 estava pronta. Era, então, a hora de os defensores dos rebeldes se apresentarem. O trabalho publicado nas páginas do periódico do Instituto, contudo, parece ter passado despercebido pelos letrados rio-grandenses, no Rio Grande do Sul e em São Paulo. Foi apenas com a publicação em livro, no ano seguinte, em 1881, que a memória do conselheiro Araripe entrou na arena de debates.

## O ofício do historiador face ao juízo do passado II: a memória lida na província

Tão logo a *Guerra civil no Rio Grande do Sul* foi publicada em livro, as reações de letrados da província do Rio Grande de São Pedro foram vistas em periódicos locais. A *Gazeta de Porto Alegre* (1879-1884) noticiava em 24 de maio de 1881 o recebimento do livro ofertado pelo autor, reconhecendo a importância da memória que passou a ser considerada a primeira obra de história publicada sobre a Revolução Farroupilha.

Ao receber o volume ofertado por Araripe, a *Gazeta* reconhecia que a memória documentada devia ser analisada minuciosamente devido à importância do assunto para a província. O redator do jornal, Karl von Koseritz (1830-1890), prometia, então, artigos especiais nos quais trataria do trabalho, que passaram a ser publicados em 4 de junho de 1881, sob o título *O livro do Sr. conselheiro Araripe*.

Koseritz era imigrante alemão, redator e editor de jornais em Pelotas, Rio Grande e Porto Alegre, entre as décadas de 1850 e 1880 (PAREDES 2007, p. 244; CESAR 1971, p. 249-256; BOEIRA 2013, p. 226, n. 193). Além disso, era monarquista, liberal e polemista, destacando-se na divulgação de ideias científicas e evolucionistas no Rio Grande do Sul, ainda que, como argumento adiante, o cientificismo não estivesse no cerne de suas críticas a Araripe. De acordo com Igmarr Grützmann, Koseritz estava fortemente vinculado aos liberais do Rio Grande do Sul, sendo próximo da sua principal liderança, Silveira Martins, tendo sido também redator do órgão do partido na província, o jornal *A Reforma*. Ainda segundo a autora, o jornal no qual Koseritz divulgara suas críticas ao conselheiro era “sua maior tribuna política e o mais conhecido veículo de suas ideias [...]” (GRÜTZMANN 2007, p. 130-131; ver também CESAR 1971, p. 250).

Lazzari avalia que as críticas de Koseritz ao trabalho de Araripe buscaram alcançar a “relação de equivalência” entre o movimento rebelde de 1835 e o povo rio-grandense, pois essa era

“uma associação de óbvio proveito político para os chefes liberais do Rio Grande” que se arvoravam defensores dos interesses rio-grandenses diante da Corte. Ainda de acordo com o autor, o redator da *Gazeta* aproveitara a oportunidade de defender a memória da Revolução de 1835 em primeira mão, adiantando-se, dessa forma, aos rivais republicanos (LAZZARI 2004, p. 214). O trabalho de Lazzari ajuda a compreender os interstícios da disputa política acerca da memória dos farroupilhas, na qual os artigos de Koseritz se apresentavam como uma defesa e uma reclamação de posse do passado rebelde pelos liberais rio-grandenses. Coincidência ou não, Koseritz fora eleito pelo Partido Liberal para a Assembleia Provincial no ano de 1883. Mas, se por um lado a análise nos ajuda a situar Koseritz no cenário político do Rio Grande do Sul, por outro, ela não se detém sobre as críticas de método e as censuras que o redator faz ao conselheiro, apesar de apontá-las.

Ao iniciar a série de artigos, Koseritz deixa explícito seu objetivo. Eram os juízos do historiador do IHGB, que escrevera uma memória sem o intuito de julgar os feitos dos rebeldes farroupilhas, que procurava revogar através desses textos, como se pode perceber, quando o historiador afirma

O que pretendemos nestes artigos, é rebater *os juizos injustos*, que amesquinhão o character do povo rio grandense e fal-o-hemos com toda a cortezia que devemos ao respeitavel autor desse trabalho, que aliás demonstra amor ao estudo e dedicação ás [*sic*] cousas patrias. (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881, grifo meu)

O periodista se via obrigado, então, a “reconhecer o serviço que o Sr. conselheiro Araripe prestou á historia da provincia” (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881). Esse é um lugar comum na recepção da memória documentada: a ela é reconhecido o mérito pelo serviço prestado não à nação, mas à província, por organizar e publicar um trabalho que até então só havia sido abordado de maneira esparsa e fragmentada. O fato de ser a província e não a nação a maior interessada numa narrativa sobre o evento indicava que esse era visto como um assunto que dizia respeito unicamente aos rio-grandenses.

Esse aspecto da crítica ao trabalho do conselheiro Araripe estava ligado, nos artigos de Koseritz, à restrição da legitimidade sobre a escrita da história do evento aos naturais do Rio Grande do Sul. Mesmo que o trabalho de Araripe tivesse seus méritos reconhecidos, a história do evento deveria ser obra de um historiador rio-grandense, segundo o redator da *Gazeta*,

[...] diremos com franqueza, teríamos preferido que S. Ex. não tivesse publicado a sua *memoria*, porque a primeira obra historica sobre a revolução, devera ter sido escripta por um rio-grandense, que conhecendo as tradições de sua terra, teria desenvolvido pontos de vista mui diferentes. (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881, grifo no original)

Este era considerado um ponto fundamental: somente o pertencimento à pátria rio-grandense qualificaria o historiador para tratar dos fatos da revolução, pois só assim seria possível compreender as tradições que permitiriam interpretar o desenrolar do conflito. O melhor juízo sobre a Farroupilha seria aquele oferecido por um filho da província. Portanto, ele deveria ser, segundo Koseritz, parcial.

Nem mesmo a interdição que Araripe prescrevia para o tratamento de um tema tão recente e delicado parece ter sido levada em consideração por Koseritz. Em sua série de artigos (22/06/1881), o redator considerava que “se achão extinctos os odios da guerra civil, que apagado e esquecido está o facho da discordia interna [...]”. Ignoravam-se, portanto, as ressalvas do historiador do IHGB acerca do tempo necessário para uma escrita da história livre de prejuízos. O assunto poderia ser abordado, desde que de uma ótica favorável. Nesse sentido, a cautela do conselheiro Araripe em apresentar sua narrativa dos eventos da Revolução como uma memória histórica foi ignorada na leitura que Koseritz fazia dela, pois a considerava como “a primeira obra historica sobre a revolução”.

Ao contrário da prescrição de distanciamento proposta por Araripe, Koseritz advogava justamente uma proximidade. Onde Araripe buscava o distanciamento temporal para uma melhor

apreciação dos fatos, Koseritz reclamava uma proximidade cultural. Enquanto para o primeiro a falta de distância temporal impossibilitava o bom julgamento dos fatos e dos personagens, para o segundo era justamente a distância cultural que impedia que a memória de Araripe não fosse uma interpretação tão verdadeira quanto poderia ser. O fato de tal proximidade prejudicar a objetividade do historiador parecia um problema menor diante da perspectiva de um trabalho que poderia adquirir um caráter mais rio-grandense e também mais verdadeiro.

Dir-nos-hão talvez, que o objectivismo proprio do historiador, teria soffrido neste caso:

Não duvidamos, mas a apreciação teria sido mais verdadeira, e sobretudo – mais rio-grandense.

Em relação á [sic] historia pertence a primeira palavra de direito aos immediatamente interessados; embora sejam subjectivos em seu modo de encarar os successos, embora a paixão ainda não amortecida, lhes empreste tintas mais carregadas, – o primeiro subsidio para a historia deve ser delles. (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881)

Dessa forma, a crítica de Koseritz reclamava um pertencimento que Araripe não possuía. A análise de Rodrigo Turin acerca do *ethos* do historiador oitocentista argumenta que esse vínculo visceral entre o autor e a história que escreve era um dos requisitos básicos que compunha a retórica acerca do ofício, uma vez que, segundo ele, “Três requisitos básicos dão forma ao ritual da escrita: o sentimento pátrio, o domínio técnico-científico e a pertinência do produto em relação ao seu uso” (TURIN 2009, p. 14). Faltava a Araripe o sentimento pátrio para melhor julgar a rebeldia do povo rio-grandense. Ainda assim, o articulista cedia ao argumento e aceitava que a proximidade cultural em relação à tradição e a falta de distanciamento temporal teriam por consequência uma narrativa de “tintas mais carregadas”. Entretanto, isso não retirava o direito e a necessidade de que o evento fosse, em primeiro lugar, objeto dos historiadores rio-grandenses.

Koseritz, contudo, fazia coro a Araripe num aspecto: o trabalho de dar linhas mais definitivas à escrita da história caberia à posteridade. Segundo o redator, “mais tarde virá o historiador geral estudar essas obras e pesar o seu conteúdo, separar o joio do trigo e construir assim o edifício da historia” (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881). Assim, vê-se esboçar sob as críticas de Koseritz uma diferenciação entre a história geral e a história particular da província do Rio Grande do Sul. Essa última deveria ser, em primeiro lugar, feita pelos próprios interessados, no que se estabelecia o pertencimento como critério de escrita. Só depois viria a história geral, na qual as cores carregadas do historiador particular seriam matizadas. Era esse historiador geral desconhecido, localizado nalgum lugar do futuro que estava por vir, quem deveria se encarregar de nuançar a leitura e o juízo apaixonado dos rio-grandenses que se dedicassem ao estudo da Farroupilha. Não era, portanto, um trabalho para o historiador do IHGB, a quem simplesmente faltavam os subsídios para que fosse autor legítimo de uma história da Revolução de 1835.

Desde a primeira até á ultima pagina do livro, ouve-se ali a voz da legalidade, esta voz, ainda saturada das paixões do momento, *injusta* sempre, frequentemente cruel para com os rebeldes da Sparta do Sul.

Tudo quanto de nobre e grandioso houve na attitude desse povo heroico, durante o decennio de luctas, não o sabe, não o comprehendeu o auctor do livro. (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881, grifo meu)

Acredito, assim, que a parcialidade, na crítica de Koseritz, se configurava ao mesmo tempo como uma necessidade e um defeito. Por um lado, era uma necessidade que permitiria apresentar a Revolução de 1835 sob um ponto de vista mais simpático e mais verdadeiro, devido ao conhecimento das tradições da província na qual ela se desenrolou, tal como requeria o *ethos* do historiador oitocentista. Por outro, porém, a parcialidade era um defeito que impedia Araripe de contemplar o evento em sua totalidade, uma vez que tomava o ponto de



vista em muito desfavorável aos feitos dos rebeldes. Parece, assim, haver apenas uma maneira de ser parcial corretamente, e não era aquela adotada por Araripe. A avaliação de Koseritz abordava, então, o problema do ponto de vista adotado pelo historiador, aspecto, segundo R. Koselleck (1997, p. 105) que se tornara constitutivo da experiência e do conhecimento histórico moderno. Todavia, ao tomar partido – ou seja, ao assumir um ponto de vista específico, o da “legalidade”, pronunciando juízos sobre a Farroupilha –, Araripe não se posicionava ao lado do “partido justo” (KOSELLECK 1997).

O redator da *Gazeta* reclamava igualmente da seleção de fontes feitas pelo conselheiro Araripe, uma vez que os arquivos da República Rio-grandense não teriam sido acessíveis ao historiador, como se pode ver a seguir:

S. Ex. vio-se pois obrigado a lançar mão, só e exclusivamente, dos documentos officiaes existentes na secretaria do governo e dos subsidios que lhe puderão prestar os archivos publicos do Imperio.

Isto quer dizer, que o Sr. conselheiro Araripe só ouviu a voz da legalidade; que só enxergou os acontecimentos pelo prisma do governo legal e dos seus delegados; que portanto é *unilateral em todas as suas apreciações e juizos*.

E’ este o grande, o immenso defeito do livro do illustre magistrado cearense. (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881, grifo meu)

A falta de documentos da República tinha uma só consequência: Araripe fora parcial também devido ao seu equívoco como historiador na seleção dos documentos, e isso fora fundamental para que não fosse capaz de ver o evento sob um ponto de vista rio-grandense. Essa, no entanto, é uma afirmação apressada de Koseritz, pois, quando o livro foi publicado em 1881, os documentos coligidos pelo historiador do IHGB ainda não haviam sido publicados pelo periódico da instituição. A crítica do periodista, além disso, representava, talvez, uma certa antipatia em relação à memória documentada, pois, ao

longo da narrativa, Araripe fazia remissão a alguns documentos emanados do regime republicano, o que indica, senão a má vontade de Koseritz, uma leitura apressada da memória. Não obstante, a censura do articulista dava a entender que somente o desconhecimento por parte do historiador dos arquivos da República permitiria um julgamento tão erroneamente parcial. Era como se uma interpretação positiva se impusesse a qualquer um que analisasse o passado Farroupilha de um ponto de vista correto (ou que se servisse dos documentos da República Rio-grandense).<sup>4</sup> Koseritz, por sua vez, valeu-se dos documentos da época para contrapor os juízos de Araripe, mostrando que era preciso subsidiar os argumentos contrários com elementos que os tornassem plausíveis e verdadeiros. De outra forma, sem o embasamento documental, as apreciações do redator não teriam força contra a leitura “viciada” de Araripe. A partir do sexto artigo da série, portanto, o redator da *Gazeta* passou a oferecer sobretudo correspondências trocadas entre os chefes militares do conflito e também com o então barão de Caxias, que serviam de fundamento a suas críticas (KOSERITZ 27/06/1881; 28/06/1881; e 02/07/1881).

As apreciações de Koseritz acerca da memória, contudo, não se detinham apenas nos aspectos relativos aos métodos utilizados pelo conselheiro. A crítica do articulista recaía também sobre o próprio autor responsável da primeira história da Farroupilha, que era acusado de ter atuado como magistrado e não como historiador em seu julgamento histórico. Esse era um aspecto que limitava o alcance do seu olhar: seu “golpe de vista parece não ir além dos termos do código criminal” (KOSERITZ 07/06/1881). Ou seja, de acordo com o redator da *Gazeta*, Araripe só foi capaz de ver o passado farroupilha através da grade de leitura da legislação do Império, o que lhe impunha limites no julgamento do passado. Tratava-se de uma incompatibilidade: a *démarche* do magistrado era incompatível com o tema que o historiador analisava em sua memória. As palavras de Koseritz davam a entender que os juristas analisariam os fatos com uma frieza que lhe impediria de reconhecer o entusiasmo e o amor à pátria.

4 - No que se refere aos documentos coligidos por Araripe, havia, de acordo com H. Hruby (2012, p. 163), equilíbrio de fontes.

Velho magistrado, homem methodico, filho do Norte, que não comprehende esse vibrar especial da fibra do patriotismo nos campos do Sul, fez o Sr. Araripe um apanhado de dados parciaes, tomados dos archivos da legalidade; coordenou esses dados, esses capitulos e paragraphos com a methodicidade das obras de jurisprudencia; encarou todos esses grandes feitos, filhos do entusiasmo e do amor á terra do Rio Grande, com o *criterium* do legista e – publicou uma obra que amesquinha o movimento popular do Rio Grande, que fére a verdade historica e deprime o caracter deste heroico povo. (KOSERITZ 04/06/1881)

Logo, para Koseritz, a censura se dirigia ao caráter jurídico do julgamento histórico de Araripe, que isolava o evento da cultura rio-grandense a qual o produziu para pronunciar, como juiz e não como historiador, sua sentença. De fato, a separação entre as atribuições do historiador e as do juiz não pareciam ser tão facilmente diferenciadas. É o que se vê no final da memória documentada escrita por Araripe. A partir do capítulo XXXII, intitulado “Os rebeldes do Rio-grande do Sul considerados ante o direito criminal e a justiça do paiz”, o historiador esboçava uma definição legal do que se considerava *sedição* e *rebelião*, apoiando-se na linguagem jurídica dos códigos criminais do Império.

Vê-se, dessa forma, que a crítica de Koseritz a Araripe não se atinha somente aos juízos do historiador do IHGB. Era a maneira como o conselheiro executava o ofício historiográfico que estava em questão. Dizia:

Talento, não o é o Sr. Araripe e nobreza de coração não a mostra [...] Realmente - *difficile est satyram non scribere*, quando se lê semelhantes offensas ao caracter deste nobre povo, que tão mal conhece o ex-presidente da provincia, o qual poderá ser talhado para tudo, menos para algum Herodoto. (KOSERITZ 17/06/1881)

Além disso, Araripe era criticado pelo redator da *Gazeta* por se apropriar das críticas que os legalistas faziam aos rebeldes à época, assumindo a perspectiva de suas fontes: “Não é de estranhar, que o governo e os legaes da epocha, fizessem taes alegações, mas o *historiador deve julgar por outra fórma*”

(KOSERITZ 13/06/1881, grifo meu). Da mesma maneira, os olhos de magistrado embaçavam a visão do historiador, pois transformam os grandes feitos de um povo em fatos de um processo judicial, julgados à luz estreita e fria da lei, o que é possível de ser observado no seguinte excerto:

O velho magistrado que *julgou-se autorizado a formar juízo solemne* sobre o character da revolução desta provincia, esqueceu que o homem que sempre pertenceu á escola autoritaria e que mede os successos da historia dos povos pela estreita bitola da jurisprudencia criminal, não é por certo competente para semelhante tarefa. (KOSERITZ 10/07/1881, grifo meu)

Assim sendo, era a competência de Araripe como historiador que estava em questão: em primeiro lugar, ele não estava autorizado a formar juízo sobre a Farroupilha; em segundo, atuara como magistrado, e não como historiador; por fim, seu posicionamento político, como defensor da legalidade e monarquista conservador, também fora alvo de críticas. As questões levantadas por Koseritz à memória, portanto, não necessariamente mobilizavam os novos critérios de cientificidade reclamados pela geração de letrados que, a partir de 1870, passou a formular críticas à historiografia produzida no IHGB. Os problemas colocados por Koseritz devem-se, antes, a dois aspectos que não dialogam de maneira necessária com o debate colocado pelo cientificismo dessa geração: suas críticas tratam do historiador (monarquista, conservador, filho de revolucionário) e da prática do ofício historiográfico (seleção das fontes, adoção do ponto de vista dos contemporâneos, confusão entre as tarefas dos historiador e do juiz). Uma resposta à memória de Araripe que levará em conta os critérios da vanguarda será formulada por Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, no livro *História da Republica Riograndense*, publicado em 1882, no qual criticava os autores que, analisando a história, davam grande importância à ação dos indivíduos e pouca atenção às leis do movimento histórico (ANTONIOLLI 2017, p. 161 ss).

Assim, ainda que Araripe afirmasse isentar-se do julgamento ao evento e aos seus principais personagens, a recepção da memória por uma parcela dos homens de letras rio-grandenses deixava claro que a pretensão de isenção passara despercebida, ao menos, para esse público. Nos artigos de Koseritz, portanto, a alegada imparcialidade do conselheiro imperial passara sem ser notada, e, ao contrário, a memória era vista como uma injustiça contra o povo rio-grandense. A tentativa do historiador em eximir-se da tarefa de juiz, organizando a narrativa dos fatos como uma memória (e não uma história) foi ignorada, assim como os alertas para os perigos de uma história acerca de um evento tão próximo temporalmente. O último artigo da série foi publicado em 19 de julho de 1881. Koseritz dava por encerrada sua tarefa de “rebater os falsos juízos do Sr. Araripe”.

## Considerações finais

Com a publicação em livro da *Guerra civil no Rio Grande do Sul*, por Tristão de Alencar Araripe, em 1881, foi possível perceber que foi recebida de formas diversas, na Corte e na província do Rio Grande. A diferença no tratamento que a obra recebeu estava vinculada ao conteúdo do trabalho do historiador. Assim, no IHGB a memória era recebida como trabalho judicioso e imparcial (RIHGB 1879, p. 302), pois reafirmava os princípios da historiografia empreendida no Instituto, não apenas em relação aos aspectos teóricos e metodológicos do ofício, mas também políticos, em consonância com os objetivos do Estado: fundar a nação e promover a civilização através da manutenção regime monárquico. Afinal, não se pode esquecer que a memória fora lida na presença do Imperador, e, além disso, recebera autorização do governo para consultar o Arquivo Imperial, assim como foi publicada, juntamente com os documentos que apresentam, na revista do IHGB. Contudo, a memória não teria a mesma sorte na província do Rio Grande do Sul.

Questionando os julgamentos históricos do historiador sancionado pelo IHGB a falar do conflito, Koseritz levantava restrições à forma como Araripe realizou seu ofício

historiográfico. O redator do jornal da *Gazeta* fundamentava, então, suas apreciações numa dupla acepção de justiça relativa à história (que versam sobre o estabelecimento da verdade) (KOSELLECK 1997, p. 214): um primeiro, que trata da retidão dos procedimentos metodológicos, que não foram seguidos por Araripe, segundo o redator; e, outro, que trata da formação equitativa do julgamento, novamente ignorado por Araripe, que julgava como juiz, não falava do ponto de vista rio-grandense, e, crime maior, adotava a posição dos adversários da revolução. Não é menos interessante, como contraponto, que, no Instituto, o mesmo trabalho tenha recebido outro tratamento. Na série de artigos redigidos por Koseritz, via-se, assim, tanto uma censura à *prática* historiadora de Araripe quanto uma desconsideração do *lugar* que o IHGB representava para a escrita da história no Brasil oitocentista, para falar como M. de Certeau (2006).

Noutro sentido, percebe-se, a partir das manifestações acerca da *Guerra civil do Rio Grande do Sul*, como, no século XIX, os responsáveis por assumirem a posição de juiz do passado pareciam mudar constantemente no discurso dos historiadores: ora o papel de formular juízos cabia ao leitor; ora era o historiador que, como filósofo moral, deveria proferir as sentenças; ou ainda, era somente com o decorrer do tempo que se tornava possível julgar, ficando a tarefa delegada às futuras gerações. As críticas ao trabalho de Araripe, realizadas por Koseritz, contudo, centraram suas atenções não só nos julgamentos históricos proferidos, mas igualmente no autor da memória, indicando, assim, os prejuízos da posição social do historiador do IHGB à análise dos acontecimentos e personagens da Farroupilha.

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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

**Juliano Francesco Antonioli** 

jucahist@gmail.com

Doutorado em História pela

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul – Brasil

Texto produzido durante o curso de doutoramento, financiado pela CAPES, com primeira versão apresentada ao GT de Teoria da História e Historiografia da ANPUH-RS, em setembro de 2016. Agradeço a leitura e aos comentários de Pedro Telles da Silveira, Mara Rodrigues, Renata Dal Sasso Freitas, Eliete Tiburski e Gabriela Correa da Silva.

RECEBIDO EM: 06/JUN./2018 | APROVADO EM: 10/JAN./2019

# The utopia of America: Time and Authenticity in Ángel Rama's critics

A utopia da América: tempo e autenticidade na crítica de Ángel Rama

Pedro Demenech

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8247-1460> 

## ABSTRACT

This article discusses Ángel Rama's critique of Latin American culture, mainly in the prologue to *La novela latinoamericana. Panoramas 1920-1980* (1982), the only collection of texts he published while still alive. In the prologue, Ángel retraces his steps across essays written between the sixties and the seventies, analyzing and scrutinizing his own intellectual and theoretical concerns. By reading the prologue, one realizes how time and authenticity were articulated to inaugurate an idea of America. Ángel then employs the principles of incompleteness and fugacity to interpret Latin American culture as an essay. Furthermore, he proposes a re-reading of Pedro Henríquez Ureña's *La utopía de América* (1925). Finally, he deals with the issue of temporality at a moment in history when the present seemed infinite.

## KEYWORDS

Latin America; Ángel Rama; Time.

## RESUMO

Este artigo trata de algumas questões presentes na crítica da cultura de Ángel Rama, professor, jornalista, editor, ficcionista e dramaturgo uruguaio para a América Latina, principalmente no prólogo de *La Novela en América Latina* (1982), a única coletânea de textos que publicou ainda vivo. Nesse prólogo, Ángel, ao haver recolhido alguns de seus textos escritos entre os anos 1960 e 1970, remontou um percurso no qual analisou e esmiuçou suas preocupações intelectuais e teóricas. Tornando possível perceber como o tempo e a autenticidade são articulados para fundar uma ideia de América. Depois, utiliza os princípios de inacabamento e provisoriade para interpretar a cultura do continente como um ensaio. Adiante, fez uma releitura de Pedro Henríquez Ureña sobre a utopia da América. Por último, lidou com uma temporalidade situada entre o passado e o futuro num momento em que o presente parecia infinito.

## PALAVRAS-CHAVE

América Latina; Ángel Rama; Tempo.

During the sixties and seventies, Rama wrote a series of essays that were later published under the title *La novela latinoamericana. Panoramas 1920-1980*. To get right to the point, I quote an excerpt from its prologue (RAMA, 2008):<sup>1</sup>

we write in Nuestra América about the role of time, about *perishable time*, we write about the reader's urgency and the environment and the hour that we live or which lives in us, undoubtedly time writes us and disperses us, and transforms us into ashes (RAMA 2008, p. 17, self-translated).

This is the role of time which, in Rama's work, points to a place of writing. In fact, this 'reciprocous writing'—embodied in the idea that America 'writes' him as he writes about America—is followed by the exercise of reading, the urgency to give meaning to a continent oscillating between utopia and failure.

In other words, nostalgia and future aspirations are not enough: we must write the past and design the future. That is why José Martí's<sup>2</sup> (1853–1895) *Nuestra América* becomes, in Rama's hands, a Latin American cultural project, or, more precisely, a reflection on the continent's identity.

According to Aguiar and Vasconcelos, Rama's imbricated relationship with Latin America is like a novel taking place in another time—muffled by the violence of dictatorships, yet also containing the spark of transformation born in the post-World War II period, when different radical ideologies (Third Worldism, developmentalism and culturalism) were articulated on a continental scale by different groups of intellectuals (AGUIAR; VASCONCELOS 2001, p. 15–27).

Rama sees Latin America as a utopian territory, so he tattoos the rigor of these years on his own skin. In addition to supporting the Cuban Revolution, he resisted the Uruguayan military regime established in 1973, earning him the prize of almost 10 years in exile and, above all, an intellectual solitude that is sometimes misunderstood, as it resulted from the choice of maintaining critical independence.

1 - From now on, I refer to this work by means of the following denomination: *La novela...* It is worth pointing out that I did not use the first edition, from 1982 (published by Colcultura and organized by Juan Gustavo Cobo Borda).

2 - Cuban intellectual who worked as a journalist and lived part of his life in exile, mostly in New York. He was also politically active and left behind a body of work that is fundamental for thinking about the unity and modern concept of Latin America.

Rama embraced authenticity as a value of action, derived mostly from the irony ingrained in his criticism. For the most part, this choice is accompanied by the desire and effort to establish an authentic cultural experience, a particularity of modern consciousness which, according to Trilling, is linked to the possibility of restoring a lost connection between man and the organic world (TRILLING 2014). That attempt at reconnecting was present especially in his obsession to write about a tradition that, in the sixties and seventies, seemed to be not only threatened, but rather dissipated.

Thus, the construction of authenticity is expressed in Rama through values such as *organicity* and *tradition*, incorporated into his critical thought so as to ensure the existence of Latin America. However, it is not so much the the past, but rather the present, that is able to provide an authentic existence. Our stratum of time, by its very condition, inscribes both past and future. This is what allows the critic, as well as the novelistic characters he analyzes, to patiently survive a world constantly threatened by degradation:

... so many years of mistrusting the book's illusory and eternal pomp, I must be getting older as I patiently recompile five hundred years of Latin American culture for the Ayacucho Library ... when I agreed to put together in a volume what I wrote during this minimum lapse encompassing 1964 to 1981, in which I followed, step-by-step, the rise of the novel (RAMA 2008, p. 17, self-translation).

Rama was suspicious of the book's pretense of eternity, since he knew that he could disappear like the characters of the novels he studied. He embodied the task of rebuilding culture, or, even better, reorganizing it. Paradoxically, in this way Rama makes eternal a culture that is permanently losing its eternal quality. In fact, as he strives to rebuild culture, he is actually rebuilding his own work. That is why the prologue of *La novela...* gives us access to major theoretical questions as approached by Rama, helping outline some crucial issues.

In a compilation form, the historicity of his criticism stands out above all. Likewise, we investigate Rama's intellectual trajectory, dispersed among the magazines and newspapers to which he contributed. When dealing with such a collection, the concern must be to create an organicity for these dispersed writings, i.e., build a compilation.

Writings scattered in books and magazines here and there, without order, answering on demand; they do not come from ourselves, distance us from what we would like to do and, for this reason, we may never find propitious leisure (RAMA 2008, p. 17, self-translation).

The rationalizing urgency evoked above is integral to intellectual work in Latin America. It is present at the time of writing, which cannot be thought of if not as a product from both readers and literary thinkers. Thus, as a literary intellectual in the second half of the twentieth century, Rama builds upon newspaper criticism in order to build a culture (AGUILAR 2010). Since he has to actually approach his audience, part of his intellectual output is distributed among these means of communication. Thus, the disorder of his writings, which he recognizes, is more due to the unrelenting speed of the press than to the lack of an intellectual project.

*Order, demand, interior, idleness:* words that, read separately, seem to have no meaning in the context of Rama's life trajectory. Together, however, they could be thought as synonymous to his Latin American project. I say this because, even in these dispersed writings, the presence of a overarching will is evident, emanating from the critic's soul and leading Rama to draw nearer to America. Thus, these words become even clearer if we read them as part of

A selection, moreover, of those panoramic studies, which draws the general movements, and [also] seeks to unveil the internal processes of a genre, on an immense continent, full of millions of incommunicable men (RAMA 2008, p. 18, self-translation).

Rama's criticism is at the same time an *explanation* of a literary genre, the novel, and a *communication*, since he articulates letters to bring together cultural differences. His work seems to be nothing more and nothing less than the production of panoramas that open his readers' horizons. These readers may be incommunicable in relation to one another, and yet they live on the same continent, Latin America. Therefore, the *internal reading* of these Latin American novels brings us closer to their external processes of production. The very subtitle of *La novela...*, "Panoramas: 1920–1980," already indicates the extent of Rama's tradecraft in the period between the 1960s and 1970s, when the so-called Latin American boom placed it in the spotlight worldwide. That is why, in the book, Rama's Latin American narrative on the avant-garde outbreak does not reach beyond the eighties. I believe that at that point in history, the idea of a time that writes us as we write it, of which Rama spoke about, was even clearer. In fact, we can see how his texts

... answer to external demands ... for anthologies, magazines' special numbers, weeklies, because—we hardly have to insist on this point—the novel is the vulgar genre of the time, driven by the imaginary of others, in which the triumphant continental man came to be codified, forgetting that his greatest virtues lie in his *poetry* and his *essay*, the *old, real genres* (RAMA 2008, p. 18 – *my emphasis*, self-translation).

In justifying that his work is driven mainly by external demands, Rama touches on a point concerning Latin America's frail development of intellectual activity. In addition to the lack of public and minimally committed cultural development institutions, which began to take root in the 19th century, the Latin American intellectual has to contend with extensive work hours in non-related jobs.

In Europe, in countries such as France and England, since the late eighteenth century the novel has developed with institutional support—including public education policies that increased readership—and was also able to count on the



emergence of a sprawling publishing market. Its development was encouraged by the press, which in the second half of the nineteenth century had been consolidated by the book industry. In Latin America, however, this only happened after the 1920s. Thus, we realize that

... some of the novel's functions in Europe—as a representation (and domestication) of the new urban space—were carried out in the Latin American continent by forms that enjoyed less prestige in the old continent, such as the *chronicle*, generally linked to the journalistic milieu (RAMOS 2008, p. 99 – *author's emphasis*, self-translation).

However, since the Latin American novel reached its apex between the 1960s and 1970s, it is understandable why Rama devoted himself to studying it: in addition to responding to requests from magazines and newspapers, he had to earn money. Although we are discussing the prologue of a collection of essays about the novel, Rama's internal articulation in *La novela...* reveals issues external to his text. The organization of the essays by their own author also says something of himself.

Uncoincidentally, poetry and essay are defined as the “old real genres” of America. According to Rama, this reveals a virtue of the American past that still has a bearing on the present. These two genres, in fact, are associated with reflection and creation. The two traditions, according to the author, would have been weakened by the literary market's demands.

Without necessarily refuting the novel, Rama extols the forgotten virtues of poetry and essay, admitting: “I think it pleases me more to linger on a book than on an author” (RAMA 2008, p. 18). As in a confession, Rama speaks of the pleasure of critical activity. After all, in its origins, both poetry and essay are genres that produce pleasure and demand reflection, i.e., explanation. Rama, in following this path, points, in the first person, to the reason for this explanatory act:

To go into a text to revise it and make it mine, to write from it more pages than those that compose the original text, to unfold a work ... adds to that fragment and transposes it into *another* intellectual discourse. Because criticism ... is always an autonomous creation (RAMA 2008, p. 18 – *author emphasis*, self-translation).

Criticism in this sense is not merely explanatory. On the contrary, as an intellectual discourse, it appears as an autonomous creation building upon what already exists. In this passage, Rama reveals the active role played by the critic in the construction of literature, something close to Perrone-Moisés' "critic-writer" (PERRONE-MOISÉS 2009). For Perrone-Moisés, this critic-writer, besides performing a dynamic valuation of the past, deals with poetics (as creation) by means of canonical forms that dialogue with tradition, novelty, influence and intertextuality.

The critic-writer resembles the intellectual writer. The difference between them is that, for Perrone-Moisés, the critic acts within the literary space while, for Gilman, the intellectual acts within the public space (PERRONE-MOISÉS 2009; GILMAN 2012).<sup>3</sup> Their respective roles are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary. In Rama, for example, both roles are present in Latin Americanism as a creative tool in the opposition to pre-established cultural models which claimed to be universal, but excluded Latin America. In this dialogue with literary works, he approaches the past and the present, in a literary space gaining meaning in the public context, as he is committed, precisely, to building Latin American culture. In this way, it is necessary to emphasize that in the course of his readings, Rama gave meaning to, selected and pointed out values pertinent to the development of what began resemble a literature, an invention stemming from the "pleasure of reading" (RAMA 2008, p. 19).

For Rama, literature is a personal taste defined by *sorcery*, *delusion* and *madness*, inaccurate and even exaggerated words that reveal a possible connection between critical activity and the attribution of values, both consequences of the passion for reading. Passion and value aggregate and exclude the inner makings of literature, since, according to Rama:

1 - From now on, I refer to this work by means of the following denomination: *La novela...* It is worth pointing out that I did not use the first edition, from 1982 (published by Colcultura and organized by Juan Gustavo Cobo Borda).

2 - Cuban intellectual who worked as a journalist and lived part of his life in exile, mostly in New York. He was also politically active and left behind a body of work that is fundamental for thinking about the unity and modern concept of Latin America.

*The depth of a text is what we decide is profound. And not even that: it is impulse and enjoyment ... I know that I adhere to this prolonged knowledge, which ceaselessly searches and always finds something new to kindle the desire (RAMA 2008, p. 19 – my emphasis, self-translation).*

Subjectivity, one of the defining elements of individuality, also determines literary value, a movement that makes Rama's work endless. Passion as portrayed here would be synonymous with the search for novelty because, through this passion, Rama constantly revises the past to construct values, move the present, and provide a basis to what this present calls "new." Thus, little by little, the "new" gains form in the future. Explaining and penetrating the text's depths by means of impulse and enjoyment, so as to create something more consistent, in a way enhancing tradition, are the tasks that Rama assigned to himself.

Criticism, then, is to write further on the basis of pre-existing work, mainly to produce a discourse that pretends to be another. Hence the question of how the critic, more than adding elements to literature, creates an autonomous genre.

Thus, Rama wrote extensive, but not conclusive, essays on authors such as Júlio Cortázar, José María Arguedas, Gabriel García Márquez, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Salvador Garmendia. Reading these authors, he accumulated enough material to write his "libros-ferrocarril," based on the compilation of previously published articles, revised and rewritten. He attributed this idea to his mother, who read only the Bible, a book where one could find the sum of *universal knowledge* necessary for explaining life (RAMA 2008).

As well as the five hundred years of Latin American culture, recompiled in the Ayacucho Library, Rama knows the culture of his present. All the abovementioned authors were consecrated by the Latin American boom, to which he opposed, declaring that this art would lose value if treated like merchandise. It should be noted that, for him, literature, besides aesthetic delight, is an instrument of political action and criticism.

... If I have never been able to bear the widespread vanity of those who are mere apprentices, it is because I have never been interested in the authors, their little stories and their ephemeral glories that obscure their deep selves. But the beauty, the pleasure of works of art [that appear] as if they had no author, as if they were written by History or Society or God—by all unknown [words with] capital letters—and were left here for our splendid rejoicing, written in eternity (RAMA 2008, p. 20, self-translation).

*History, Society, God and all the unknown capital words:* elements that write—and circumscribe—a “self” deep in eternity. These words seem to create asymmetrical and antithetical concepts, such as: author versus History, ephemeral glories versus Society, vanity versus Truth. However, they are the basis of Rama’s critique of culture.

Such words, equivalent to conceptual abstractions, give form and force to history, and history for Rama is fundamental. Thus art reaches its fullness out of mundane places such as fame, work, and ambition. In opposition to this, it should transform human experience through socio-cultural development, changing and improving the mundane society in which it was created.

In *La novela en América Latina*, Rama drafted a series of panoramas, defined as “visualizations of a set, in which the author and his works are mere support beams for the will of tendential forces, which draw the ‘figure’ of an epoch” (RAMA 2008, p. 19–20). Drawing epochal figures, Rama’s work is a balancing act between personal desire and external demands. He justifies, therefore, that his essays on literary works differ from his panoramas, made in alternation with the critical activity.

In the prologue, Rama outlines a sort of panorama of his work, setting up an epochal figure in which he inserts his own trajectory. We could say that Rama is applying his mode of literary analysis to portray an image of himself. The idea of the essay, as presented by Lukács (2015), introduces a way for this reflection on an “image,” present in texts such as the prologue of *La novela...*, to be realized. This becomes

especially true in light of the fact that the book brings together different panoramas, linking them into a new unit. This occurs in the construction of this narrative where panoramas, work and life, independent of each other, are articulated to produce something new, in order to impress vigor and movement on Rama's intellectual journey.

The prologue, moreover, reveals the major characteristics of Rama's work, a continuous *work in progress*. We find something inconclusive by nature, for his work produces "questions [which] are directed to life, dispensing the mediation of literature and art" (LUKÁCS 2015, p. 34). The essay, like other writings accumulated by Rama, precedes any systematization and presents itself as two-way street in a continuous state of reformulation. According to Lukács, "both the one who judges and the one who is judged ... circumscribe a whole world in order to bring to eternity, precisely in its singularity, something that once existed." For this reason the essay "is a tribunal, but its essence, what determines its value, is not, as in the [judicial] system, the sentence, but the trial" (LUKÁCS 2015, p. 52). Rama's work is, in essence, unfinished, open, that is: a panorama that fecundates horizons while delimiting times.

## Culture as essay or fusion of new forms

The *principles* of incompleteness and provisionality allow Rama to interpret American culture also as an essay. In each new form something is added, becoming more deep and opening up the indecipherable horizons of a continent that, by its own history, is inconclusive as well singular and closed. Perhaps, Rama systematized the continent's contrasts in order to face the severity that life imposed on him. Or, because

This has to do with a tendency which—more than to myself—I attribute to the cultural environment where I graduated. Parodying Graham Greene, I could say that "Uruguay made me:" the critical spirit which developed there during a certain historical period, in which I had to live, was so dominant, that I

named a book dedicated to Uruguayan letters from 1939 to 1968 as *La Generación Crítica* (RAMA 2008, p. 21, self-translation).

This quote could not more accurately reflect a subject related to Rama and to my thesis. It is about *formation* and *being tied* to the so-called “critical spirit” of Uruguay which, in addition to modeling his identity, serves as a paradigm for interpreting American culture and society. His connection to the homeland is so strong that his contemporaries were

possessed by critical spirit ... written by the time, by the urgency with which society had become entangled in its self-examination, after a long and joyful and trusting period, until leaving no space for any other consideration (RAMA 2008, p. 21, self-translation).

Possessed by the critical spirit and written by the time: good definitions for someone who claimed that in America one writes about the role of time, perishable time, the urgency of the reader, the environment and the time we live. Thus, as a member of this “critical generation,” the bonds he established with this happy and confident society were fundamental.

Still in his youth, concerned with the course of society, scrutinizing its political problems, he concludes that “it is worthless to aspire to be outside, to dream of a vision, like the one men from [the year] 2000 will dream of, at their own risk. We will be fatally alienated from it, as has happened many times before” (RAMA 2008, p. 21, self-translation). Therefore, there is “no other way of reading literature than from our lives’ historical point of view, which, apart from any partisan or doctrinal restraint,” he designates as the point of view of a “culture that builds a people in the circumstances this people happened to find itself in” (RAMA 2008, p. 21, self-translation). This critical spirit develops further throughout the years, and the idea that “Uruguay made me” is translated into the following statement:

... now I can only say that I was born in a popular neighborhood of Spanish immigrant priests. In that place and in the nearby public school I was educated, in an open and alluvial society that had codified democracy, hopes and happiness (RAMA 2008, p. 21, self-translation).

Borrowing from an expression by José Luis Romero<sup>4</sup> in reference to Argentina, Rama speaks of an open and alluvial society, mentioning the immigration flow that changed the socio-cultural configuration of the Platine region between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. Words like hope and happiness, and the achievement of democracy, attribute value to this society or, more precisely, to the epochal figure of Uruguay. Such is the importance of this moment that Rama states that

as with historical time, the country in which one is born, the family to which one belongs, the society in which one grows, it is about previous coordinates that, even when denied, do not fail to explain the fundamental components of a life and an intellectual task (RAMA 2008, p. 21–22, self-translation).

4 - About the expression "aluvional" (alluvial) see: Altamirano (2005).

We can point to some traits that Rama inherits from this society. Influenced by his brother Carlos Rama, he speaks of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) as a milestone that educates him politically and intellectually, consolidating his preference for democracy. However, at this time of formation, the pleasure of reading is more significant than school education. In a 1978 interview with *El Universal in Caracas*, Rama said that

Since my childhood reading has been for me a kind of private happiness for which there were only a few substitutes. When I was twelve I used to go to the National Library to read, and the curious thing was that the readings were like work journeys. For hours I read what then—in my teenage years—were my preferred authors, from the Spanish literature ... In my youth, my readings were the great English and French literatures and my great passion, since then, became Spanish-American literature (RAMA *Apud* BLIXEN; BARROS-LÉMEZ 1986, p. 11).

From Uruguayan culture, childhood and trips to the National Library, came his contact with the “great” Western literature in Spanish, French and English. However, it is in his youth that Rama discovers his “passion” for Spanish-American literature, a passion that makes him, above all, a critic concerned with creation. During these years, in addition to being influenced by his brother, Rama develops a taste for reading, illustrative of the idea that literature has a social function traversed by the personal vision of those who conceptualize it. For the pleasure of reading, Rama embarks on criticism as a professional activity, conferring values to it that served to demarcate it within the epoch’s social experience.

One could speculate that Rama’s criticism was based on his popular origin, public education and, above all, the alluvial society around him, codified in democracy. With these components of his life and intellectual task, while theorizing and thinking about Latin American culture, he was producing another West, rich in possibilities, in the image of his Latin Americanism.

Rama presents a narrative of the past, adapted to the needs of the present, when thinking about who deserves citizenship and political participation. He mobilizes an hegemony of and subordination towards Latin America, establishing this other West which, although poorer and less developed, is also modern, due to incorporating different values that help it articulate with the non-Western America (indigenous, black), re-reading the past and building the future.

## The other West of the American Utopia

Going further into the discussion of the previous section, Rama suggests the possibility of another West, seeing America as a territory of utopia directed towards the future. We see an America that, before even having inherited a past, is nostalgically guided by the future. From this point of view, one thus needs to find out what America had inherited before inheriting the West.



Pedro Henríquez Ureña (1884–1946) is probably the one author who shaped the bases of the concept of a Latin American utopia. For him, this utopia ensures a belonging within the Latin American community and culture. In fact, as an architect of the modern concept of *Hispanic-American culture*, Henríquez Ureña wrote history based on the commonalities between Latin American cultures (DIÁZ-QUINONES 2010). This American utopia, then, would be a path towards unity. In his last two works, *Las corrientes literarias en la América Hispánica* (the original was published in English in 1945, then translated into Spanish in the same year) and *Historia de la cultura en la América Hispánica* (published posthumously in 1947), Latin American cultural unity is the horizon to be reached.

In order to discuss this question, I must refer to the development of Rama's argument in the prologue to *La novela en América Latina*, where he mentions his partnership with Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot (1928–2005)<sup>5</sup> to gather Henríquez Ureña's dispersed essays. Besides expressing admiration for Ureña, they mention being driven not only by admiration for the master, but also

5 - Colombian philosopher and essayist, trained at universities in Germany, where he was a student of Heidegger.

... the pleasure of following him in his reading; noting his discovery of the similarities between Balbuena's *El Bernardo* and Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*; his analysis of the first Borges, still so far from fame; the evolution of his reading of the fathers and magical masters of his education, Rodó and Darío; the socialist and nationalistic impact that Pettorutti's paintings had over him. This dual reading favored a better understanding of Latin American culture, because it recovered, at the same time, the literary production and the structures of meaning born of a period (RAMA 2008, p. 23–24).

There is an intention to recover this literary production and its structures in order to analyze Henríquez Ureña's idea of Latin America, which, over the years, was consolidated by people who, like Rama, were committed to critical work on the continent. That is why the texts for *La utopía de América*, from the Ayacucho Library, prioritize the writings on Latin American culture.

In 1925, Henríquez Ureña publishes “La utopia de América”—from which the book’s title comes from—in the *Estudiantina* journal, La Plata. He outlines the characteristics of a past that is essential in the building of American civilization. The critique of the past gives access to the chains that move the continent’s new life, its character. Referring to the case of Mexico, Ureña discusses the “continuous struggle and occasional equilibrium between timeless traditions and new impulses,” saying that

[...] in spite of how much they tend to descivilize it, in spite of the astonishing commotions that shake and stir to the cements, in long stretches of its history, it possesses in its past and in its present something with which it can create or – perhaps more exactly – continue and to extend a life and a culture that is peculiar, unique and yours. (HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA 1989, p. 4, self-translation).

In Mexico, the important heritage of indigenous tradition precedes the arrival of the Spanish in America, and persisted even under the destructive forces of conquest. From this basis, a truly unique culture emerged in the country. From the meeting of two cultures, another one is born in which the autochthonous element, the mediator of the new culture, “is a reality, yet the autochthonous does not only correspond to the indigenous race ... but also to the peculiar character that everything Spanish has assumed in Mexico since the beginning of the colonial era” (HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA 1989, p. 4).

Henríquez Ureña, in this sense, differs from Rodó, both due to classicism and the idea of an American culture (since the American culture would be the fruit of a fusion between the pre-Colombian Aboriginal people and the Spanish people). While one distrusts this cultural fusion, the other exalts it. The colonial past provides a continuity, an order, which finds in Indigenous people a bridge between past and present. The native, as well as being an Indian integrated into Hispanic culture, is the guardian of Spanish things in America. According to Henríquez Ureña, the Mexican characteristic was

to be found, to a greater or lesser extent, throughout “our America,” if anything because four hundred years of Hispanic life had already imprinted it all over the continent.

The unity of its history, the unity of purpose in political life and intellectual life, makes our America an entity, one *magna patria*, a grouping of people destined to be increasingly united. If we had preserved that childish audacity with which our ancestors used to call Athens any city of America, I would not hesitate to compare ourselves with the politically disaggregated but spiritually united people of classical Greece and Renaissance Italy. But if I dare to compare ourselves with them, it is to learn, from their example, that disunity is disaster (HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA 1989, p. 5).

America, for Henríquez Ureña, is no more than a *great homeland* (a *magna patria*) of spiritually united peoples. As an entity, the continent is united by its common past, both Spanish and Indigenous. Thus, the continent must affirm its faith in its destiny as the future of civilization: the American utopia responsible for articulating the future to the nostalgia of a superior unity—previously imagined by Bolívar and Martí. From this intention, comes the desire to establish a canon beyond national traditions, accompanied by three other general premises.

These premises, according to Díaz-Quiñones, are: 1) *the elaboration of the national tradition*, marked by the strengthening of the National State (the Dominican Republic); 2) *the exile*—provoked by the United States’ occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916–1924) and by Trujillo’s dictatorship—that puts Don Pedro in touch with artistic, intellectual and political movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, allowing different traditions to be assimilated; 3) the link between *culture and order* that goes through Ureña’s work (DÍAZ-QUIÑONES 2010).

The culture and order pair appears in “La utopía de América” as civilization *versus* barbarism. In the establishment of order against anarchy, with every crisis of civilization in America, Henríquez Ureña exalts the spirit that fights, alone, against

the internal military force and the external economic power. That is why he reminds us of Bolívar who, in a moment of disappointment, said that if it was possible to return to chaos, the peoples of Latin America would go there.

Henríquez Ureña justifies his fear of fragmentation from a thesis according to which Central Africa, in ancient times, moved from organized social life and creative civilization to dissolution, becoming an easy prey to “foreign envy.” Here we find the limits of this Hispano-American culture: for Henríquez Ureña, Afro-American cultures were synonymous with barbarism. Although in America this possible dissolution was in the horizon—as can be seen in *Facundo’s* (by Sarmiento) struggle between light and chaos, civilization and barbarism—the strength of the sword is defeated by the will of the spirit. Besides Sarmiento, men of letters such as Alberdi, Hostos and Rodó were the true carriers of the people’s interests in Latin American development, even more than the liberators. In the case of the triumph of the spirit over barbarism, it would not be worth fearing an outside power, since all power is ephemeral.

6 - One version of this future land is in Hegel (HEGEL 1995).

The development of this American utopia does not lie in strength, but in the spiritual field that, from the earliest times, strived for the common good in order to achieve social justice and genuine freedom. Thus, Henríquez Ureña discusses the “classical idea” of utopia, stating that

utopia is not a vain game of puerile imaginations: it is one of the magnificent spiritual creations of the Mediterranean, our great ancestral sea. The Greek people gave to the Western world the restlessness of constant improvement. ... Look to the past and create history; look to the future and create utopias (HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA 1989, p. 6–7, self-translation).

The American utopia places America as the land of the future<sup>6</sup> Establishing an opposition between the East and the West, Henríquez Ureña believes that this utopia would not accomplished by laws or human will, but by human

effort. In this sense, the revival of the classical utopia by the Renaissance would have been a way of uniting politically disaggregated peoples.

The choice of Greece as a cultural model is not merely a meta-historical recourse. According to Díaz-Quiñones, it is an ideal of imaginative criticism that allows Henríquez Ureña to somehow construct a historical poetic, applying it to the reading of the Hispano-American tradition (DÍAZ-QUIÑONES 2010). This is how he seeks variety within unity, the national in local differences, and also an auratic character of art that preserves the old while still maintaining a belief in renewal.

Henríquez Ureña imagines the creation of the universal man, who harmoniously combines things of his homeland with foreign elements. This notion of universality, articulated by difference rather than exclusion, seeks to avoid the uniformity idealized by the “sterile imperialisms,” establishing a harmony inclusive of the voices of different peoples.

Henríquez Ureña expected America and all its regions to preserve and improve their activities, especially the artistic ones. The continent would have a “double treasure,” fruit of the Indigenous and Spanish traditions, fused into new chains. Here, we come back to the autochthonous, which synthesizes these two tendencies, preserving them in balance and harmony, and allowing America to continue producing those “magisterial men,” symbols of our “modern life.”

This, as already mentioned above, was elaborated more accurately in *Historia de la cultura en la América Hispánica*, in which Henríquez Ureña, besides praising these magisterial men, chooses the designation “Hispánica” instead of “Latina,” commonly used at the time (HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA 1961). Believing to unite fragments of these differences under a common cultural history, he used the concept of Hispania, used by the Roman Empire to refer to what is now understood as Ibero-America (Spain and Portugal). Then, to achieve the American utopia, Henríquez Ureña sets up an archive that, besides being shown systematized in his posthumous works,

gives form to an editorial project. Weiberg took notice of Henríquez Ureña's participation in the creation of an American Library for the Fondo de Cultura Económica (WEINBERG 2014). Different authors integrated this collection while sharing the same historical and cultural scope, supported by a tradition that gives meaning to the whole. Henríquez Ureña used the history of culture to build this project and give order to the collection.

In that case, ethics and cultural policy promoted Hispanic-American values and highlighted American utopia. A reading of the continental cultural tradition was realized, promoting the expansion of the national horizons integrating these traditions. In this way, Henríquez Ureña created an *American cultural homeland*.

Throughout the twentieth century, this cultural homeland was cultivated and expanded, facing problems in the sixties and seventies, due to several *coups d'état* and the suspension of democracies in Latin America. Barbarism, once again, threatened the American Utopia and its spirit. Whenceforth, this idea of utopia is understood as the valorization of democracies and freedom.

Based on the discussion above, we now understand how Rama's critique of culture was in consonance with Henríquez Ureña's American utopia:

... while criticism does not constitute the works themselves, it does construct literature, understood as an organic *corpus* in which a culture, a nation, the people of a continent is expressed, since America itself remains an avant-garde intellectual project that awaits its concrete realization (RAMA 2008, p. 24, self-translation).

To build this organic *corpus*, Rama got inspiration from Antonio Candido. *La Novela...* was also dedicated to Candido. Inspired by the "literary system," Rama transposed the concept into Latin America. For him, as for Candido, Latin American literature would be an "organic aspect of civilization" (CANDIDO 2013, p. 25), forming the circuit between author, reader and market.<sup>7</sup>

7 - For a better analysis on the question of literary system: GAIO 2017; WAIZBORT 2007.

Garramuño and Amante, remarking Candido's influence on Latin American literary criticism, show that his ideas about the continent influenced several critics (GARRAMUÑO; AMANTE 2001). Formation, literature as a metropolitan derivation, and other concepts forged by Candido were appropriated, and even reformulated, by various critics—as in Rama's case. The way the Brazilian critic reflected on Brazilian literature has been incorporated into Latin American literary criticism at large.

American utopia and the literary system of Candido, concepts appropriated by Rama, form a *corpus* open to the future. In this way, the Uruguayan critic expresses one of the premises of the artistic avant-garde concerning America, understood as the place that expects concrete realization. However, this project becomes weaker over the years. In the 1920s, as we saw earlier, Latin America was conceptually understood as a "*magna pátria*," spiritualized and anti-imperialist. Still in the 1920s, in the context of artistic and literary vanguards, Latin Americanism was mobilized on a continental scale, something that had already been done in the nineteenth century, but only in an incipient way.

In these years, according to Funes, Latin America was thought of according to national terms (FUNES 2006). As Europe ceases to be the reference for Latin America and the United States gain power, becoming a threat to the continent's interests, Latin Americanism becomes politicized. The "critical spirit" developed during this period, from the 1940s and 1950s, is built on the larger agenda of anti-imperialism, detaching itself from national issues.

Aside from rescuing the sources of Latin American criticism—from Sanín Cano (1861-1956), Sílvio Romero (1858-1914), Alfonso Reyes (1899-1959) to Pedro Henríquez Ureña—Rama, following Candido, understood that the construction of literature would serve to reconnect the different cultural sources. According to Aguilar, in referring to criticism as an "avant-garde intellectual project," Rama establishes an ambiguous relationship with this project, since

... if when using the term “avant-garde” he seems to insert this attempt into the orbit of the broad modernist cycle, he adds a dissonant complementary note, since ... he used the term not to continue the cosmopolitan trend, but to think of temporalities heterogeneous in relation to one another, and to recover regional trends (AGUILAR 2001, p. 72, self-translation).

These terms, in line with Rama’s thought, become even when Latin American critics, forgetting their masters, give way to tendencies such as New Criticism, French structuralism, or even claim independence from universal culture, to which Rama inevitably belongs, in the name of Marxist thought. Against this deliberate forgetfulness, he writes:

I confess that this was one of the reasons I founded the Ayacucho Library: the disconcerting spectacle of an intellectual continent claiming its identity and originality, not to mention the splendid works that had accumulated in the same American land, patiently rearranged by the critical thinking of our predecessors (RAMA 2008, p. 24, self-translation).

This rearticulation of Latin American critical thinking is a way of responding to heterogeneous temporalities and regional tendencies, which Aguilar sees as a dissonance in the cosmopolitan exaltation opened by the modernist cycle in the nineteenth century (AGUILAR 2001). In other words, I would say that Rama works with Borges’ idea that an author creates his pioneers. For this reason, this Latin Americanism, forged in the Ayacucho Library, rearticulates from the inside, that is, from the continent, the history and the production of critical thinking.

## Conclusion

Rama modifies the conceptions of both past and future. Claiming identity and originality, he keeps working with the value of “American lands.” According to this perspective, the Spanish-American modernism of the late nineteenth and early



twentieth centuries, due to its valuing of European culture, would be less of a pioneer of the idea of Latin America than the avant-garde Latin Americanism developed in the 1920s.

This point will later become explicit in the claims that the Latin American narrative of the sixties and seventies would be a processes of “perfect spontaneous generation” and “mimetically dependent on European vanguards.” These statements would disregard an internal process regarding the renewing character of the literature that, from the avant-garde period, was connected to an international process of autonomization, when some of its artistic mechanisms were conceived. According to Rama, when the narrative captivates a significant number of readers, it is necessary to explain to them that the process of “poetic evolution of the continent” is not just the “conception of novelty and/or foreignism.” The process as a whole must be qualified. This is how, when we arrive “in the age of massification and its tools of communication, the critical task is more difficult and at the same time the most necessary” (RAMA 2008, p. 25). At the time marked by mass communication’s tools, critics should be committed to presenting the complexity of these phenomena. After all, according to Rama,

There is no society that suddenly enters into economic development (which never announces its arrival), where the values set by the previous elites are not flooded and the improvised *best sellers* are not a big success, prized by the instruments of diffusion. And it is in these societies and in these revolting times that the restructuring of literatures is most urgent, [a restructuring] which, flowing from the transformations that have taken place, seeks to establish values, orders, hierarchies, such as those that shine in the distant past and are but the consequence of a wide and patient critical attention (RAMA 2008, p. 25).

Rama, as a critic-writer and intellectual-writer, scrutinizes these valuation processes, an outcome primarily of *desarrollos económicos*. What is at issue here is less the definition of processes than the way he interprets them. Reflecting on social experience, Rama understands that both the denial of previous

values and the restructuring of society and, consequently, of literature, happen through instruments of cultural diffusion. This mediation, by the way, makes a clean slate of a previous effort to establish parameters of analysis.

*Value, order and hierarchy*, in this context, make no sense because the present seems, more and more, to be infinite. The remote past is lost in the absence of a wide and patient attention. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain balance or, according to Rama, to understand Martí's lesson: "we are children of someone and parents of someone, we belong to the process always transformative, we come from and we go to, even if we think about the future, a selective lesson from the past makes us richer [...]" (RAMA 2008, p. 24, self-translation).

Belief in something generated from the outside or spontaneously is like denying the accumulation of the American experience, which would anticipate unannounced paths of development that deny history itself. This is the "hard task:" to think about the future based on selected lessons from the past. Only thus, in contemporary Latin America, could the stagnation of critical spirit and Latin Americanism be prevented. Rama states that there are two criticisms: one academic, based on a sedimented perspective, and another that feeds from the urgency of social transformation. It must be understood that what Rama named as an *organic corpus* is also a way of narrating history.

With this *corpus* it is possible to revive the past, to think about the future and to crossover the present. These, in fact, are the functions of the American utopia. Although it awaits its realization, in the face of the loss of value, order and hierarchy, it is this American utopia that rearticulates mechanisms, guaranteeing possibilities to face a world that deviates the critical spirit from its course. The critic's hardest task, then, is to provide meaning to this utopia by making something of that critical spirit endure and prevail.

In conclusion, the American Utopia gave Rama a real possibility—on a critical level—to formulate answers to the

preestablished models of developmentalist modernism which, based on Europe and the United States, placed Latin America on a lower level. With no intention of exhausting this subject, I suppose it is clear now how Rama interprets culture, especially in Latin America. The bonds with the West, the valuation of the past and the projection of the future are mechanisms that allow him to construct a unified conceptual vocabulary that re-articulates America from the inside, avoiding exclusion or interpretative imbalance.

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## AGRADECIMENTOS E INFORMAÇÕES

**Pedro Demenech** 

p\_demenech@yahoo.com.br

Graduate scholarship holder, FAPERJ Nota 10

Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro - Brazil

Translate to English: Augusto Bruno de Carvalho Dias Leite (UFES) and Lorena Lopes da Costa (UFOPA). [including quotations from Ángel Rama]

RECEIVED IN: MAY/09/2017 | APPROVED IN: JUNE/15/2018



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#### 4.3. Capítulo de livro

##### *Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome (orgs.). Título do capítulo. *In*: SOBRENOME2, Nome2 (orgs.). **Título da obra em negrito**: subtítulo sem negrito. Cidade: Editora, Ano.

SOBRENOME, Nome (orgs.). Título do capítulo. *In*: SOBRENOME, Nome. **Título da obra em negrito**: subtítulo sem negrito. Cidade: Editora, Ano.

##### *Exemplos:*

LÖWY, Michael. Carga explosiva: o surrealismo como movimento romântico revolucionário. *In*: GUINSBURG, J; LEIRNER, Sheila (orgs.). **O surrealismo**. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2008.

RICOEUR, Paul. Fase Documental: a Memória Arquivada. *In*: RICOEUR, Paul. **A memória, a história, o esquecimento**. Tradução de Alain François. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2007. p. 155–192.

#### 4.4. Coletânea

##### *Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome (orgs.). **Título da obra em negrito:** subtítulo sem negrito. Cidade: Editora, Ano.

##### *Exemplo:*

CARDOSO, Ciro Flamarion; MALERBA, Jurandir (orgs.).  
**Representações:** contribuições a um debate transdisciplinar.  
Campinas: Papirus, 2000.

#### 4.5. Artigo de periódico

##### *Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do artigo. **Nome do periódico:** subtítulo sem negrito, v. X, n. Y, p. pp-pp, Ano.

##### *Exemplo:*

RIGOLOT, François. The Renaissance Crisis of Exemplarity.  
**Journal of the History of Ideas**, v. 59, n. 4, p. 557-563,  
1998.

#### 4.6. Artigo de periódico on-line

##### *Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do artigo. **Nome do periódico:** subtítulo sem negrito, v. X, n. Y, p. pp-pp, Ano. Disponível em: URL do site. Acesso em: Dia mês (abreviado) ano.

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do artigo. **Nome do periódico:** subtítulo sem negrito, v. X, n. Y, p. pp-pp, Ano. DOI XXXX. Disponível em: URL do site. Acesso em: Dia mês (abreviado) ano.

*Exemplo:*

ASDAL, Kristin; JORDHEIM, Helge. Texts on the Move: Textuality and Historicity Revisited. **History and Theory**, v. 57, n. 1, p. 56-74, 2018. DOI 10.1111/hith.12046. Disponível em: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/hith.12046>. Acesso em: 9 abr. 2019.

**4.7.** Texto disponível na internet

*Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do artigo. **Nome do Site**, dia, mês (abreviado), Ano. Disponível em: URL do site. Acesso em: Dia mês (abreviado) ano.

*Exemplo:*

BENTIVOGLIO, Julio. "Precisamos falar sobre o currículo de História". **Café História**, 15, maio, 2017. Disponível em: <https://www.cafehistoria.com.br/curriculo-de-historia/>. Acesso em: 18 abr. 2018.

**4.8.** Artigo publicado em anais eletrônico

*Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do trabalho. *In*: NOME DO EVENTO (EM MAIÚSCULO), número do evento, ano, cidade. **Anais** [...]. Cidade: Editora, ano, p. pp-pp.

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do trabalho. *In*: NOME DO EVENTO (EM MAIÚSCULO), número do evento, ano, cidade. **Anais** [...]. Cidade: Editora, ano, p. pp-pp. DOI XXXX. Disponível em: URL do site. Acesso em: Dia mês (abreviado) ano.

*Exemplo:*

ARAÚJO, Rodrigo Cardoso Soares de. O polêmico Corsário, um pasquim da Corte Imperial (1880-1883). *In*: SEMINÁRIO DIMENSÕES DA POLÍTICA NA HISTÓRIA: ESTADO, NAÇÃO,

IMPÉRIO, I, 2007, Juiz de Fora. **Anais** [...]. Juiz de Fora: Clio Edições, 2007, p. 500-501.

#### 4.9. Tese acadêmica

##### *Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome. **Título da tese em negrito**: subtítulo sem negrito. Ano. Tese/Dissertação (Grau em Área do programa) - Nome do Programa, Universidade, Cidade, Ano.

SOBRENOME, Nome. **Título da tese em negrito**: subtítulo sem negrito. Ano. Tese/Dissertação (Grau em Área do programa) - Nome do Programa, Universidade, Cidade, Ano. Disponível em: URL do site. Acesso em: Dia mês (abreviado) ano.

##### *Exemplo:*

RIBEIRO, Tatiana O. **A apódexis herodotiana**: um modo de dizer o passado. 2009. Tese (Doutorado em Letras Clássicas) - Programa de Pós-Graduação em Letras Clássicas, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2010.

#### 4.10. Artigo de Jornal

##### *Estrutura:*

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do artigo. **Nome do Jornal**, dia mês (abreviado) Ano. Caderno p. pp-pp.

SOBRENOME, Nome. Título do artigo. **Nome do Jornal**, dia mês (abreviado) Ano. Caderno p. pp-pp. Disponível em: URL do site. Acesso em: Dia mês (abreviado) ano.

##### *Exemplos:*

GLEISER, Marcelo. Newton, Einstein e Deus. **Folha de S.Paulo**, 13 jun. 2010. Ilustrada, p. A23.

RODRIGUES, Artur. Obra de ficção cria "liminar" e vira alvo de investigação da PF. **Folha.com.br**, São Paulo, 11

set. 2015. Disponível em: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2015/09/1680327-obra-de-ficcao-cria-liminar-e-vira-alvo-de-investigacao-da-pf.shtml>. Acesso em: 11 set. 2015.

**4.11.** Observações sobre a apresentação das referências:

**4.11.1.** O *In*, utilizado na apresentação de capítulos de livros, é em itálico;

**4.11.2.** Sempre que utilizar uma referência consultada online, deve-se inserir a URL na parte 'Disponível em:' e 'Acesso em:', e caso o documento possua DOI, esta informação deve ser inserida;

**4.11.3.** URL de artigos de jornais e textos da internet devem ser encurtadas, recomenda-se o encurtador <https://bitly.com>;

**4.11.4.** A ABNT NBR 6023:2018 não utiliza mais "\_\_\_\_\_" e omite o nome de um autor, o nome deve ser repetido.

**4.11.5.** Não deve ser utilizado aspas (simples ou duplas) em títulos de livros, capítulos ou artigos a menos que o título tenha, efetivamente, este símbolo.

**4.11.6.** Caso o tipo de documento que você queria citar não esteja listado acima, pedimos que consulte a ABNT NBR 6023:2018, caso a dúvida persistir, entre em contato com a secretaria da revista [historiadahistoriografia@hotmail.com](mailto:historiadahistoriografia@hotmail.com).